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Abstract 
 
Just over ten years ago on night of the 28th of August 2006, angry mobs took to the 
streets of Masiphumelele township outside Fish Hoek, near Cape Town, and 
attacked and looted foreign national spaza shops in the neighbourhood. The attacks 
shocked the city, and prompted the provincial government to initiate an intervention 
to address the underlying causes of the violence. The outcome comprised an 
agreement between foreign national and South African spaza shopkeepers that 
permitted foreign nationals to return on condition that they did not open any new 
shops in the township. These mediation efforts comprised the beginning of many 
governance interventions in Cape Town and across the country that were aimed at 
curtailing foreign national spaza shops in South Africa.  
 
This thesis examines formal and informal attempts to govern foreign national spaza 
shops in South Africa, and seeks to understand what they reveal about the nature of 
politics in South Africa, as a postcolonial and developing country. In doing so it 
locates itself in the theoretical framework of law and society, as it examines legal 
phenomena from a social science perspective. Its findings are based on case study 
methodology involving qualitative interviews with key participants and stakeholders, 
as well as document collection, participant observation, and media reports. 
 
The research finds that many governance actors’ anxieties towards foreign national 
spaza shops relate less to shopkeepers’ particular activities and more to South 
African traders’ abilities to incite local socio-economic discontent against these 
shops, and thereby threaten political establishments. However, governance 
interventions rarely unfolded as intended due to resistance by competing interest 
groups who sought to advance their private economic concerns rather than public 
and political rights. This invokes features of Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault and 
Giorgio Agamben’s theories of the ‘social’ or ‘biopolitics’, which argue that the entry 
of economic concerns into the political sphere is characteristic of the modern age.  
 
The thesis therefore reflects on Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s theories in 
assessing what governance efforts reveal about the nature of South Africa’s political 
sphere. It finds that the social realm in South Africa differs from their accounts in two 
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significant respects. First, the social sphere is conflicted between various economic 
goals – with parties seeking to foster basic life and sustenance, as well as to 
advance the emancipation of citizens from the colonial legacies of apartheid through 
economic mobility and opportunity. This makes finding a path to advance overall 
economic advancement in the country more difficult and contentious. 
 
Second, the social sphere in South Africa is not a centralised bureaucratic monolith. 
It is a splintered and multifaceted system of power where no single political entity 
enjoys full authority. This results in a complex configuration and sharing of power 
between formal state institutions and informal grassroots organisations – what the 
thesis terms the ‘fractured social’. These dynamics, which commonly feature in 
postcolonial and developing countries, shape the nature of the country’s 
constitutional democracy, the application of laws, as well as the political sphere’s 
ability to fully address the economic legacies of colonialism and apartheid.  
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1. Introduction  
 
… the intention of the Nuremberg Laws was ‘to establish a level on which a 
bearable relationship between the German and the Jewish people [became] 
possible1 
 
1.1 The Cape Times morning edition 
I was in the midst of my early morning pocrastination session of sipping coffee and 
scanning my email inbox, when my supervisor approached my office cubicle and 
placed the morning edition of the Cape Times on my desk.  In an agitated voice she 
muttered ‘Can you believe this? Today, don’t worry about work. You’re going to write 
a response’.  At the time I was an awkward second year candidate attorney based at 
the law firm Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr’s competition department, and had never 
engaged in public discourse or engagement in my life. ‘Me?’ I thought surprised, that 
is until I read the article, which lit my curiosity and hurriedly began writing. 
 
Dated 17 August 2009, and titled ‘Somalis refuse to sign ‘one-sided deal’ for spaza 
owners’,2 the article set out a new venture at aimed addressing antagonisms towards 
Somali spaza shopkeepers in the neighbourhood. ‘Spaza’ shops are small informal 
grocery shops that operate from residential properties in most of South Africa’s 
peripheral black ‘townships’. These shops sell basic food and household items 
ranging from bread, milk, sugar, canned foods, soft drinks, cooking oil, soap and 
cigarettes. Shops can be found trading from empty shipping containers on people’s 
front yards, converted garages, or front rooms of houses (see photographs at the 
end of the chapter).3 Since the mid-1990s foreign nationals seeking refuge from 
persecution and civil war, or simply escaping poverty have increasingly arrived in 
South Africa, and entered into the spaza market,4 with shops becoming a noticeable 
presence in the country’s townships in the early 2000s. In Cape Town, most foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers are Somali nationals, but other nationalities such as 																																																								1	Hannah	Arendt	citing	the	opinion	of	the	Reichsvertretung	of	the	Jews	in	Germany	(a	national	association	of	all	
Jewish	communities	and	organisations	in	Germany	founded	in	1933)	regarding	the	Nuremberg	Laws	of	the	1930s	
that	deprived	Jews	of	political	rights	in	Germany,	in	Hannah	Arendt	Eichmann	in	Jerusalem	(1963)	Penguin	Books,	
New	York	at	127.	
2	Quinton	Mtyala,	Cape	Times,	Monday	17	August	2009.	
3	Personal	observations	in	field	sites	and	informal	discussions	with	Somali	traders.			
4	Interview,	Khayelitsha	police	officer,	Khayelitsha,	25	October	2012.	Interview,	Somali	Retailers	Association	
representative,	Bellville,	10	January	2011.	
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Ethiopians, Bangladeshis, Burundians, Chinese and Pakistanis are also present in 
the market. Foreign national spaza shopkeepers are drawn to the spaza market for a 
number of reasons, including the many untapped business opportunities, the 
relatively low start-up costs of spaza shops, and the informal nature of business in 
townships, where permit and paper requirements are low and often not enforced.5 
Most of them work and live in their shop premises, sleeping in a small room behind 
their shops or in shops themselves. This arrangement saves foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers from having to pay extra rent, but is also a necessary precaution 
needed to prevent possible theft or looting of their businesses, which would likely 
occur were they to leave their premises vacant. 
 
I scrolled through newspaper article curious about what had outraged my supervisor. 
It did not take me long understand her bafflement. The article described that Somali 
spaza traders in Gugulethu had been pressured into signing a trading agreement 
with competing South African shopkeepers. This startled me, since any agreement 
between business competitors in my line of work raised an immediate red flag. I had 
spent much of my time at the department reading, ordering and paginating dozens of 
thick files of clients’ email correspondence, commercial contracts, and business 
records all in an effort to locate any evidence that could suggest they had engaged in 
unlawful efforts to reduce competition. This work was all the more necessary given 
the rigor with which the country’s Competition Commission pursued its investigations.   
 
The specific terms of the proposed agreement in Gugulethu were especially 
bewildering. In particular the agreement prohibited Somali traders from opening new 
shops in Gugulethu, obliged them to fix their prices to those offered by their South 
African competitors, stipulated that 70 percent of spaza shops in Gugulethu be 
owned by South Africans, and required Somali traders to move their shops 100 
metres away from South African shops. According to competition law in South Africa 
not even a ‘concerted practice’, let alone a written agreement between business 
competitors was permitted if it had the effect of preventing or lessening competition 
in a market.6 The provisions of the Competition Act were event stricter when it came 																																																								
5	Interview,	Somali	Retailers	Association	representative,	Bellville,	10	January	2011.	
6	Section	4(1)	of	the	Competition	Act	89	of	1998	provides:	
‘4.	Restrictive	horizontal	practices	prohibited		
(1)	An	agreement	between,	or	concerted	practice	by,	firms,	or	a	decision	by	an	association	of	firms,	is	prohibited	
if	it	is	between	parties	in	a	horizontal	relationship	and	if-			
(a)	it	has	the	effect	of	substantially	preventing	or	lessening	competition	in	a	market,	unless	a	party	to	the	
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to practices involving market division or price fixing.7 The agreement also appeared 
to breach other laws. For example according to the Refugees Act of 1998, asylum 
seekers and refugees also enjoyed the right to work and operate businesses in the 
country.8 Added to that was the fact that the terms of the agreement discriminated 
against a group of business owners on the basis of their nationality and ethnicity. The 
proposed arrangement therefore seemed bizarre, not only in terms of its clear breach 
of competition law, but also for its implications for constitutional democracy. Who 
would endorse such an outlandish venture? Oddly a very wide range of parties. This 
included the police, a local community organization called the Anti-Eviction 
Campaign, and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).  
 
A few days later a subsequent newspaper article appeared in the Cape Times and 
confirmed that the agreement between South African and Somali traders had been 
signed. I spent the next two days writing an opinion piece that criticised the 
Gugulethu agreement largely from a competition law perspective. However, I dwelt 
on the issue for several years thereafter, puzzled at how such a range of governance 
actors – including those tasked with defending the law and refugee rights - could 
come to view discriminatory and unlawful economic arrangements as acceptable. I 
later discovered that the Gugulethu agreement was not the only informal 
arrangement in existence restricting foreign national spaza traders. Similar informal 
agreements limiting foreign national spaza shop numbers had been entered into in a 
number of other townships in Cape Town including Masiphumelele in 2006, and the 
Strand and Khayelitsha in 2008, as well as in towns and cities further afield such as 
Paarl, Saldanha Bay, Bisho, and Port Elisabeth.9 
 
																																																																																																																																																														
agreement,	concerted	practice,	or	decision	can	prove	that	any	technological,	efficiency	or	other	pro-competitive,	
gain	resulting	from	it	outweighs	that	effect;	or		
(b)	it	involves	any	of	the	following	restrictive	horizontal	practices:		
(i)	directly	or	indirectly	fixing	a	purchase	or	selling	price	or	any	other	trading	condition;	
ii)	dividing	markets	by	allocating	customers,	suppliers,	territories,	or	specific	types	of	goods	or	services;	or		
(iii)	collusive	tendering’.		
7	Ibid,	section	4(1)(b).		
8	Section	27	(f)	of	the	Refugees	Act	130	of	1998	grants	refugees	the	right	to	seek	employment	in	the	country.	The	
Supreme	Court	of	Appeal	has	upheld	asylum	seekers’	right	to	work,	linking	it	to	the	constitutional	right	to	dignity	
(Minister	of	Home	Affairs	and	Others	v	Watchenuka	and	Others,	2004	(1)	All	SA	21	(SCA)	28	November	2003).	
9	Conversations	with	Somali	traders,	as	well	as	media	articles	(see	Mandlenkosi	Mxengi	‘Bhisho	acts	on	
xenophobic	threats’	Fever.Online	26	July	2012,	available	at	http://www.fever-
blue.co.za/articles/articledetails.aspx?id=29153,	date	accessed	25	March	2013.	Pozisa	Majavu’	Somalis	accuse	
councilor	of	assault,	bribery’	Eastern	Cape	Today	July	20,	2012,	http://getectoday.co.za/uncategorized/somalis-
accuse-councillor-of-assault-bribery/,	date	accessed	25	March	2013.	Luyolo	Mkentane	‘Somalis	to	register	with	
Spaza	Body’	The	Herald	25	March	2011	at	1).	
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State institutions and representatives did little to directly query or act against these 
governance outcomes. For example, when contacted by the Cape Times about the 
agreement signed in Gugulethu in 2009, the Competition Commission’s 
spokesperson stated that not all agreements restricting competition violated 
competition laws. The spokesperson added that the Commission could initiate its 
own investigation if there was ‘reason to believe the law is being breached’.10 No 
such investigation subsequently followed.11 Even the UNHCR, which is tasked with 
protecting refugee rights celebrated the Gugulethu agreement as a ‘blue print’ for 
other communities.12 It seemed as though concerns over the rule of law and political 
principles of the anti-apartheid struggle spelled out in the constititution such as 
human dignity, equality and non-racialism took a second footing to the economic 
demands of South African spaza shopkeepers.  
 
Informal agreements restricting foreign national spaza shop operations were not the 
only type of governance interventions prevalent in the country at the time or 
subsequently. Political leaders, state officials, and community structures had 
engaged in many other attempts at regulating these businesses. Other governance 
efforts included fining operations against foreign national spaza shops, informal 
curfews regulating operating hours, new policy documents and proposed legislation 
and calls by political leaders (such as the Premier of the North West province) to 
confiscate spaza shops belonging to foreign nationals.13 All these interventions – 
whether in the form of informal agreements or restrictive new legislative Bills – 
elevated the economic concerns of South African traders over broader political and 
constitutional rights principles. For example, a 2012 ANC policy document suggests 
preventing foreign nationals from operating spaza shops in the country.  It states 
that: 
 
In many townships and rural areas some asylum seekers have been involved 
in informal Trading… This informal trading is mainly in the form of hiring 
Spaza shops and houses from South African [sic]. Non-South Africans should 																																																								
10	Quinton	Mtyala	‘Somalis	refuse	to	sign	“one	sided”	deal	for	spaza	owners’	Cape	Times	Monday	17	August	
2009.	
11	Telephone	inquiry,	Competition	Commission	representative,	18	March	2011.	
12	Quinton	Mtyala	‘Somali	and	Local	strike	deal	on	peace’	Cape	Times	20	August	2009.	13	Boitumelo	Tshehle	‘North	West	Premier	Supra	Mahumapelo	to	bar	foreign	owned	spaza	shops’	Sowetan	18	
March	2016,	available	at	http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/03/18/north-west-premier-supra-
mahumapelo-to-bar-foreign-owned-spaza-shops,	date	accessed	3	March	2017.		
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not be allowed to buy or run Spaza shops or larger businesses without having 
to comply with certain legislated prescripts. By-laws need to be strengthened 
in this regard.14  
 
However, the discussion document does not consider the constitutional implications 
of introducing specific legislative prescripts that apply only to ‘non-South Africans’. It 
also does not reflect on how thousands of non-South Africans should alternatively 
seek out a living in the absence of being able to operate spaza shops. Similarly the 
Minister of Small Business Development, Lindiwe Zulu’s response to widespread 
xenophobic riots in early 2015 revealed a preoccupation with the economic interests 
of South African shopkeepers. In particular she stated that foreign business owners 
who were being targeted by looters could not expect to live peacefully in the country 
unless they shared their trade practices with their South African competitors.15 This 
suggested that despite formal laws granting many foreign national traders asylum 
and refugee status in the country, as well as the constitutional right to freedom and 
security of the person, in practice these protections were not guaranteed, but rather 
hinged on traders not posing an economic threat to South Africans. Other actions 
such as fining operations that discriminated against foreign nationals, and proposals 
to confiscate their spaza shops and transfer them to South Africans also illustrate 
that the economic interests of South African traders frequently took primacy over the 
constitutional and political rights values of dignity, equality, plurality, freedom and the 
rule of law.  
 
Such responses raise the question of why state and other governance bodies did not 
act decisively against legal transgressions and constitutional infringents affecting 
foreign nationals. Instead these measures showed that governance actors ranging 
from police, NGOs, the Competition Commission and the UNHCR frequently chose 
the route of elevating the economic interests of South African spaza traders above 
the rule of law and the country’s constitutional dispensation. South Africa’s 
constitution is not any simple piece of posited legislation.  It encapsulates much of 
the spirit and aspirations of the anti-apartheid struggle. Although it may not go as far 																																																								
14	ANC	policy	discussion	document	titled	‘Peace	and	Stability’	March	2012	at	6,	available	at	
http://www.anc.org.za/docs/discus/2012/peacev.pdf,	date	accessed	3	March	2017.	
15		Khulekani	Magubane	‘Reveal	trade	secrets,	minister	tells	foreigners’	Business	Day	28	January	2015,	available	
at	www.pressreader.com/south-africa/business-day/20150128/281496454689189,	date	accessed	3	March	2017.		
Min.	Lindiwe	Zulu	to	foreigners:	"Share	your	ideas	with	local	business	owners"’	Radio	702	28	January	2015,	
available	at	http://www.702.co.za/articles/1505/zulu-foreign-business-owners-must-share,	date	accessed	3	
March	2017.	
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in terms of political inclusivity and socio-economic rights as the Freedom Charter, 
which served as a uniting document for diverse anti-apartheid political bodies,16 its 
provisions including relating to ‘Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms’ 17  comprise basic preconditions to 
political freedom in the country. 
 
My concern with the ways in which parties overlooked this document was that it 
entailed turning away from a number of core values that characterised the country’s 
struggle for political emancipation and democracy. The governance of foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers symbolises a political era in the country where 
limitations on the state and constitutional freedoms do not carry as much weight as 
previously envisaged. 
 
This fundamental change in contemporary South African politics and society 
revealed through governance events was something that I struggled to grasp. This 
thesis is largely an attempt to understand the dynamics that took place in Gugulethu 
in August 2009, as well as prior and subsequent formal, informal and hybrid efforts to 
govern foreign national spaza shop traders in South Africa. Through its investigation, 
the thesis aims to better understand the nature of politics in a postcolonial and 
developing world context – namely post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
1.2 A governance approach to law and society 
The thesis defines ‘governance’ as the ways in which individuals or bodies exercising 
a degree of authority attempt to steer social or public order. The governance of 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers thus entails diverse actors contesting, 
generating and enforcing laws and social rules that oversee the ability of foreign 
nationals in South Africa to trade. Understanding this process involves exploring how 
law and society interact and influence each other. For example, various parties and 																																																								
16	For	example	the	Freedom	Charter	adopted	on	26	June	1955	states	that	‘All	people	shall	be	entitled	to	take	part	
in	the	administration	of	the	country’	and	‘there	shall	be	equal	status	in	the	bodies	of	state,	in	the	courts	and	in	
the	schools	for	all	national	groups	and	races’	(italics	added).	It	also	advances	socio-economic	rights	such	as	‘The	
mineral	wealth	beneath	the	soil,	the	banks	and	monopoly	industry	shall	be	transferred	to	the	ownership	of	the	
people	as	a	whole’	and	‘Restrictions	of	land	ownership	on	a	racial	basis	shall	be	ended,	and	all	the	land	redivided	
amongst	those	who	work	it,	to	banish	famine	and	land	hunger’.	Available	at	
http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/AD1137/AD1137-Ea6-1-001-jpeg.pdf,	date	
accessed	3	March	2017.	
17	Section	1(a)	of	the	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	South	Africa,	1996.	
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stakeholders respond to diverse societal and political pressures such as poverty and 
mobilisations by South African traders, by entering the governance arena and 
shaping laws and social rules. The thesis thus falls within the theoretical framework 
of law and society, which examines legal phenomena from a social science 
perspective.18 The law and society movement is interdisciplinary and encompasses 
many diverse schools of thought including legal anthropology, sociology of law, 
socio-legal studies, the school of legal pluralism, sociological jurisprudence, and 
critical legal theory to name a few. The framework of law and society is of heightened 
importance in a world where the ‘rules of the game’ often differ markedly from the law 
in books. 
 
A governance perspective is particularly valuable to the law and society movement. It 
enables one to combine empirical studies of law with critique, as governance entails 
political contestation and power play that is revelatory of broader social and political 
conditions. Furthermore, examining governance is vital to understanding law and 
society in a world that is experiencing rapid transformation, and where the continued 
existence of laws and political systems as they stand is not guaranteed. Given that 
societies are continually changing and evolving it is valuable to understand the 
processes involved in the development and application of laws, rules and regulations 
(which governance incorporates), and not only what rules and laws happen to state 
at a given time. 
 
The thesis’ examination of the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers 
relies on a case study methodology, which involves gathering a rich collection of data 
(ranging from interviews, document collection to participant observation) from 
multiple perspectives that cannot be easily ascertained through quantitative surveys 
and statistics. I conducted most of the field research component of the case study 
between September 2010 and October 2012 in various townships in the Western 
Cape. Information about nation-wide policy developments was subsequently 
researched through relying on media articles, press releases, legislation, and policy 
documents. 																																																								
18	Reza	Banakar	‘Law	Through	Sociology’s	Looking	Glass:	Conflict	and	Competition	in	Sociological	
Studies	of	Law’	in	Ann	Denis,	Devorah	Kalekin-Fishman	(eds)	The	new	ISA	handbook	in	contemporary	
international	sociology:	Conflict,	competition	and	cooperation	(2009)	Sage	Publications	Ltd,	London	at	67.	
Lawrence	M.	Friedman	‘The	Law	and	Society	Movement’	(February	1986)	38:3	Stanford	Law	Review	763-780.	
Susan	S.	Silbey	‘Law	and	Society	Movement’	in	Herbert	M.	Kritzer	(ed)	Legal	Systems	of	the	World:	A	Political,	
Cultural	and	Social	encyclopedia	(vol	II:	E-L)	ABC	Clio,	California,	860-863. 
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1.3 Investigating the political implications of the governance of foreign national 
spaza shopkeepers 
Much has been written about xenophobia towards foreign nationals in South Africa 
and beyond and what it reveals about local, regional and global politics.19 Some 
studies focus on local level dynamics. For example, Misago highlights the role of 
local political leaders in orchestrating xenophobic attacks against foreigners in South 
Africa in 2008.20 He argues that ‘that violence against foreigners was organised and 
led by local groups and individuals attempting to claim or consolidate the power and 
authority needed to further their political and economic interests’.21 Similarly Reddy 
views xenophobic violence in South Africa as an outcome of the ruling party’s fragile 
legitimacy and unclear ideology, which enables local narratives of belonging and 
authenticity to gain currency in poor and marginalised black neighbourhoods.22 
Others examine xenophobia on a macro and global scale. 23  Gerschiere and 
Nyamnjoh believe that that increasing preoccupations with autochthony (a Greek 
term for a person derived from the soil) in both Europe and Africa is an outcome 
capitalism’s tendency to free up labour, while simultaneously setting up boundaries 
to close in and exclude.24 
 
However, the abovementioned studies tend to focus on attitudes towards foreigners 
or outsiders in general, rather than foreign national traders in particular. Recognising 																																																								
19	Loren	Landau,	‘Transplants	and	Transients:	Idioms	of	Belonging	and	Dislocation	in	Inner-City	Johannesburg’	
(September	2006)	49:2	African	Studies	Review	125–145.	Jonny	Steinberg	‘Security	and	disappointment:	Policing,	
freedom	and	xenophobia	in	South	Africa’	(2012)	52	British	Journal	of	Criminology	(2012)	345–360.	Jonathan	
Crush	‘The	Perfect	Storm:	the	realities	of	xenophobia	in	contemporary	South	Africa’	(2000)	SAMP	Migration	
Policy	Series	no.	50,	Idasa,	Cape	Town;	Mazibuko	K.	Jara	and	Sally	Peberdy,	‘Progressive	humanitarian	and	social	
mobilisation	in	a	neo-apartheid	Cape	Town:	A	Report	on	Civil	Society	and	the	May	2008	Xenophobic	Violence’	
(2009)	The	Atlantic	Philanthropies,	available	at	
http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/app/uploads/2015/09/1_Synthesis_consolidated_c.pdf,	date	accessed	3	
March	2017.	Michael	Neocosmos,	From	‘Foreign	Natives’	to	‘Native	Foreigners’:	Explaining	Xenophobia	in	Post	
Apartheid	South	Africa:	Citizenship	and	Nationalism,	Identity	and	Politics’	(2006)	Codesria,	Dakar,	Senegal.	
20	Jean	 Pierre	Misago	 ‘Disorder	 in	 a	 changing	 society:	 authority	 and	 the	micro-politics	 of	 violence’	 in	 Loren	 B.	
Landau	(ed)	Exorcising	the	Demons	Within	(April	2012)	United	Nations	University	Press,	Tokyo,	New	York,	Paris	at	
89.	
21	Ibid.	
22	Thiven	Reddy	‘The	‘Cabbage	and	the	Goat’:	Xenophobic	Violence	in	South	Africa’	(2012)	44	African	Historical	
Review	3-28.	
23	Jean	Comaroff	&	John	L.	Comaroff		‘Naturing	the	Nation:	Aliens,	Apocalypse,	and	the	Postcolonial	State	(2001)	
7:2	Social	Identities	233-265.		Francis	B.	Nyamnjoh	(ed)	Insiders	and	outsiders:	Citizenship	and	xenophobia	in	
contemporary	Southern	Africa	(2006)	Zed	Books,	London	and	New	York.	Peter	Geschiere	and	Francis	B.	Nyamnjoh	
‘Capitalism	and	autochthony:	The	seesaw	of	mobility	and	belonging’	(Spring	2000)	12:2	Public	Culture	423-452.	
Sabelo	J.	Ndlovu-Gatsheni	‘Do	‘Africans’	exist?	Genealogies	and	paradoxes	of	African	identities	and	the	
discourses	of	nativism	and	xenophobia’	(2010)	8	African	Identities	281-	295.	
24	Peter	Geschiere	and	Francis	B.	Nyamnjoh	‘Capitalism	and	autochthony:	The	seesaw	of	mobility	and	belonging’	
(Spring	2000)	12:2	Public	Culture	423-452.	
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the particular economic, social and political conditions of foreign national traders is 
important given that their economic activities are frequently the subject of political 
contestations and governance interventions in South Africa and around the globe.25 
For example, much ‘xenophobic’ violence in South Africa is directed at foreign 
national businesses, especially those engaged in trade in goods. While a number of 
studies have focused on foreign national traders in South Africa,26 these studies have 
tended to hone in on their economic activities or explored crime affecting their 
businesses, rather than examine mobilisations against their shops and governance 
interventions aimed at curtailing their activities. For example, Charman et al explore 
the business practices of foreign national spaza shopkeepers in Delft South, Cape 
Town and investigate the reasons for why many of these shops appear to have 
outcompeted South African spaza businesses. 27  Gumbo studies the business 
practices of migrant spaza shop entrepreneurs in Soweto, Johannesburg to find out 
how they innovate and make their businesses more competitive.28  Charman et al 
also investigate crime affecting foreign national businesses and the extent to which 
South African spaza businesses are similarly affected.29 While these studies can 
assist in setting out the broader context in which the governance of foreign national 
spaza shops plays out, they do not comprehensively account for governance 
interventions targeting these businesses. 
 
To effectively understand the political implications of the governance of foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers in South Africa, the thesis draws on work examining the 																																																								
25	For	example,	in	1921	the	government	of	the	Union	of	South	Africa	established	an	Inquiry	to	look	into	the	laws	
governing	‘Asiatic’	traders	and	businesses.	Idi	Amin	justified	deporting	Indians	from	the	country	on	the	basis	of	
their	business	activities	(see	‘Indo-African	history:	Watch	Idi	Amin	defend	the	decision	to	kick	Indians	out	of	
Uganda’	Scroll.In	27	October	2015,	available	at	https://video.scroll.in/1138/indo-african-history-watch-idi-amin-
defend-the-decision-to-kick-indians-out-of-uganda,	date	accessed	3	March	2017).	The	recent	2013	Ghana	
Investment	Promotion	Centre	Act	prohibits	foreign	nationals	from	operating	certain	forms	of	small	business.		
26	Abdu	Sh	Mohamed	Hikam	‘An	exploratory	study	of	the	Somali	immigrant’s	involvement	in	the	informal	
economy	of	Nelson	Mandela	Bay’	(2011)	MA	thesis,	Nelson	Mandela	Metropolitan	University.	Jonathan	Crush,	
Caroline	Skinner	and	Abel	Chikanda	‘Informal	Migrant	Entrepreneurship	and	Inclusive	Growth	in	South	Africa,	
Zimbabwe	and	Mozambique’	(2015)	68	SAMP	migration	policy	series,	Cape	Town.	A.	Charman,	L.	Petersen,	L.	
Piper	‘From	local	survivalism	to	foreign	entrepreneurship:	The	transformation	of	the	spaza	market	in	Delft,	Cape	
Town	‘	(2012)	Transformation	78.	Rory	Liedeman	‘Understanding	the	Internal	Dynamics	and	Organisation	of	
Spaza	Shop	Operators:	A	case	study	of	how	social	networks	enable	entrepreneurialism	among	Somali	but	not	
South	African	traders	in	Delft	South,	Cape	Town’	(2013)	Master’s	thesis,	University	of	the	Western	Cape.	
Knowledge	Link	Services	‘An	audit	of	spaza	shops	in	Khayelitsha,	Cape	Town’	(2009)	Unpublished	report	
comissioned	by	the	City	of	Cape	Town.	Trynos	Gumbo	‘Resilience	and	innovation:	Migrant	spaza	shop	
entrepreneurs	in	Soweto,	Johannesburg’	in	Jonathan	Crush,	Abel	Chikanda,	Caroline	Skinner	Mean	Streets:	
Migration,	xenophobia	and	informality	in	South	Africa	(2015)	South	African	Migration	Programme	(SAMP),	the	
African	Centre	for	Cities	(ACC)	and	the	International	Development	Research	Centre	(IDRC),	Cape	Town,	at	100.	
27	Charman	et	al	(note	26).	
28	Gumbo	(note	26).		
29	Andrew	Charman	and	Laurence	Piper	‘Xenophobia,	criminality	and	violent	entrepreneurship:	Violence	against	
Somali	shopkeepers	in	Delft	South,	Cape	Town’	(2012)	43:3	South	African	Review	of	Sociology	at	81.	
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political location of outsider groups that engage in small business activities. In 
particular it explores Weber’s concept of ‘the pariah’, Bonacich’s analysis of 
‘middleman minority’ groups, Fanon’s discussion of the ‘pitfalls of national 
consciousness’ and Mamdani’s account of ‘subject races’, all of which highlight the 
precarious position of ‘outsider’ small traders, and how they become targets of 
xenophobia. The thesis finds that while many features of their accounts help to 
explain antagonisms towards and fears of foreign national spaza shopkeepers in 
South Africa, all four theorists underestimate the role of social instability and popular 
aspirations for economic mobility in the problematisation of shops. This social and 
economic anxiety that underlies the shop gevaar or ‘threat’ in South Africa, extends 
across the entire South African political sphere. 
 
To understand how these economic concerns underpin and shape the South African 
political sphere, it is necessary to not only examine animosity towards foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers, but also explore how the South African political sphere 
responds to this perceived threat through governance. Xenophobic sentiment plays 
an important role in the governance of foreign national spaza shops, but governance 
also encompasses other considerations such as economic circumstances, crime, 
informal political power, and threats of public violence. These factors are weighed 
and sifted by governance actors when determining governance strategies and 
interventions. By focussing on how diverse political groupings congregate and 
respond to the presence of foreign national spaza shops in South Africa’s townships 
through engaging in governance, the thesis attempts to shed light on critical 
dynamics underlying South Africa’s political sphere. It is this goal – i.e. understanding 
the workings of the South African political sphere and how it grapples with challenges 
such as migration, widespread poverty, economic inequality and the legacies of 
apartheid - that underscores the thesis. 
 
The governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers demonstrates that the South 
African political sphere houses varied formal, informal and hybrid locations of power 
and authority. These varied bodies frequently possess conflicting interests and goals, 
which result in many governance interventions rarely materializing as initially 
envisioned. Yet despite the multitude of actors involved in governance and their 
competing goals, there was a common value and understanding shared by most – 
namely the perception of economic advancement was a central political goal, with 
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political rights concerns such as opposition to discrimination, as well as adherence to 
the rule of law often falling secondary to economic interest. 
 
Such a political state of affairs is not unique to South Africa. Many scholars have 
noted how the xenophobic violence that rocked South Africa in 2008 was fed by a 
politics that cared less for legal and constitutional principles than it did for accessing 
economic resources.30 Neither is entry of economic concerns into the political sphere 
particularly exceptional to South Africa. Fanon describes how struggles against 
colonialism descend into nationalist and chauvinist attempts at accessing and 
maintaining economic wealth in the aftermath of liberation.31 Chatterjee highlights 
how liberation struggles in many postcolonial states failed to achieve their republican 
goals and eventually established developmental states aimed at uplifting people’s 
economic conditions.32 
 
Arendt argues that the entry of economic matters into the political sphere is a general 
phenomenon of the modern age. She and other theorists such as Foucault and 
Agamben argue that the ancient Greek distinction between the public sphere of 
politics and the private realm of the household has become blurred in modern times. 
The former sphere was traditionally a realm of political speech and action, while the 
latter domain encompassed all economic matters related to the maintenance of life 
and the survival of the species. Arendt states that: 
 
The distinction between a private and a public sphere of life corresponds to 
the household and the political realms, which have existed as distinct, 
separate entities at least since the rise of the ancient city-state; but the 
emergence of the social realm, which is neither private nor public, strictly 
speaking, is a relatively new phenomenon whose origin coincided with the 
																																																								
30	Steinberg	(note	19).	Loren	Landau	‘Loving	the	alien?	Citizenship,	law,	and	the	future	in	South	Africa’s	demonic	
society’	 	 (April	 2010)	 109:435	 African	 Affairs	 213-230.	 Jonny	 Steinberg	 ‘South	 Africa’s	 xenophobic	 eruption’	
(November	2008)	ISS	Paper	169	at	1.	Heribert	Adam	and	Kogila	Moodley	Imagined	Liberation:	
Xenophobia,	Citizenship,	and	 Identity	 in	 South	Africa,	Germany,	and	Canada	 (2nd	ed)	 (March	2014)	African	Sun	
Media,	South	Africa.	
31	Frantz	Fanon	The	Wretched	of	the	Earth	(1963)	Grove	Press,	New	York.	
32	Partha	Chatterjee	The	Politics	of	the	Governed:	Reflections	on	Popular	Politics	(2004)	Columbia	University	
Press,	New	York	at	37.	
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emergence of the modern age and which found its political form in the nation-
state.33 
 
For Arendt this phenomenon (which she calls the rise of the ‘social’) results in the 
gradual decline of authentic political engagement – which she believes was originally 
characterised by plurality, distinction and advancing political freedom - and the rise of 
mass bureaucracies aimed at managing and regulating people’s lives. Ironically 
Arendt argues that this process tends to be even more exaggerated and extreme in 
the aftermath of revolutionary struggles for political freedom, which in her view have 
almost all given rise to repressive one-party dictatorships.  While the thesis is 
primarily concerned with the decline of political rights and freedoms set out in the 
constitution, Arendt’s republican-inspired account of the nature and demise of the 
political sphere is still relevant to the South African context given that both the South 
African constitution and Arendt’s political sphere are rooted in notions of plurality, 
equality and freedom. Furthermore the apparent reduction of political sphere in the 
Arendtian sense in post-apartheid South Africa negatively impacts on the realization 
of constitutional rights and freedoms in the country. 
 
The thesis leverages off Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s observations to assess 
how economic concerns manifest in the governance of foreign national shopkeepers 
and compete with – and come to dominate over – political rights and freedoms. 
Although South African theorists frequently stress that economic concerns play an 
important role in political contestations over foreign nationals in the country,34 they 
have not explored how political and governance actors navigate economic and 
political rights and freedoms in great detail. It is this contestation between the 
economic and the political domain that guides the thesis in examining the political 
implications of the governance of foreign national spaza businesses.  
 
The thesis finds that economic concerns reflected in the governance of foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers do not only relate to meeting people’s basic physical 
needs or engaging in consumption as described by Arendt, Foucault and Agamben, 
but are also linked to economic mobility and opportunity. These latter aspirations 																																																								
33	Hannah	Arendt	The	Human	Condition	(2nd	ed)	(1958)	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	Chicago	at	28.	34	Steinberg	(note	19).	Loren	Landau	‘Loving	the	alien?	Citizenship,	law,	and	the	future	in	South	Africa’s	demonic	
society’		(April	2010)	109:435	African	Affairs	213-230.	Jonny	Steinberg	‘South	Africa’s	xenophobic	eruption’	
(November	2008)	ISS	Paper	169	at	1.	
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sometimes come into direct conflict with the former economic goals and generate 
confusion over how foreign national spaza shops should be governed.  
 
The economic conflicts involved in the governance of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers are further aggravated by the fractured nature of the South African 
political sphere. This is especially the case in the country’s townships, which house a 
range of informal grassroots organisations and groups that engage in political 
mobilisations and protests, as well as local rule making, adjudication and 
enforcement. These bodies challenge the state’s authority and often inhibit it from 
applying the law as it stands. Township political realms therefore come to reflect two 
distinct, yet also overlapping, ‘social’ spheres - the state on the one hand, and 
informal township interest groups on the other – each exhibiting distinct ways of 
navigating economic and political concerns. While the state’s ability to generate 
economic policies is limited by formal laws and the country’s constitutional 
framework, local grassroots groups enjoy the ability to take direct action to address 
economic demands without needing to refer to legal precepts. However, their powers 
are curtailed by competing local level interest groups, and a lack of financial and 
administrative capacity to develop and enforce far-reaching change.  
 
While both the state and informal grassroots organisations enjoy distinct powers and 
capabilities, neither entity enjoys full authority in South Africa’s low-income township 
neighbourhoods. This forces them to collaborate and engage in continual power play. 
While the state resorts to patronage streams and identity politics to influence 
grassroots leaders and township communities, grassroots organisations galvanise 
the state through threatening to incite violence amongst the country’s largely poor 
and marginalised township residents. The result is that state government in post-
apartheid South Africa seeks stability in response to threatened violence of an 
‘uprising of the poor’ via suspending its functions, and deferring to local civic and 
political structures in governance arrangements.  This not only undermines the 
country’s constitutional dispensation but also weakens the ability of the state to 
service its economic goals of poverty alleviation and job creation. Instead the state 
becomes distracted by the narrow and conflicting economic demands of competing 
interest groups to the detriment of the broader public. 
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The existence of constitutional government alongside and integrated with powerful 
grassroots governance may in some ways seem like an ideal form of emancipatory 
democratic rule. Yet when both state and informal governance structures become 
primarily motivated by economic goals, the outcome can be profoundly divisive and 
oppressive. While a balance of powers may seem to hold competing forces and 
authorities at bay, those who lack power or utility in the balancing act confront the 
worst of state power as well as popular rage, and a blurred and pliable version of the 
law.  The thesis argues that the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers – 
in particular parties’ attempts to steer social order to create a ‘bearable relationship’35 
between different national groups – is symptomatic of a post apartheid politics 
contending with a fractured social realm.  
 
The ways in which the South African political sphere grapples with balancing 
economic and political freedoms in the face of challenges such as migration, 
lingering economic stagnation and social instability do not only reveal themes that 
are pertinent to other postcolonial and developing states. It is also of relevance to 
many political systems in the West that are encountering declining levels of 
economic mobility, resistance to multiculturalism and diversity, and increasing 
distrust in ruling political establishments. 
 
1.4 Chapter outline 
The following chapter (chapter two) discusses the thesis’ methodology. It offers a 
definition of the term ‘governance’ and sets out the thesis’ theoretical framework of 
‘law and society’. It describes the thesis’ case study methodology, including its use of 
archived material collected over a number of years, and how this material was re-
read for the purposes of the thesis. Lastly it considers my positionality in relation to 
my research participants and its impact on data collection processes, as well as the 
ethics of conducting research on contexts of social conflict and involving vulnerable 
research subjects. 
 
Chapter three, titled ‘Unpacking the shop gevaar: justifications for curbing foreign 
national shops’ explores the motivations for governance interventions.	This includes 
the reasoning given by key governance actors for their grievances towards foreign 																																																								
35	Arendt	(note	1).	
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spaza shopkeepers, and why they perceived shops as a threat. In analyzing the shop 
‘threat’ in South Africa, the thesis refers to Weber’s concept of the ‘pariah’, 36 
Bonacich’s analysis of the ‘middleman minority’,37 Fanon’s description of popular 
attacks against foreign national businesses in post-colonial settings, 38  and 
Mamdani’s account of ‘subject races’.39 
 
The thesis then moves on to explore how governance interventions have unfolded in 
practice. Chapter four reveals that governance interventions rarely materialised as 
intended. This was due to competing economic interests, and the absence of legal 
enforcement mechanisms, and alleged bribery. It argues that political and 
constitutional rights concerns as motivating principles were almost absent in these 
processes. Instead the chapter finds that the governance of foreign spaza 
shopkeepers in South Africa exhibits a political sphere largely concerned with varied 
economic interests. It thus considers Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s theories of the 
social, which highlight the rise of economic concerns over political freedoms in 
modern western states. The chapter concludes by examining the strengths and 
weaknesses of their analyses understanding the rise of the ‘social’ in a post-colonial 
and developing country such as South Africa.  
 
Chapter five of the thesis investigates what the governance of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers reveals about the nature of politics in post-apartheid South Africa. As 
mentioned, governance developments reveal that economic matters play a central 
role in the South African political sphere – and often come into conflict with the 
emancipatory political aspirations of the anti-apartheid struggle. However, unlike the 
bureaucratic and centralised social realms described by Arendt, Foucault and 
Agamben, the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers reflects a fractured 
social realm. This does not involve republican forms of political participation, but 
rather a haze of contesting and competing interest groups, whose sole motivation are 
the economic interests of their members. The fractured social thus acquires 
authoritarian and repressive features that bend the rule of law and fail to provide a 
space for authentic political deliberation and reflection. 																																																								
36	Max	Weber	Economy	and	Society:	An	outline	of	interpretive	sociology	(1922)	vol	1,	English	edition	edited	
Guenther	Roth	and	Claus	Wittich	in	1978,	University	of	Califomia	Press,	Berkeley,	Los	Angeles	and	London.	
37	Edna	Bonacich	‘A	Theory	of	Middleman	Minorities’	(October	1973)	38:5	American	Sociological	Review	583-594	
38	Fanon	(note	31).	
39	Mahmood	Mamdani	‘Beyond	Settler	and	Native	as	Political	Identities:	Overcoming	the	Political	
Legacy	of	Colonialism’	(October	2001)	43:4	Comparative	Studies	in	Society	and	History	651-664. 
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The conclusion draws together the key arguments made in the thesis. It discusses 
how fears over the outbreak public violence play a significant role generating anxiety 
towards foreign nationals spaza shops (i.e. the shop gevaar). This anxiety drives a 
variety of governance actors to seek ways to limit and curtail shop activities. These 
activities often entail the elevation of economic interests over political rights values, 
which mirrors theories of the ‘social’ or ‘biopolitics’ proposed by Hannah Arendt, 
Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben. Yet, unlike the social realm described by 
these theorists, the social sphere in South Africa is not monopolised by a 
bureaucratic nation state but an amalgamation of formal and informal and localised 
political bodies, which often have contested goals and motivations. It concludes by 
finding that this ‘fractured social realm’ does not advance, but rather undermines 
principles of plurality and threatens the country’s democratic and constitutional 
values and institutions. 
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Somali spaza shop, Laingville, Saldanha Bay, 2012. Photo: Kai von Kotze 
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Somali traders in living quarters behind shop, Ceres, 2012. Photo Kai von Kotze 
 
 
Burundian container shop on landlord’s front yard, Kraaifontein 2011. Photo: Vanya 
Gastrow 
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Small spaza shop or ‘tuck shop’, Acacia Park, Philippi, 2011. Photo: Toto Gxabela 
 
Somali spaza shop in informal settlement, Thabo Mbeki, Philippi, 2011. Photo: Toto 
Gxabela  
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Somali spaza shop, Velddrif, Saldanha Bay municipality, 2011. Photo Vanya 
Gastrow 
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In September 2010 I began work as a Visiting Researcher the African Centre for 
Migration & Society (ACMS) at the University of the Witwatersrand.  The project 
required me to research the ability of foreign national shopkeepers in the Western 
Cape to access formal and informal justice when they were victims of crime. This 
entailed interviewing a number of parties ranging from foreign national shopkeepers, 
police, prosecutors, to residents about how local communities and state institutions 
responded to crimes affecting foreign national shops. Although the project brief 
referred broadly to ‘shopkeepers’, media articles and policy reports indicated that 
only certain foreign national shops were heavily affected by crime – namely spaza 
shops in townships. Police officials and prosecutors later confirmed this situation. I 
therefore focussed my research on the spaza market as opposed to all foreign 
national shops in general. 
 
During the course of my discussions with foreign national spaza shopkeepers in 
Cape Town and further afield it emerged that threats and attacks against them were 
frequently met – not with police investigations and prosecutions or informal 
adjudications and punishments – but rather with negotiations between shopkeepers 
that gave rise to informal trade agreements. Thus I expanded the scope of access to 
justice to include governance interventions aimed at regulating foreign national spaza 
shops. This theme subsequently became the focus of my PhD studies. 
 
The thesis comprises a case study on the governance of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers in South Africa. By interrogating governance phenomena it seeks to 
better understand the nature of politics in a postcolonial and developing world 
context – namely post-apartheid South Africa. This entails several methodological 
discussions. First, this task requires clarifying what is meant by the term 
‘governance’, which is an ambiguous term that means different things to different 
people. Second, because the research topic is interdisciplinary in nature and 
encompasses academic fields ranging form political studies, philosophy, migration 
and law, it enjoys no self-evident theoretical framework. As a result it is necessary to 
put forward and justify a theoretical framework for the thesis.  
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Third, exploring the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers furthermore 
entails collecting data about governance events and interventions. In this respect the 
thesis confronts an important methodological constraint, namely that it is largely 
based on archived field research that I conducted over a period of two years between 
September 2010 and October 2012 for the ACMS on access to justice. As a result 
most of the data was collected with a different purpose in mind – in particular to 
examine crime affecting foreign national spaza shopkeepers in the Western Cape 
and their ability to access formal and informal justice mechanisms. The chapter thus 
sets out how archived material was re-read to explore the thesis topic. Fourth and 
lastly, other factors impacting on data collection include the researcher’s positionality 
as a white, middleclass woman, as well as ethical considerations relating to 
conducting research involving vulnerable subjects and heated and politically 
contentious issues, are set out below. 
 
2.2 The definition of ‘governance’ 
The term ‘governance’ has different meanings depending on the context in which the 
term is deployed.40  Its root ‘govern’ originates from the Greek word ‘kuberman’ 
meaning ‘to steer’.41 Scholars writing from different disciplinary perspectives have 
given the term a myriad of different interpretations depending on the context in which 
it is being used. For example, there exist discussions on corporate governance, good 
governance, network governance, participatory governance, new governance, and 
global governance. The thesis defines ‘governance’ as the ways in which individuals 
or bodies exercising a degree of authority attempt to steer social or public order. This 
definition does not envision governance as a singular hierarchy, but a heterarchy of 
competing formal and informal, and public and private governing bodies that can 
overlap with and contest each other. Furthermore, the definition understands 
governance to be a steering activity and not a structure. Governance is not a static 
snapshot of rules and systems that shape our lives, but a continual process.  
Rosenau states that ‘[t]o analyze governance by freezing it in time is to ensure failure 
																																																								
40	Peer	Zumbansen	‘The	Conundrum	of	order:	The	concept	of	governance	from	an	interdisciplinary	perspective"	
(2010)	6:8	Comparative	Research	in	Law	&	Political	Economy	Research	Paper	No.	37/2010.	Claus	Offe	
‘Governance:	An	Empty	Signifier?’	(2009)	16:4	Constellations	550-562.	Stijn	Smismans	‘Civil	society	and	European	
governance:	from	concepts	to	research	agenda’	in	Stijn	Smismans	Civil	Society	and	Legitimate	European	
Governance	(2006)	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	Limited,	UK	at	8.		
41	Oxford	English	Dictionary	(2014)	Oxford	University	Press,	available	at	
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/govern,	date	accessed	29	April	2014.	
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in comprehending its nature and vagaries’.42 Furthermore, the physical and societal 
structures in which we are embedded do not just exist independently, but are a 
product of conscious and subconscious human endeavours. Framing governance as 
an activity highlights how social orders are created, influenced or maintained by the 
choices, preferences, and decisions of individuals or collectivities and their 
engagement with diverse contextual factors, even when orders may at times seem 
unchanging and banal.  
 
While it is important to define what governance entails it is also necessary to set out 
how it is located in relation to two further factors, namely structures and forces.  As 
mentioned already, the thesis considers governance to be an activity of steering 
social order, rather than a structure.  However structures are still very relevant to 
governance, as structures such as formal and informal rule systems are employed by 
governance to shape social orders. Structures can also vest governance actors with 
authority, and influence governance actions.  
 
Governance also occurs in the context of various external forces. Forces are 
contextual factors that weigh on governance decisions, and can include violence, 
discourses, and social conditions such as poverty and degradation. Sometimes 
structures overlap with forces – e.g. rule systems are a structure that can also 
possess a strong or weak force. Forces are relevant to governance, as governance 
actors rarely make decisions without reference to the contexts and conditions that 
surround them. Forces do not amount to governance, but are rather like the winds, or 
currents that influence steering. Governance actors consider and weigh these factors 
against each other. Locating governance in relation structures and forces is 
important for its critical examination, as structures and forces often reflect power 
configurations in a given society. Governance displays how these power 
configurations are weighed, balanced and synthesised by those exercising a degree 
of authority, thereby shedding light on the values, concerns and principles that 
ultimately come to characterise a political sphere.  
																																																								
42	James	Rosenau	‘Governance	in	the	21st	century’	(1995)	1:1	Global	Governance	13-34	at	17.	
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2.3 The theoretical framework of law and society  
As previously mentioned the thesis defines ‘governance’ as the ways in which 
individuals or bodies exercising a degree of authority attempt to steer social or public 
order. Governance therefore involves processes of decision-making by those in 
positions of authority whose outcomes have legal or normative implications. 
Exploring these processes sheds light on how the spheres of law and society 
interrelate. The thesis therefore falls within the theoretical framework of ‘law and 
society’, which examines legal phenomena from a social science perspective. It 
encompasses diverse interdisciplinary fields including legal anthropology, the 
sociology of law, the school of legal pluralism, critical legal theory, and legal 
consciousness studies.   
 
However to a degree the law and society movement does not offer a comprehensive 
theoretical framework for the thesis.  This is because the thesis does not only seek to 
describe governance but also critically assesses the political implications of 
governance. The law and society movement often falls short of this goal. Many law 
and society works reflect a disjuncture between empirical descriptions of law in 
practice on the one hand, and theoretical critique on the other. For example, studies 
with an empirical focus on legal practices (characteristic of the school of legal 
pluralism) tend to remain just that – descriptions without deeper assessment of their 
implications. In contrast, critical studies of law (common amongst critical legal 
theorists) are usually preoccupied with critiquing legal ideologies without engaging in 
any in depth empirical exploration of how law manifests in the practical world. Where 
they do refer to empirical events these critical reflections usually rely on news articles 
or other written documents rather than direct interviews and discussions with actors 
involved. 
 
This disconnect between empiricism and critique in the law and society movement 
results in many accounts of law and society being left incomplete and unrealised. A 
more complete analysis involves a combination of critical reflection and empirical 
observations of law. This thesis thus attempts to critically analyse empirical accounts 
of legal and regulatory phenomena and how they interrelate with society. 
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The general absence of ‘critical empiricism’ within the law and society movement has 
been acknowledged by a number of law and society scholars.43 Between 1982 and 
1995 the ‘Amherst group’ of scholars attended regular seminars in Amherst, 
Massachusetts with the intention of developing a critical approach to law and 
society. 44  They believed that much of law and society research had become 
preoccupied with what they termed ‘gap studies’, i.e. the empirical difference 
between the ‘law on the books’ and the ‘law in action’, and required more critical 
analysis. However disagreement and animosity soon emerged amongst group’s 
members, which, combined with the distractions of various work priorities led to the 
dissolution of the group.45 In spite of this some scholars associated with the seminar 
such as Susan Silbey continue to explore the idea of critical empiricism through ‘legal 
consciousness studies’ (LCS) which today is a dominant field in law and society 
studies.46 
 
LCS attempts to combine empirical studies of law with critique by exploring the 
concept of legal consciousness, i.e. the way in which ordinary people think about and 
experience law on a day-to-day basis.47 This involves empirically investigating the 
ways in which people routinely use law, as well as analysing what this reveals about 
prevailing hegemonies and forms of domination existing within legal frameworks.48 
However, this approach tends to focus inwards, rather than outwards. What I mean 
by this is that by primarily critiquing the role of law and legal doctrines in everyday 
society, LCS overlooks the social, economic and political forces propel the 
development of development of laws and rules in the first place. They thus lack an 
outward orientation relating to what the development and application of laws and 
social rules reflect about the world and its politics. While it is true that every society is 
shaped by its laws, laws are also products of the societies in which they are located 
and thus reflective of them. While ideologies prevalent in everyday legal practices 
and routines can reinforce social hierarchies and domination, it is equally important 																																																								
43	David	M.	Trubek	and	John	Esser	‘”Critical	empiricism”	in	American	legal	studies:	Paradox,	program	or	
Pandora’s	box?’	(1989)	4	Law	and	Social	Inquiry	3-52	at	4	and	13.	
44	John	Brigham	‘The	Constitution	of	Interests:	Institutionalism,	CLS,	and	New	Approaches	to	Sociolegal	Studies’	
(1998)	10:	2	Article	10	Yale	Journal	of	Law	&	the	Humanities	421-461.	
45	Ibid.	Christine	B.	Harrington	and	Barbara	Yngvesson	‘Interpretive	Sociolegal	Research’	(Winter,	1990)	15:1	Law	
&	Social	Inquiry,	135-148.	John	P.	Esser	and	David	M.	Trubek	‘From	"Scientism	without	Determinism"	to	
"Interpretation	without	Politics":	A	Reply	to	Sarat,	Harrington	and	Yngvesson’	(Winter,	1990)	15:1	Law	&	Social	
Inquiry	171-180.	
46	Susan	S.	Silbey	‘After	legal	consciousness’	(2005)	1	Annual	Review	of	Law	and	Social	Science	323-368	at	326	
47	Mauricio	García-Villegas	‘Symbolic	Power	Without	Violence?	Critical	Comments	on	Legal	Consciousness	
Studies’	(December	2003)	16:4		International	Journal	for	the	Semiotics	of	Law	363–393	at	365.	
48	Silbey	(note	46)	at	333.	
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to understand how everyday legal and normative practices are devised and 
strengthened in the first place and the political forces weighing in on these 
processes. This approach can provide insight into core political values and dynamics 
in society.  
 
The framework of governance is appropriate for the task of combining empiricism 
with criticism. As mentioned, governance links legal and normative orders to broader 
socio-political factors. This is because governance involves political manoeuvring 
and contestation, and entails persons, institutions or groups in positions of authority 
choosing between diverse courses of action. In the process they weigh wider social 
and political factors such as power, violence, and popular sentiment in the 
development and application of laws, rules, policies, and regulations. The choice of 
path, and the dynamics surrounding such decisions are revelatory of the nature of 
politics in a given community. From a governance perspective, the linkages between 
law and society and their political implications therefore become vivid and more 
magnified. 
 
Furthermore, governance does not only operate through the development and 
application of laws or social rules. Governance can occur via non-legal means such 
as direct force and violence or arbitrary decisions. These non-legal or extra-legal 
means of governance are relevant to critical law and society studies, as they have 
implications for the place of legal systems in generating social order.  
 
Lastly, studying socio-legal phenomena from a governance perspective is not only 
useful for combining empiricism and critique. It is also helpful for understanding how 
legal and political systems operate in a rapidly changing world confronting new or 
growing pressures such as globalisation, migration, expanding gaps between the rich 
and poor, and environmental changes. Unlike legalistic terms such as ‘law’ or 
‘regulation’,  ‘governance’ discloses how laws, rules and policies emerge over a 
period of time in response to altering contexts. In contrast, laws and regulations are 
largely static outcomes of governance processes. The thesis is does not aim to 
simply posit and interpret the varied laws and rules ‘governing’ Somali spaza traders. 
Instead it also examines the development and implementation of laws, rules, 
customs and policies in response to new and changing societal pressures. Thus a 
governance framework enables the thesis to critically analyse the evolution, 
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coproduction and development of laws, rights and justice during periods of social and 
political flux, as is the situation in contemporary South Africa, and many other nations 
and regions globally.  
 
2.4 Research methodology 
The methodology of the thesis is that of a case study – the subject being the formal 
and informal governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers in South Africa. It is 
an ‘instrumental’ case study as opposed to an ‘intrinsic’ case study, as the case 
study acts as foundation for a further analysis on the nature of politics in a 
developing and postcolonial state, namely contemporary South Africa.49   
 
A key feature of a case study is that it attempts to understand complex phenomena 
that cannot be easily answered through singular means of data collection. Instead it 
relies on a range of evidence to put together a picture. This can include interviews, 
surveys, participant observation and document collection. 50  While case studies 
encompass similar methods to histories (such as the collection of documents and 
artefacts), case studies involve the added features of ‘direct observation of the 
events being studied and interviews of the persons involved in the events’. 51 
Researching the political implications of governance of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers - which comprises complex and multi-layered phenomena - 
necessitates collecting a rich description of such phenomena from multiple 
perspectives that cannot be easily ascertained through singular methods such as 
quantitative surveys and statistics.52 
 
The thesis therefore relies on a variety of data collected over a period of time. Data 
sources include interviews, participant observation, newspaper articles, press 
releases, academic and policy papers, legislation, and documents such as 
agreements, fines and leaflets. Participant observation was particularly important, as 
many decisions pertaining to the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers 																																																								
49	Anne	Suryani	‘Comparing	Case	Study	and	Ethnography	as	Qualitative	Research	Approaches’	(June	2008)	5:1	
Ilmu	Komunikasi,	http://jurnal.uajy.ac.id/jik/files/2012/05/7.-Anne-Suryani-117-128.pdf	117-127	at	118.	
50	Jean	Hartley	‘Case	study	research’	in	Catherine	Cassell	and	Gillian	Symon	(eds)	Essential	Guide	to	Qualitative	
Methods	in	Organizational	Research	(2004)	SAGE	at	323.	Robert	K.	Yin	Case	Study	Research:	Design	and	Methods	
(vol	5)	(2009)	Sage	Publications,	Inc	at	38.	
51	Yin	(note	50)	at	58.	
52	Robert	C.	Bogdan	and	Sari	Knopp	Biklen	Qualitative	Research	for	Education:	An	Introduction	to	Theory	and	
Methods	(5th	edition)	(2007)	Pearson	Education,	Inc	USA	at	2.	
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were reached at community meetings held at local police stations or community 
halls. By being present at some of these meetings I could directly observe the 
arguments and roles of different parties in attendance. These details were not always 
mentioned or recalled by interviewees. Such direct data is important for learning how 
governance functions, as well as the interactions between local and national level 
political actors (senior government officials often attended these meetings). I also 
observed court appearances of foreign national spaza shopkeepers who had been 
fined to view first hand how the implementation of governance rules and policies 
(such as policing fining, and the municipal administration of by-laws) worked. 
 
Document collection also contributed towards assembling a fuller picture of the 
governance of foreign national spaza traders. Some documents comprise hard 
evidence of events, such as police issued fines, municipal trading permits, 
intimidation letters, and copies of trade agreements. Furthermore, documents such 
as newspaper articles and press releases contribute further information on 
governance developments and the views and perspectives of varied governance 
actors.  
 
Relying on a collage of triangulated accounts enables the thesis to construct a more 
accurate narrative of governance events and processes. For example, many 
interviewees could not recall certain data, such as names of key actors involved in 
governance, the dates of certain meetings and the specificities of governance 
agreements or rules. These gaps were reinforced and supplemented by other forms 
of data including media accounts, and written documents. Likewise, documents and 
newspaper articles, while often setting the dates and outcomes of meetings, and the 
names of parties involved, did not provide deep insight and analysis into governance 
processes, which were better obtained from in depth interviews with individuals 
engaged in or affected by governance practices.  
 
However the thesis’ case study on the governance of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers encounters a key constraint, namely that it is made up of mainly 
archived data. This archived material is made up of interviews, original documents 
(such as copies of fines and informal trade agreements), news articles, policy 
documents, and notes of meetings that I collected during the course of the field 
research I conducted for the ACMS beginning in September 2010 until October 2012. 
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After the conclusion of the project, I continued to keep in touch with foreign national 
spaza shopkeepers who kept me informed about current events affecting their 
community. At the same time I conducted numerous interviews relating to informal 
migrant entrepreneurship as a consultant on projects run by the Southern African 
Migration Project (SAMP) at Queens University in Canada. These experiences 
contributed to my further familiarity and knowledge of the governance of foreign 
national spaza shops. To better understand the data collection process and the 
different phases of it I set out below the research methodology as initially designed 
and carried out for the ACMS between September 2010 and October 2012, as well 
as the additional experiences and research that contribute to my knowledge of the 
thesis topic.  
 
2.4.2 Initial research – Visiting Researcher for the ACMS (2010 to 2012) 
In September 2010 I began work on a project for the ACMS, which involved 
investigating the ability of foreign shopkeepers to access formal and informal justice 
mechanisms when they were victims of crime. At the time there had been a spate of 
murders affecting foreign national spaza shopkeepers in Cape Town, many of which 
involved arson attacks and resulted in traders being burned to death in their shops.53 
To explore what was occurring as well as the degree to which cases were being 
addressed by formal and informal justice systems I investigated the experiences of 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers in several townships in Cape Town and the 
Western Cape Province using qualitative, semi-structured interviews with diverse 
parties ranging from foreign national spaza traders, police officers, prosecutors, 
NGOs, and South African residents in affected areas. 
 
The research focussed on the spaza market, as media and policy reports highlighted 
that foreign national spaza shops were particularly affected by violent crime.54 Later 
interviews with police in field sites confirmed that spaza shops were most prone to 																																																								
53	Sandiso	Phaliso	‘Somali	dies	in	Cape	Town	petrol	bomb	blaze’	West	Cape	News	9	September	2010,	available	at	
http://westcapenews.com/?p=2143,	date	accessed	3	March	2017.	Hlengiwe	Mnguni	‘Cape	Somalis	fear	rise	in	
attacks’	News24,	10	September	2010,	available	at	http://www.hiiraan.com/comments2-news-2010-sept-
cape_somalis_fear_rise_in_attacks.aspx,	date	accessed	3	March	2017.	
54	Karen	Breytenbach	‘Somalis	are	'suffering	brunt	of	xenophobia'	IOL	News	7	August	2006,	available	at	
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/somalis-are-suffering-brunt-of-xenophobia-1.288384#.T8-2He3Q9UQ,	
date	accessed	06	June	2012.	Staff	Reporter	‘Toll	hits	30	after	more	Somalis	murdered’	4	September	2006,	
available	at	http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/toll-hits-30-after-more-somalis-murdered-
1.292234#.T89hQu3Q9UQ,	date	accessed	6	June	2012.	Ludger	Schadomsky	‘Anti-foreigner	violence	remains	
endemic	in	South	Africa’	DW	Akademie	7	June	2010,	available	at	http://www.dw.com/en/anti-foreigner-
violence-remains-endemic-in-south-africa/a-5566671,	date	accessed	3	March	2017.	
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violent attacks including hit and run shootings, arson attacks, looting and robbery. 
The research focussed exclusively on Somali spaza shopkeepers, as Somalis made 
up the vast majority of spaza shopkeepers in Cape Town. For example, police 
interviewed Philippi East stated that according to their audit of local spaza shops, 
Somali nationals operated 69,5% (57 out of 82) of foreign national spaza shops in 
the station’s jurisdiction.55 Similarly a survey of spaza shops in Delft South in Cape 
Town found that Somalis made up 88,9% of foreign national spaza shops (80 out 90 
shops).56 Police in Khayelitsha and Kraaifontein also estimated that most foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers in their station’s jurisdiction were Somali.57 
 
I began the research with a personal motive in mind. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter,  in August 2009, while working in a competition law department of a law 
firm, I became aware of an informal trade agreement regulating the spaza market in 
Gugulethu. The agreement barred foreign national spaza shopkeepers from opening 
new shops in the neighbourhood, forced them to fix their prices to those offered by 
South African shops, and obliged them to ensure their shops were a distance of no 
less than 100 metres from South African businesses. I was curious about this 
arrangement, as it posed critical questions about the notions of law and rights in 
relation to foreign nationals. When I enquired with traders about informal rules 
governing their shops, it became apparent that the Gugulethu agreement was not an 
anomaly, and that similar arrangements existed in most townships in the city. I 
therefore widened the scope of my ACMS research on access to justice to include 
how state and non-state actors addressed crime through governance interventions. 
As a result my interviews did not only cover criminal investigations and prosecutions. 
As part of my task of investigating informal justice mechanisms I included questions 
about conflict mediation interventions as well as laws and informal rules governing 
foreign national spaza shops in the field sites. 
 
The research initially focused on three field sites in Cape Town namely Philippi, 
Khayelitsha and Kraaifontein. Because the initial research concentrated on access to 
justice for victims of crime, field sites were were chosen according to the degree of 
crime experienced by Somali spaza shopkeepers in the areas. All three field sites 																																																								
55	Interview,	Philippi	East	police	sector	managers,	Philippi	East,	8	November	2011.	 
56	Charman	et	al	(note	26)	at	58.	
57	Interview,	Khayelitsha	police	station	sector	manager,	Khayelitsha,	25	October	2012.	Interview,	Khayelitsha	
police	station	detective,	Khayelitsha,	27	October	2011.	Interview,	Harare	police	station	crime	intelligence	official,	
Harare,	Khayelitsha,	24	May	2012.	Interview,	Kraaifontein	police	station	colonel,	Kraaifontein,	8	November	2011.	
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were located in black township neighbourhoods, where spaza shops were 
predominently located. In the absence of public police statistics on crime affecting 
foreign nationals, I selected the field sites on the basis of advice provided to me by 
the Somali Association of South Africa (SASA), a Somali community organisation 
operating in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth.  
 
SASA representatives identified Kraaifontein (containing the townships of 
Bloekombos and Wallacedene) and Philippi as ‘hotspots’ where crime affecting 
Somali spaza shopkeepers was rife.  In contrast they described that the township of 
Khayelitsha as relatively peaceful and quiet. Kraaifontein and Philippi were thus 
chosen as field sites because of their perceived high levels of crime, while 
Khayelitsha was chosen as a comparison site to identify possible factors that 
contributed to greater safety. However, during the course of the research it became 
apparent that Somali spaza shopkeepers in Khayelitsha also experienced high levels 
of violent crime, especially robbery and looting. Furthermore I could not locate any 
township in Cape Town where Somali spaza traders generally felt safe. Yet, what did 
distinguish Khayelitsha from Kraaifontein and Philippi was a lower rate of attacks and 
murders orchestrated by South African traders against their foreign national 
competitors. Khayelitsha was thus retained as a comparison field site because of this 
differing feature.  
 
All three field sites lay out on the peripheries of Cape Town approximately 25 to 35 
kilometres from the city centre. They were made up of both formal housing areas as 
well as informal shack settlements. However foreign national spaza shops tended to 
be located more in formalised areas. In certain informal settlements in Philippi there 
were no foreign national spaza shops to be found at all,58 whereas in Khayelitsha 
some foreign nationals spaza shops were situated on main roads or in close 
proximity to main roads in informal settlements such as Endlovini in Harare. 59 
According to the 2011 census the populations of all three field sites were mainly 
‘black African’ and Xhosa speaking.60 Levels of poverty and unemployment were 
high, with 50.8% of the population of Khayelitsha and 59% of residents living in 
																																																								
58	Interview,	Philippi	East	sector	managers,	Philippi	East,	8	November	2011	
59	Patrolling	with	Harare	crime	prevention	police	officers	on	24	May	2012.	
60	Adrian	Frith	compilation	of	census	2011	data	available	at	https://census2011.adrianfrith.com/place/199.	The	
site	developer	used	population	statistics	obtained	from	the	Census	2011	Community	Profile	Databases,	and	
calculated	geographical	areas	from	the	Census	2011	GIS	DVD.	
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Philippi being unemployed,61 Similarly Bloekombos and Wallacedene in Kraaifontein 
exhibited unemployment rates of 66.8% and 52% repsectively.62  
 
Khayelitsha (meaning ‘new home’) was established in the 1980s by Dr. Piet 
Koornhof, the Minister of Cooperation and Development in the apartheid government 
to house ‘illegal’ residents living in the city’s squatter camps or established 
townships.63 It was the largest of the three field sites, housing a population of 
391,749 residents, of whom 96.77% were black and 90.54% spoke Xhosa as a first 
language. 64 According to the police, foreign nationals operated 50% of spaza shops 
in Site B and Site C, and 60% of shops in Harare.65 Between 80% and 90% of 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers were Somali nationals.66  
 
Philippi was established as a farming region by German immigrants in the late 
1800s, and today still houses a large horticultural area, which provides much of the 
city’s fresh produce.67 Parts of Philippi were first established as township settlements 
in the mid-1970s, with large developments continuing throughout the 1990s.68 By 
2011 it had a population of 200,603.69  The area now houses a number of township 
neighbourhoods including Philippi East, Browns Farm, Samora Machel, and 
Weltervreden Valley.70 Research was conducted in Philippi East (Lower Crossroads, 
Better Life, Pola Park, Thabo Mbeki and Acacia Park) and Browns Farm. As was the 
case in Khayelitsha, the vast majority of residents in Philippi were black and Xhosa. 																																																								
61	City	of	Cape	Town	Information	and	Knowledge	Management	Department	‘A	Population	Profile	of	Khayelitsha,’	
April	2005,	at	14,	available	at	
http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/stats/CityReports/Documents/Population%20Profiles/A_Population_Profile_of
_Khayelitsha_1052006142120_359.pdf,	date	accessed	2	June	2012.	2001	census	data	for	the	City	of	Cape	Town,	
available	at	http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/stats/2001census/Pages/Profiles.aspx,	date	accessed	10	June	2012.		
62	Ibid.	
63	‘South	African	history	Online	‘Khayelitsha	township’	available	at	
http://www.sahistory.org.za/place/khayelitsha-township,	date	accessed	3	March	2016.	
64	Frith	(note	60)	at	https://census2011.adrianfrith.com/place/199038.	
65	Telephone	 interview,	 Khayelitsha	 police	 station	 crime	 intelligence	 officers,	 17	 April	 2012.	 Interview,	 Harare	
station	commander,	Harare,	Khayelitsha,	7	December	2011.	
66	Interview,	 Khayelitsha	 police	 station	 sector	 manager,	 Khayelitsha,	 25	 October	 2012.Interview,	 Khayelitsha	
police	station	detective,	Khayelitsha,	27	October	2011.	Interview,	Harare	police	station	crime	intelligence	official,	
Harare,	Khayelitsha,	24	May	2012.	
67 	Dr	 Jane	 Battersby-Lennard	 and	 Gareth	 Haysom	 ‘Philippi	 horticultural	 area:	 A	 city	 asset	 or	 potential	
development	 node?’(April	 2012)	 Report	 commissioned	 by	 Rooftops	 Canada	 Foundation	 Inc.,	 Foundation	 Abri	
International	 in	 partnership	 with	 the	 African	 Food	 Security	 Urban	 Network,	 available	 at	
http://www.afsun.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Philippi-Battersby-LennardandHaysom.pdf,	date	accessed	3	
March	2017.	
68	Valerie	Anderson,	Sepideh	Azari	and	Anya	van	Wyk	‘Philppi	Community	Profile’		(2009)	The	South	African	
Education	and	Environment	Project	(SEAP)	report,	available	at	
http://www.saep.org/media/docs/125810846813.pdf,	date	accessed	3	March	2017.	
69		Frith	(note	60)	at	https://census2011.adrianfrith.com/place/199033	
70	Anderson	et	al	(note	68)	at	12.	
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For example, 2011 Census indicates that 96,82% of the population of Philippi East 
identified themselves as ‘black’ and 82.60% spoke Xhosa as a first language.71 
According to a database at Philippi East Police Station, there were 147 spaza shops 
in their jurisdiction in 2011.72 Of these, South Africans operated 90 shops (52,3% of 
shops), while foreign nationals operated 82 shops (47,7%). Somali nationals 
operated 57 shops,  (and hence the majority of foreign national spaza shops) in the 
station’s jurisdiction. Traders from a range of different countries operated the 
remaining 24 shops including traders from Ethiopia (seven shops), Burundi (nine 
shops), Bangladesh (three shops), Malawi (one shop), Togo (one shop) and Nigeria 
(one shop). 
 
Kraaifontein was a suburb on the outskirts of Cape Town and housed Bloekombos 
and Wallacedene townships, both of which fell within the jurisdiction of Kraaifontein 
police station. The area was surrounded by commercial farms and was also close to 
the agricultural towns of Paarl and Stellenbosch. According to the 2011 census 
Bloekombos and Wallacedene had a combined population of 39,622.73As was the 
case with Khayelitsha and Philippi, most residents identified themselves as black 
African (89.53% in Bloekombos and 75.40% in Wallacedene) and Xhosa speaking 
(73,79% in Bloekombos and 62.56% in Wallacedene) in the 2011 census. 74 
However, unlike Khayelitsha and Philippi, both Bloekombos and Wallacedene also 
housed substantial ‘coloured’ populations (8.57% in Bloekombos and 22.87% of the 
population of Wallacedene).75 A Somali community representative from Kraaifontein 
reported that the community had conducted a survey of Somali shops for the 
Kraaifontein police station, and had counted 108 Somali shops in total in 
Wallacedene and Bloekombos.76 However, because they had only counted Somali 
shops they did not know how South African or other (non-Somali) foreign national 
spaza shops there were in the area. Police estimated that foreigners operated 
approximately 99% of spaza shops in Kraaifontein, while Somali community leaders 
																																																								
71	Frith	(note	60)	at	https://census2011.adrianfrith.com/place/199033007	
72	Interview,	Philippi	East	sector	managers,	Philippi,	Philippi	East,	8	November	2011.	
73	Frith	(note	60)	at	https://census2011.adrianfrith.com/place/199018	
74	Frith	(note	60)	at	https://census2011.adrianfrith.com/place/199018019;	and	at	
https://census2011.adrianfrith.com/place/199018016	
75	Frith	(note	60)	https://census2011.adrianfrith.com/place/199018019;	and	at	
https://census2011.adrianfrith.com/place/199018016	
76	Interview,	Kraaifontein	Somali	trader,	Kraaifontein,	5	June	2012.	
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from Kraaifontein believed that foreign nationals only operated 50% of spaza 
shops.77 The real percentage probably lay somewhere in between. 
 
Apart from the three field sites of Khayelitsha, Philippi and Kraaifintein, interviews 
were also conducted with Somali spaza shopkeepers based in the townships of 
Masiphumelele and Gugulethu. This was because these neighbourhoods had 
witnessed significant governance interventions in response to mobilisations by South 
African spaza shopkeepers. Masiphumelele was the site of the earliest xenophobic 
riots against foreign national spaza shops in the city in 2006, which were followed by 
the first attempt to informally regulate foreign national businesses. Gugulethu 
experienced elabroate trade negotiations in 2009 response to threatening letters 
being sent to Somali spaza shops in the area. I also interviewed Somali shopkeepers 
in the coloured neighbourhood of Elsies Rivier where many shopkeepers complained 
about aggressive fining and unlawful arrests by police.  
 
In order to get an idea of provincial level trends (as the research focussed on the 
Western Cape) I conducted interviews with seventeen Somali spaza shopkeepers 
based in six different small towns across the Western Cape Province, namely 
Vredenburg, Velddrif, Tulbagh, Ceres, Prince Albert Hamlet and Caledon. These 
towns were selected based on their geographical location as well as their distinct 
economies.  
 
Interviews with Somali spaza shopkeepers and South African township residents 
were carried out with the help of paid research assistants from the respective field 
sites. This was because I was unfamiliar with both the Somali community, as well as 
Cape Town’s townships. I did not know my way around the Somali neighbourhood in 
Bellville nor any townships in Cape Town, let alone the social dynamics at play. 
Research assistants therefore helped to acquaint me to their neighbourhoods and 
explain my research to interviewees. They also assisted with interpretation where 
needed.   
 
																																																								
77	Interview,	Kraaifontein	police	station	colonel,	Kraaifontein,	8	November	2011.	Interview,	Kraaifontein	Somali	
community	representative,	Bellville,	14	December	2010.		
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Most of the interviews that I conducted with Somali spaza shopkeepers were carried 
out in Bellville rather than in their shops. While some traders were comfortable 
speaking to me in their shops (especially in small towns where almost all interviews 
were conducted in interviewees’ shops), the majority in Cape Town preferred that I 
interview them in Bellville instead. Somali spaza shopkeepers working in small 
towns, or coloured neighbourhoods in the city where levels of crime and social 
conflict were not as severe were happy to speak in their shops. However others in 
more crime-ridden urban townships were visibly uncomfortable and did not wish to 
draw any attention to themselves by conversing with me in their shop premises. At 
the time they told me that it was because they did not want their customers to 
overhear the interviews.  However, I also suspect that as a white middle class 
researcher, I drew attention to the interview, as I clearly not a ‘local’. As a result of 
their discomfort, traders suggested other venues to be interviewed. For example, a 
Gugulethu shopkeeper requested that I interview him in my car, which was parked on 
a pavement some distance from his shop. Another trader invited me to interview him 
in the home of his landlord, but was hesitant answering my questions, as his landlord 
was within earshot of our conversation watching television. These experiences led 
me to offer to alternatively meet traders in Bellville. At first a local Imam granted me 
permission to carry out interviews in the office of his mosque. When the office was in 
use I carried out interviews at a local coffee shop called ‘Blue Café’ which had an 
outside area that was quite quiet. I later conducted interviews at the offices of 
different Somali community organisations such as the Ogaden Youth and Student 
Union (OYSU), the Somali Refugee Aid Agency (SORAA) and the Somali 
Association of South Africa (SASA). 
 
When I interviewed Somali spaza shopkeepers I used the snowball technique by 
asking interviewees whether they knew of any further people I could speak to.  I also 
relied on my research assistant’s network of friends and acquaintances to identify 
new respondents. In contrast interviews with South African township residents were 
conducted by approaching residents sitting on street corners or in their yards, who 
seemed to have time on their hands to converse. I sought out a more random sample 
of South African respondents, as I wished to obtain a variety of perspectives on 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers and governance systems, rather than just the 
views of a particular social network. I did not conduct focus groups with South African 
residents because foreign national spaza shops were a contentious issue for some 
residents and I did not wish to cause any local acrimony. A similar approach was 
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recently also taken by the Competition Commission, which decided not to hold public 
hearings for its inquiry into foreign national retail businesses out of fear that it could 
spark unrest.78 I also believed that residents would provide more accurate accounts 
of how they felt if they were interviewed individually. Most interviews were carried out 
on weekends in order to access both employed and unemployed South Africans. 
 
I asked all interviewees whether I could voice-record their interviews, and a 
substantial number indicated that they did not wish to be recorded.  These included 
police officers, prosecutors, some residents, and some foreign national spaza 
shopkeeepers. In these instances I took notes during the interviews instead.  I 
transcribed all my written interview notes (including those for those interviews that 
were voice-recorded). However, due to time and resource contraints I did not 
transcribe all voice-recordings of my interviews, and only did so for some interviews 
that I felt were particularly important. Interviewees were also asked whether they 
preferred being interviewed in their home language rather than in English. In 
instances where they elected to be interviewed in their home language, I would rely 
on my research assistants (who were fluent in both languages) to interpret for me. I 
would then rely on my notes and recordings of these translations rather than the 
original home-language account when conducting my analysis, as I lacked the 
financial resources to pay someone to translate and transcribe these recordings. As 
a result some of my data may miss the nuances and greater accuracy that translated 
transcriptions would likely have provided. 
 
Interviews with foreign national spaza shopkeepers were summarised and ordered 
into an excel spread sheet that set out key themes covered by the interviews, i.e. the 
number and types of crimes experienced by traders, the response of the formal 
justice sector to these crimes, informal rules regulating their shops, the nature of 
community structures and their response to crimes, as well as ‘personal information’, 
which comprised interviewees’ contact details, the location of their shops, the date 
they established their businesses, how they came about opening shops, and where 
relevant the date that they closed down their businesses (many of them had closed 
down or sold their shops in the aftermath of attacks). By ordering interviews in this 
way I could more easily understand and compare the different types of crimes 
affecting foreign national spaza shopkeepers in each field site, as well as varied 																																																								
78	Telephone	conversation	with	representative	from	the	Competition	Commission,	19	January	2017.	
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formal and informal responses to crimes, forms of business regulation, and a general 
time frame of shops’ presence in neighbourhoods. 
 
Because of high levels of violent crime, very few foreign national spaza shopkeepers 
in Cape Town’s townships were women. As a result, with the exception of two female 
spaza shopkeepers in Masiphumelele, all foreign national spaza shopkeepers 
interviewed were men. The fact that almost all spaza shopkeepers interviewed were 
male, means that the study does not shed light on how the small minority of female 
spaza shopkeepers may have encountered crime and governance in Cape Town’s 
townships. 
 
I avoided interviewing South African spaza shopkeepers altogether in order to 
prevent the risk of reviving any latent antagonisms towards foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers. A number of South African retailers in my field sites had regularly 
mobilised against foreign national spaza shopkeepers and police believed that some 
had allegedly orchestrated murderous attacks against them. Instead of conducting 
interviews with South African spaza traders, I relied mainly on observing South 
African spaza shopkeepers at four conflict mediation meetings in Khayelitsha in 
2012. 79  At these meetings, South African spaza shopkeepers discussed their 
business struggles, their views about foreign national spaza shopkeepers, and how 
they felt market should be governed. The few South African shopkeepers who I did 
interview were either interviewed because I encountered them by accident while 
conducting interviews with residents, or were introduced to me by my research 
assistants who were acquainted to them. 
 
The research project with the ACMS came to an end in October 2012 by which time I 
had conducted a total of 189 interviews with Somali shopkeepers, South African 
residents, police officers, prosecutors, local councillors, landlords and South African 
shopkeepers (see table below). It culminated in a report titled ‘Elusive Justice: 
Somali traders’ access to formal and informal justice mechanisms in the Western 
Cape’.80 This research forms primary basis of the empirical fieldwork component of 
the thesis. Its contribution to the thesis lies not only in the material gathered  																																																								
79	Meetings	were	held	on	7	March	2012,	20	March	2012,	29	March	2012	and	18	April	2012.	
80	(2012)	African	Centre	for	Migration	&	Society	report,	available	at	
http://www.migration.org.za/uploads/docs/report-38.pdf,	date	accessed	3	March	2017.	
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regarding governance interventions, but also in its in depth findings regarding crime 
affecting foreign national spaza shopkeepers and the workings of informal and formal 
justice systems. This is because violent crime, xenophobic violence and weak formal 
justice mechanisms are key contextual factors influencing governance strategies.  
 
2.4.2 Additional research (2010 to 2016) 
 Despite drawing predominantly on the above archived qualitative field research, the 
thesis encompasses further interviews and field experiences. During the course of 
the initial research for ACMS I became aware that much contention about foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers related to their economic activities. On the one hand 
many residents appreciated foreign national spaza shops’ low prices and efficient 
services, while others viewed shops as restricting economic opportunities for South 
Africans. South African spaza traders also organised mobilisations against foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers as a means of ridding themselves of economic 
competition. This led me to carry out several further qualitative interviews with Somali 
spaza shopkeepers regarding their trade practices, as well as a focus group on the 
issue with ten traders from Khayelitsha. These observations and interviews 
culminated in a second report published in 2013 and titled ‘Somalinomics: A case 
study on the economic dimensions of Somali informal trade in the Western Cape’.81 
This research contributed to the thesis, by enabling me to better understand the local 
economic context in which governance interventions were taking place. 																																																								
81	Vanya	Gastrow	with	Roni	Amit	(2013)	African	Centre	for	Migration	&	Society	report,	available	at	
http://www.migration.org.za/uploads/docs/report-42.pdf,	date	accessed	3	March	2017.	
Interviews 
Area Somali 
traders 
SA 
residents 
SA 
traders 
Police Land-
lords 
Legal 
Aid 
Prose-
cutors 
Other 
stake- 
holders 
Khayelitsha 15 14 0 11 1 1 0 3 
Kraaifontein 10 10 3 5 2 2 1 2 
Philippi 15 35 5 4 4 1 4 3 
Small towns 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other areas 9 6 1 0 0 0 0 5 
Total 66 65 9 20 7 4 5 13 
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I also came across valuable information by becoming engaged with the Somali 
community in Cape Town. During the course of my research I frequently received 
information from Somali spaza shopkeepers and activists about matters affecting the 
community ranging from crime, law enforcement raids, and threats by South African 
shopkeepers. On the one hand this came about as a result of having acquainted and 
befriended a number of Somali shopkeepers and community activists. Because most 
of my interviews with Somali spaza shopkeepers were conducted in Bellville, I got to 
know the neighbourhood and many of its residents and frequenters very well. This 
included community activists, and ordinary shopkeepers who I had met through 
interviews. On the other hand, my knowledge of the challenges affecting the Somali 
community, my contacts in the NGO field, and my legal background also led a 
number of Somali community members to contact me to report legal or regulatory 
problems that their businesses had encountered and seek advice. 
 
This contact broadened my exposure to issues and events affecting the community. 
For example, in late 2011 police throughout Cape Town carried out fining operations 
against Somali spaza shops. I first became aware of the issue when conversing with 
a Somali community activist in Bellville. He mentioned that he had spoken to the 
UCT Refugee Rights Unit who advised that the legislation cited on the fines did not 
exist. I checked the fines myself and agreed with the Unit’s finding. Thereafter a 
number of traders approached me for advice about their fines, all of whom I referred 
to an attorney at the Legal Resources Centre who was working on the matter. 
Likewise my attendance at meetings between Somali and South African 
Additional interviews 
Area Somali 
traders 
Khayelitsha 2 
Franschhoek 1 
Philippi East 1 
Masiphumelele 1 
Ravensmead and 
Grassy Park 
1 
Total 6 
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shopkeepers in Khayelitsha was at the invitation of Somali community leaders who 
wished me to observe what took place. The thesis draws on these experiences in its 
discussion of governance of foreign shopkeepers. 
 
Lastly in 2014 and 2016 I conducted interviews with key organisations and 
institutions for two projects being carried out by the South African Migration 
Programme (SAMP) on foreign migrant entrepreneurs and their contribution to local 
economies. In particular I interviewed migrant community leaders, NGOs assisting 
refugees and asylum seekers, the Western Cape provincial department of economic 
development and tourism, and local government departments (including the City of 
Cape Town’s law enforcement department, environmental health department, 
economic development department, and planning and building development 
management department). These interviews also contributed to my knowledge of 
migrant informal businesses and their regulation in the city. Unlike my research for 
the ACMS, the project also involved me interviewing foreign national community 
representatives from a range of different countries, including Congolese, Burundian, 
and Oromo (Ethiopian) community representatives. These interviews helped me 
better understand the City’s regulatory framework in relation to informal economies, 
as well as other migrant communities that were active in the spaza market. 
 
Interviews with key organisations 
NGOs 7 
Local government officials 7 
Provincial government officials 2 
Migrant community organisations 6 
Other stakeholders 4 
 
 
2.4.3 Adapting the initial research data to the thesis topic 
My research with the ACMS focussed predominantly on the ability of Somali spaza 
shopkeepers in the Western Cape to access justice when they were victims of crime. 
In contrast the current thesis explores the governance of these shops on local as well 
as national levels and their political implications.  At first glance this seems like a very 
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different topic.  However as mentioned, during the course of my field research for 
ACMS I widened the notion of ‘justice’ to include governance interventions that arose 
in response to attacks on and threats against Somali spaza shopkeepers.  Thus my 
interviews with shopkeepers, South African residents, landlords, police and 
prosecutors also explored conflict interventions and formal laws and informal rules 
governing the market.  
 
Yet the archived data has two important shortcomings. First, although the data 
covered the topic of governance, I was not conscious at the time that I would use the 
material specifically towards a PhD examining the political implications of 
governance.  Had I conducted all the interviews with that awareness in mind I would 
have enquired more into interviewees’ views regarding laws, rights and justice, and 
how they navigated the intersection between political freedom and economic needs 
and aspirations. Fortunately many of my interviews did cover these topics, however 
the data would have been richer had I been more alert to the relevance of that line of 
questioning for my PhD. 
 
A second shortcoming of the archived research is that it was based on fieldwork that 
I conducted in the Western Cape, whereas the thesis topic relates to governance in 
South Africa. Due to cost constraints I did not carry out local level field sites research 
beyond the Western Cape province. As a PhD candidate living off grants and 
scholarships I did not have the financial resources to travel to different parts of the 
country to conduct additional qualitative research. To find out more about local level 
governance elsewhere in South Africa, I conducted desktop searches of media 
articles, court cases and academic reports. Although cross-country research would 
have been valuable, it was not essential to making findings regarding local level 
governance in South Africa. Abundant media reports show that governance efforts in 
other localities in the country have frequently mirrored local trends in Cape Town. For 
example, mobilisations by South African traders against foreign national spaza 
traders have occurred regularly in different townships across the country including in 
the Western Cape,82 Gauteng,83 the Eastern Cape,84 and the Free State85 provinces. 																																																								
82	Quinton	Mtyala	‘Landlords	of	Somalis	invited	to	resolve	wrangle	over	trading’	Cape	Times	24	July	2009	at	5.	
Kowthar	Solomons	‘Truth	declared	in	spaza	shop	war’	Cape	Argus	3	August	2009	at	3.	
83	Jean	Pierre	Miasago	and	Mattew	Wilhelm-Solomon	‘Foreign	traders	are	fair	game’	opinion	piece	in	the	Mail	&	
Guardian,	May	20	2011,	available	at	http://mg.co.za/article/2011-05-20-foreign-traders-are-fair-game,	date	
accessed	1	April	2015.	Mpiletso	Motumi	‘Business	owners	set	shops	on	fire’	IOL	News,	February	27	2015	
available	at	http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/business-owners-set-shops-on-fire-
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Furthermore these calls have led to the establishment of informal agreements aimed 
at limiting foreign national spaza shops in numerous locations in the Western Cape86 
and the Eastern Cape.87 Similarly fining operations against foreign spaza traders 
have occurred in the Western Cape, Limpopo and the North West provinces.88 
Examining the governance of Somali traders at a local level in Cape Town can thus 
provide insight into wider governance efforts across the country.  
 
Furthermore, the thesis builds on the archived research data by examining formal 
national level governance developments. This involved researching national laws, 
policies, and draft legislation.  I also collected media reports and press releases to 
find out more about national level governance plans and policies and the political 
dynamics surrounding them. However, I did not carry out qualitative interviews with 
national political leaders involved in crafting new governance interventions due to 
logistical issues and a lack of response from relevant departments. For example the 
DTI advised that they no longer dealt with matters relating to small businesses as 
their mandate had been handed over to the Department of Small Business 
Development. However, the Department of Small Business Development was based 
in Gauteng, and had no office in Cape Town. In addition, I encountered difficulties 
setting up interviews with provincial offices of national departments, as I received no 
response from the Department of Homes Affairs’ Western Cape office, the South 
African Revenue Service (SARS) and the Western Cape Provincial Commissioner of 
Police.  
 																																																																																																																																																														
1.1824497#.VRvG2VyQdUQ,	date	accessed	1	April	215.	Mpiletso	Motumi	‘Business	owners	set	shops	on	fire’	IOL	
News,	February	27	2015	available	at	http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/business-owners-set-shops-on-
fire-1.1824497#.VRvG2VyQdUQ,	date	accessed	1	April	215.	
84	Luyolo	Mkentane	‘Somalis	to	register	with	spaza	body’	The	Herald	(25	March	2011)	at	24.	
85	The	editor	‘Botshabelo	engulfed	by	Xenophobic	flames’	The	weekly	Free	State	(6	July	2012),	available	at	
http://theweekly.co.za/?p=8143,	date	accessed	1	April	2015.	
86	Ester	 Lewis	 ‘We'll	 close	 down	 illegal	 spazas'	 Cape	 Argus	 8	 February	 2011	 at	 4.	 Vuyo	 Mabandla	 ‘Bid	 to	
'extinguish'	 attacks	 on	 Somalis’	 Cape	 Argus	 26	 July	 26	 2009,	 available	 at	 http://abahlali.org/node/5542/,	 date	
accessed	3	March	2017.	
87	Luyolo	Mkentane	‘Somalis	to	register	with	spaza	body’	The	Herald,	25	March	2011	at	24.	Mandlenkosi	Mxengi	
‘Bhisho	acts	on	xenophobic	threats’	Fever.Online,	26	July	2012,	available	at	http://www.fever-
blue.co.za/articles/articledetails.aspx?id=29153,	date	accessed	25	March	2013.	
88	Interviews	with	foreign	national	spaza	shopkeepers	in	Cape	Town.	Mandla	Khoza	‘Operation	Hardstick:	Cops	
out	in	force’	News24,	23	April	2012,	available	at	http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Operation-
Hardstick-Limpopo-cops-out-in-force-20120423,	date	accessed	3	March	2017.	‘Police	target	foreign	traders	in	
Limpopo’	Irin	News,	17	August	2012,	available	at	http://www.irinnews.org/report/96130/south-africa-police-
target-foreign-traders-limpopo,	date	accessed	3	March	2017.	Valerie	Cilliers	‘Court	rules	on	spaza	shops’	
Northern	News,	24	August	2012,	available	at	http://www.noordnuus.co.za/details/24-08-
2012/court_rules_on_spaza_shops/14634,	date	accessed	12	December	2013.	
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Despite the difficulties of working with archived data from different research projects 
there are benefits to the way in which the research unfolded.  This is because the 
thesis can make use of a variety of data collected over a span of several years and 
related to a number of different research enquiries (such as crime affecting foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers, their access to formal and informal justice mechanisms, 
the governance of their businesses and economic considerations). This possesses 
great value, as the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers cannot be 
viewed in isolation, but is embedded in social contexts of crime, informal governance 
structures and economic competition. By covering these broad issues, the thesis is 
better able to explore and understand multiple perspectives and considerations that 
shape and influence governance.  
 
Furthermore because governance is an activity of steering social order, not just the 
outcome of such a process – as is the case with laws and rules - it requires studying 
how rules are generated, contested and enforced. These events do not necessarily 
occur on a daily basis, but can emerge sporadically, can be once off, and evolve 
gradually over time. My long-term engagement with the Somali community as a 
researcher enabled me to observe how governance developed and adapted over 
many years.  This was all the more important given that Somali nationals in Cape 
Town were often transient and did not reside in the city for long periods of time. Many 
of those involved in early governance interventions later resettled in third countries 
such as America, England, Australia and East Africa. Most of those active in Cape 
Town today would only have select knowledge of more recent trends and events. 
Having been in the field for an extended period of time thus enabled me to assemble 
an historical outline of events. 
 
2.6 Positionality 
No researcher can claim to be a completely objective and passive gatherer of 
information and data. Instead, as England puts it, fieldwork is ‘a dialogical process in 
which the research situation is structured by both the researcher and the person 
being researched’.89  Researchers enter the field with unique biographies and sets of 
assumptions, while research participants react to the research in distinct ways 
																																																								
89	Kim	V.	L.	England	‘Getting	Personal:	Reflexivity,	Positionality,	and	Feminist	Research’	(1994)	46:1	The	
Professional	Geographer	80-9	at	84.	
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depending on how they perceive the researcher.90   This state of affairs requires 
researchers to reflect on their position relation to their research settings and how this 
impacts on their work and findings.91 
 
In particular my position in relation to my research participants shaped my research 
by influencing my ability to access key communities and institutions, impacting on the 
potential validity of my findings, and affecting my ability to probe and interpret my 
data. In terms of access, I found that being a middle class white female generally 
made reaching diverse research environments easier. Generally I encountered few 
barriers to accessing three key research groups namely, Somali spaza shopkeepers, 
South African residents, and police officers. This was aided by the fact that I followed 
certain channels in accessing them.  For example, I began my research with the 
Somali community by first setting up a meeting with the Somali Association of South 
Africa (SASA) and requesting their help and advice for interviewing Somali spaza 
shopkeepers. I then conducted interviews accompanied by a Somali research 
assistant, whom I had met through SASA, and who helped to facilitate interviews. My 
assistant’s own positionality as a community insider who also happened to possess a 
relaxed, outgoing and very sociable disposition further enabled me to establish a 
foothold in the Somali community.  Similarly when I conducted interviews with 
residents in townships I arranged for South African research assistants who were 
familiar with the respective neighbourhoods to accompany me, and help approach 
potential interviewees and explain the purpose of the research to them. I used a 
different approach when it came to accessing police officers.  Police at the Philippi 
East police station advised that I needed formal written consent from the Provincial 
Commissioner of Police in order to interview any officers at the station.  I therefore 
contacted the provincial office of the South African Police Service (SAPS), which 
required me to submit a formal application to their national legal department. Once 
permission was granted several months later I encountered almost no hurdles in 
interviewing police. The SAPS’s provincial office contacted the station commanders 
of the relevant police stations where I wished to carry out research and instructed 
them to assist me. Thus all the station commanders whom I interacted with were very 
open and helpful. Apart from allowing me to interview them, they guided me around 
their stations, and introduced me to their intelligence officers, sector managers and 
investigators whom I further interviewed.  																																																								
90	C.	Chavez	‘Conceptualizing	from	the	Inside:	Advantages,	Complications,	and	Demands	on	Insider	Positionality’	
(2008)	13:3	The	Qualitative	Report474-494	at	474.	
91	England	(note	89)	at	85.	
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When it came to interacting with the Somali community, I found that my general 
social privilege contributed towards gaining access. For example, being South 
African – as opposed to a foreign national - was advantageous when it came to 
working with the Somali community. This may seem surprising as Somalis 
themselves were foreign nationals and would probably have a lot in common with a 
similarly located researcher.  However, many foreign national researchers that 
conducted research on migration in Cape Town tended to be sojourners in the city 
who would leave after a few weeks, months, or a couple years. This limited their 
ability to form long-term relationships and play a continual role influencing migration 
policies and discourses in Cape Town and nationally. Because I was from South 
Africa, Somali participants also possibly thought that there was a greater likelihood 
that I had a wider social and professional network to draw on than someone who was 
not from the country, and thus thought I was a useful person to meet and work with. 
Being South African thus contributed to Somali activists investing their time and 
efforts in my research than if I had been a visiting scholar from oversees. At the 
same time South African interviewees such as residents, police, prosecutors, 
councillors would frequently air fearful or angry sentiments about foreign nationals, 
something they would likely be less inclined to do were they being interviewed by a 
foreign national. Other aspects of my privileged positionality also enabled me to gain 
access to the Somali community. Being middleclass and educated also contributed 
to many Somali interviewees perceiving me as a useful future contact to have should 
they need any general advice or help.  For example, a number of Somali 
interviewees made efforts to keep in contact with me subsequent to their interviews 
by sending me festive season greetings via text message or phoning me sporadically 
to ask me how I was doing.  
 
At the same time, being an outsider to the community also had advantages. In 
particular being religiously secular and coming from a different cultural background 
had the significant benefit that many of restrictive cultural and religious norms that 
applied to most Somali women in the community did not apply to me.  For example, 
when discussing my research with a Somali community activist in his office, he 
advised that a Somali woman would normally never sit alone in a room with a man, 
but assured me that I need not worry about that custom. Likewise, I was frequently 
invited to Somali restaurants and cafes in Bellville and Mitchells Plain (where I 
conducted a number of interviews), which Somali women almost never frequented.  
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Furthermore, despite being an ‘outsider’ to the Somali community, in many ways I 
had a lot in common with them. This came from an unexpected source, namely that 
Somali community leaders in Cape Town were mostly my age take or give a year or 
two. In other words we were all children of the early 1980s. As a result age seniority 
did not impact on my relationships with them. In fact because we were all of the 
same generation, we easily came to see each other as friends and colleagues, all 
navigating similar issues such as relationships, marriage, young children and figuring 
out our careers.  
 
Class disparities between my research participants and myself were also not as wide 
as they seemed. Despite the fact that most Somali were poor and lacked formal 
education, at the same time they came across as very ‘middle class’. Somalis 
admired education, with many of them aspiring to undertake tertiary level education, 
some even doing so while operating spaza shops at the same time. This was 
facilitated by the fact that there was not a large disconnect between educated or 
professional ‘elite’ Somalis and poorer Somalis living precariously just below the 
breadline in Bellville. Somalis from diverse backgrounds were still connected to each 
other through their clan affiliations, as well as because the Somali community in 
Bellville was small and tightly knit.  As a result it was not unfamiliar to see spaza 
shopkeepers, court translators, university lecturers, activists, professionals and 
students meeting and socialising together at local restaurants and cafes. Somalis 
that I encountered were also well read and interested in South African, African and 
global politics and history. They also tended to be relatively confident, socially 
aspirational, and engaged in small trade and business rather than labour work. Thus 
although Somalis mostly belonged to a different economic and educational bracket to 
me, this difference did not come across sharply, and was ameliorated by their social 
cohesiveness, their middle class values and aspirations, and their familiarity with 
engaging with educated and professional classes.  
 
The only barrier I encountered when it came to accessing Somali respondents was 
that many of them did not wish to be interviewed in their spaza shops. There were 
several reasons for this, including that they were weary that their customers could 
overhear the interview, and our interviews were frequently interrupted by customer 
requests. However, I felt as though most Somalis were self-conscious about me 
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being there in the first place given that, as a white person, I was clearly not from 
neighbourhood and thus drew attention to them and their shops.  Although I 
addressed this concern by interviewing many Somali respondents in Bellville, the fact 
that most interviews were not conducted in shopkeepers’ spaza shops inhibited my 
ability to directly observe the conditions under which many Somali spaza 
shopkeepers lived and worked. This difficulty would probably have been lessened 
had I been a African foreign national or black South African. 
 
Although my social background and racial identity inhibited me from carrying out 
interviews with Somalis in townships, it was not a stumbling block when it came to 
interviewing South African township residents. This was partly because research 
assistants from the relevant field sites accompanied me during the course of my 
fieldwork. In this way I was able to overcome the serious drawbacks and dangers of 
being unfamiliar with the neighbourhoods and not knowing my way around. Once I 
began my fieldwork I found that being a white middleclass researcher in a poor black 
neighbourhood was generally not a point of contention for local residents. Instead 
many residents viewed me as an interesting anomaly, with whom they were happy to 
engage. The spacial legacies of apartheid are stark in Cape Town, resulting in white 
South Africans barely ever setting foot in black townships. Many township 
interviewees were therefore not only hospitable, but even delighted to have me at 
their homes, urging me to come back and visit them whenever I wished, and 
remarking how pleasant it was seeing a white person in their neighbourhood. Given 
the general lack of meaningful contact between poor black South Africans and 
middle class white South Africans in the city, many township residents seemed eager 
to share their views and describe their communities to me. Unlike with Somali 
interviewees, it did not appear that South Africans necessarily viewed me as a useful 
contact to have. This was possibly because my research topic related to foreign 
national shopkeepers. Instead it seemed to me that they simply enjoyed the 
opportunity to engage across colour and class lines.  
 
Being female enhanced my ability to access Somali and South African research 
participants. I had a sense that it played a role in disarming interviewees, as I rarely 
felt that interviewees were particularly nervous or intimidated by me, or saw me as a 
threat. Sometimes I was surprised by the ease at which interviewees would share 
controversial or personal views with me, despite being well informed that I was 
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undertaking research for a report. This is not to say that being female was not an 
inconvenience at times. I felt very visible in the Somali neighbourhood in Bellville as 
a woman who clearly did not adhere to the cultural norms of the community. 
However, these discomforts did not significantly affect my ability to access the 
relevant participants and conduct research.  
 
Gender issues affected me more when it came to dispersing my research findings - 
i.e. accessing audiences rather than research subjects. Here I found that in largely 
white middle class academic and NGO circles, I did not enjoy the same relative 
privilege that I possessed amongst my research participants in Belville and the 
township field sites. In this different context my gender therefore became a more 
patent disadvantage. For example, in one instance when I raised a number of 
concerns with a director of an NGO regarding foreign national traders, she advised 
that although my concerns were important, I was irrelevant and needed to get 
someone more senior to take up the matters (all her suggestions happened to be 
senior white men). Furthermore when I contacted an NGO to host a discussion panel 
on foreign national spaza shopkeepers, an employee at the NGO apologetically 
advised that I had received no response from their director because he thought I was 
too ‘young’ (which the employee disagreed with). Although my personality, age, and 
lack of seniority likely also played a role in these incidents, I had a sense that in this 
sphere I lacked a degree of authority based on my gender. Lastly, the way I was 
frequently addressed – particularly by male academics - at public forums were subtly 
often laced with paternalism and sexism. Fortunately, while this affected the ability of 
my research to have impact, it did not substantially affect my ability to gather data. 
 
My general outsider status in relation the Somali community, South African residents 
and police officials was more of a barrier when it came to ensuring the validity of the 
research data that I collected. Somalis in general were hesitant to discuss intra-
community conflicts with me.  While they often alluded to animosity between different 
community organisations and clan networks, they avoided discussing these issues in 
detail.  I had a sense that they felt that revealing these issues with me could 
potentially heighten and aggravate conflicts by getting me involved in them, and also 
that they wished provide me with a positive impression of their community. This 
limited my ability to inquire into South African and police allegations that some violent 
attacks against Somali spaza shops were instigated by competing Somali 
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businesses – not South Africans. A further risk of being a white, middleclass, 
Anglophone carrying out research in the Somali community was that I could be 
mistaken for a UNHCR worker or an affiliated aid agency. Many Somali asylum 
seekers and refugees were desperate to apply to the UNHCR for resettlement to a 
third country such as the US. Resettlement programmes tended to target the most 
vulnerable in the Somali community, such as victims of violent crime and 
xenophobia. There was thus a risk that interviewees would embellish their interviews 
with me, in the hope of reaching a different audience. I attempted to diminish this risk 
by having my research assistant explain to potential interviewees in no uncertain 
terms that I was a researcher with no link to the UNHCR.  In addition, information 
sheets and consent forms were provided to interviewees that set out that the purpose 
of the interviews and that they were being conducted for the ACMS. This seemed to 
have paid off, as none of my research subjects raised any questions relating to the 
UNHCR or its resettlement programmes during the course of their interviews.  
 
Although I was South African, the fact that I was white and conducting research for 
the ACMS meant that it is possible some South African residents may not have been 
comfortable fully airing their opinions about Somali spaza shops with me. Because I 
belonged to a minority group myself they may have perceived me to be sympathetic 
towards foreign national groups, and thus thought that I would judge them for airing 
negative views about foreign nationals. This validity issue was potentiality reinforced 
by my general social privilege relative to township residents, as it could have led 
some to defer their responses towards what they thought my views were. It is difficult 
to fully test the degree to which this may have occurred, and thus the authenticity of 
the accounts and views and interviewees provided to me. However in order to enable 
more honest answers I framed my questions in an open and ideologically neutral 
way, avoided showing any judgement on my behalf, or giving any indication of my 
personal opinions.  
 
Although the police that I interviewed were very open and hospitable I could also not 
fully guarantee the validity of the information they provided either. Police 
interviewees clearly attempted to give as best an impression of their work and their 
activities as possible. Also because I interviewed them about their investigations and 
responses towards crimes affecting foreign nationals, they likely assumed I was 
partial to foreign nationals, and thus erred towards not airing contentious opinions 
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about them. I also came to feel that the vigorous hospitality that the SAPS showed 
me was not just a gesture of goodwill, but also a public relations exercise to put 
across a message that they had done their utmost to prevent and investigate crimes 
affecting foreign national spaza shopkeepers. Because I was not an insider to the 
goings-on of any of the police stations in the field sites and I could not verify whether 
their versions of events were correct.  The best I could do was balance their 
experiences against those of Somali spaza shopkeepers and weave the two 
accounts together. Thus while negotiating access to most communities and 
institutions was relatively trouble-free, ensuring the validity of diverse interviewees’ 
accounts was a more complicated task. While my privileged social location and 
outsider status position often aided the former endeavour, they played a more 
obstructive role in the latter undertaking.   
 
Lastly my data was also filtered by my own biography and belief system.  South 
African residents’ and police officials’ suppositions about my views regarding foreign 
nationals were not without cause. Because of my background as a white middle 
class attorney and migration researcher it is correct to say that I carried with me a 
number of biased perspectives. Before setting foot in the field, I was sympathetic 
towards foreign nationals, believed that police were not doing enough to address 
crime, thought that most township residents were xenophobic, and romanticised 
informal justice mechanisms as venues of restorative justice. Although many of these 
beliefs changed during the course of my fieldwork, these normative assumptions 
influenced my lines of questioning and the themes that I explored, especially at the 
early stages of the research. Others, such as a sympathy for the plight of refugees 
and asylum seekers continue to shape my views. Furthermore, being white and from 
a middleclass background also meant that I had no direct personal experience in 
racial oppression, extreme poverty and cultures of violence. This meant that when 
writing up my findings I had little social familiarity and shared meaning to draw on to 
make sense of some of the phenomena that I observed, such as mob killings and 
xenophobic riots. The depth of many of my insights and their accuracy would thus 
probably have been enhanced had I come from relevant communities myself. Instead 
my conclusions had to be drawn largely form careful examinations of my interview 
notes, consulting academic literature, and thinking carefully about the different 
phenomena that I had observed. At the same time, coming from a different 
background to my research subjects also played a constructed role by enabling me 
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to raise critical questions about events and systems of rule and justice that many 
participants immersed in them took for granted. 
 
My position in relation to my research subjects therefore cannot be said to have not 
tainted my research findings. My identity and background impacted on my ability to 
access key communities and institutions, the validity of people’s responses, and on 
my life experience and belief system. All these factors played a role in shaping and 
influencing the data that I collected and relied on for my thesis.  An awareness of this 
process enables one to take certain measures to counter these impacts, while at the 
same time keep in mind the inherent limitations and subjectivity of all qualitative 
research and that the ideal of a singular objective truth remains just that. 
 
2.7 Ethical considerations 
Conducting research on the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers 
raises a number of ethical concerns. The most pressing ethical concern for me was 
the potential for my field research to incite latent antagonism towards foreign national 
spaza traders in my field sites.  I was warned early on by a community mediator in 
Kraaifontein about this possibility. When I asked him how conditions where in the 
neighbourhood a few months after a spate of murders of Somali shopkeepers had 
taken place, he laughed and commented that ‘things are quiet, that is until people 
like you come along wanting to do research’.92 My fieldwork assistant in Philippi who 
worked at a local NGO in the area also shared the mediator’s concern. This was the 
most important ethical advice I received during the course of my fieldwork. It warned 
me that researchers are actors in a field irrespective of how scientific or neutral they 
attempt to be, and that the simple task of asking questions can lead to a person’s life 
being taken.  
 
Unfortunately their fears were shortly thereafter illustrated to me in practice. In early 
2011, a researcher contacted me requesting my assistance towards a research 
project on crime affecting Somali shopkeepers in the Eastern Cape. I gave her the 
details of my Somali research assistant and advised her to ask him whether he could 
put her in contact with a Somali community leader in the Eastern Cape. A few weeks 
later I found out that a Somali national who was assisting her with her research in the 																																																								
92	Telephone	interview,	Kraaifontein	community	mediator,	14	March	2011.	
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Eastern Cape had been murdered. Another Somali national had allegedly stabbed 
him under the mistaken impression that the researcher worked for the UNHCR, and 
that her Somali assistant was preventing the accused’s clan from making contact 
with her. 
 
I never heard from the researcher again so I have only a sparse and second hand 
account of the events that occurred. However, the experience affirmed what I had 
been warned in Kraaifontein, namely that researchers like myself can inadvertently 
cause fatal harm. With the awareness that I was inadvertently a causal link in a chain 
of events that led to someone’s murder, I took a cautious approach when it came to 
my own research. In particular I avoided interviewing South African spaza 
shopkeepers, who were frequently the instigators of attacks on foreign national 
township businesses. The murder in the Eastern Cape also illustrated the importance 
of informed consent to ensure that all participants understand the nature and 
purpose of the research. Thus prior to conducting interviews, I informed interviewees 
via my Somali interpreter as well as in writing of the intention of the study, and the 
terms on which the interview was being conducted. These terms set out: 
 
• The organisation for whom the research was being conducted (i.e. the 
ACMS); 
• That participation was voluntary; 
• That interviewees were free to not answer any questions they were not 
comfortable answering or to stop the interview at any time; 
• That interviews would be kept anonymous and that the names of interviewees 
would not be included in any public documents; 
• That the name of the interviewees’ firms or institutions might be known in 
public documents. 
• That the interviews were confidential, and that only my project co-ordinator 
and myself would have access to the notes and recordings.  
• That I might take notes of the interview and/or tape record the interview. 
 
Key to ensuring the safety of respondents was ensuring their anonymity. Publications 
therefore referred only to residents’ neighbourhoods, the date of the interview, and 
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the area in which the interview took place. References to interviews with Somalis 
would only make mention to the townships where their shops were located, the date 
of the interview, and the suburb where the interview took place (e.g. Bellville). In this 
way it would be very difficult for anyone to specifically identify the individual 
interviewees, as hundreds if not thousands of residents lived in the respective 
neighbourhoods, which also housed between upward of fifty to over a hundred spaza 
shops.93 
 
Where interviewees described having been victimised by crime, were suffering 
psychological trauma, or required social assistance, I felt that it was not sufficient to 
offer basic referral advice on where they could seek assistance. This was because 
many foreign national interviewees mentioned in interviews that they had been 
unable to receive help from various organisations that they had approached including 
NGOs, hospitals and the UNHCR.  This had caused them great disappointment, 
inconvenience and sometimes secondary trauma, as they felt ignored and 
overlooked. It was especially problematic because most foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers preferred to visit organisations’ offices in person rather than make 
enquiries telephonically – possibly due to language barriers. As a result they would 
often commute long distances from Bellville or outlying townships to the city centre to 
seek assistance, which could take up an entire day. To make matters worse it was 
common for organisations that were unwilling or unable to help them, would then 
refer them once more to a different organisation, which also would be unable or 
unwilling to assist them. This would use up even more of traders’ time and resources, 
often with little or no success. 
 
To avoid the above risks I did not simply provide interviewees with the names and 
contact details of organisations that I thought could help them.  Instead I offered to 
contact relevant organisations myself and make enquiries on interviewees’ behalves. 
Usually telephonic correspondence with organisations was enough to assist 
interviewees (or at least find out whether organisations had the capacity to help 
them). Sometimes when an issue affected a number of foreign spaza shopkeepers I 
would attend consultations with interviewees, as I felt that my knowledge of the field 																																																								
93	For	example,	Philippi	East	police	station	stated	that	there	were	82	foreign	national	spaza	shops	in	their	
jurisdiction,	almost	all	of	which	had	experience	violent	crime.	Spaza	shops	in	Khayelitsha	likely	number	in	the	
hundreds	(see	Mandla	Mahashe	‘Partnership	rears	hope’	News24,	29	September	2015,	available	at	
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Local/City-Vision/Partnership-rears-hope-20151028,	date	accessed	3	
March	2017.	
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would be useful. In this way I was able to better ensure that interviewees needing 
assistance were actually helped, rather than sent on a potential wild goose chase 
that could cause more harm than good. 
 
Many Somali spaza shopkeepers spoke of traumatic events that they had 
experienced during the course of their interviews including being shot, beaten or 
observing their friends and relatives being killed. Conducting research on such 
traumatised and vulnerable subjects raises the question of whether I had an 
obligation to actively address and fix their conditions. Because the topic of my 
research was on ‘access to justice’ there was also an expectation – no matter how 
hard I tried to play it down - amongst interviewees and community leaders that my 
research would be of some benefit to their community. Yet, there was little I could 
immediately do to help traders, as I could not conduct police investigations or 
prosecutions myself. Furthermore, being a researcher, rather than an activist meant 
that I could not guarantee that my research and its recommendations were going to 
be taken up by relevant actors such as police and civil society. I therefore could not 
be certain that my work would make any direct positive impact on any of my research 
subjects, or the Somali community in general.  
 
I tried to address the potential one-sidedness of these interactions, by making myself 
available to assist research participants in whatever reasonable and non-financial 
ways that I could. Interviewees frequently contacted me for advice and favours, 
particularly relating to university matters. This advice included requests about what 
different academic disciplines entailed, and requesting feedback on Masters theses. 
In one instance a trader asked me to find out how the University of Cape Town 
discarded its old computers. I also referred traders to a personal injury lawyer (for 
instances of police brutality), and the Legal Resources Centre (when it came to 
regulatory issues). I attended court cases to assist prosecutors to argue sentencing 
(in a murder and robbery case) and also advised prosecutors about invalid police 
fines. I realised that as a result of widespread prejudice that Somali community 
members encountered when dealing with South African institutions, I became seen 
as an intermediary for them. For example, I found that if I made enquiries with 
universities, NGOs or hospitals – I would obtain a quicker and more willing response 
than they would. By making these small efforts I felt that I was giving something back 
to the people who volunteered their time and emotional energy to assist me.  
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What I avoided however was acting as or being perceived as an activist or advocate 
for the Somali community. One of the first points I that I would press in my 
introductions was that I was a researcher, not an activist.  My problem with engaging 
in direct advocacy and activism arose from two concerns. First, I felt that as a 
researcher I had to maintain a degree of neutrality, so that diverse research 
participants would not feel as though I vigorously represented a particular side.  
Second was that in any case it was better for Somali community representatives to 
represent themselves and their causes, rather than myself appropriating their 
struggles and speaking on their behalf. Instead I tried to play a facilitative role by 
connecting people I had met during the course of my research with organisations and 
individuals who could provide direct assistance. I was less active in assisting South 
African interviewees because my interviews focussed mostly on their perceptions of 
foreign spaza traders, rather than their own problems. Also because my interviews in 
townships were dispersed and randomised, I did not experience the same 
community immersion as I did with the Somali community. 
 
Apart from availing myself to research participants, I also hoped that the research 
itself would influence state policies and assist activists. I published three policy 
reports subsequent to my research that related to crime affecting foreign national 
spaza shopkeepers, the regulation of their businesses, as well as the economic 
dimensions of their business activities. My reports were furnished to the SAPS, 
Somali community leaders, and NGOs such as the Legal Resources Centre. The 
research was also used to make submissions to the Department of Trade and 
Industry and to the Competition Commission.  
 
I also tried to be of support to Somali and NGO activists. On completion of my 
research I held a workshop with various Somali community leaders about my findings 
and recommendations, as well as a separate workshop for civil society. In the 
aftermath of my workshop with Somali community activists, they set up a committee 
made up of representatives from different Somali community organisations to work 
with police, monitor criminal cases and support victims. In sum I would have been 
deeply uncomfortable conducting research with victims of violent crime and 
xenophobia knowing that the research was simply for academic or philosophical 
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purposes, with no intention to try and influence policies and strategies to improve 
their condition.  
 
This is not to say that one should not at all reflect on the deeper political and 
philosophical implications of traumatic phenomena. One scorching hot afternoon, 
while driving with my South African research assistant in Philippi, he interrupted me 
in mid-conversation and asked ‘why do you care so much about what happens to 
Somalis’? Strangely I could not provide a clear answer.  Of course Somali spaza 
traders in the neighbourhood had suffered a great deal of violence and prejudice in 
Philippi, but so had almost all residents there. I ended up simply telling him in a 
confused and muffled way that I believed that Somali spaza shopkeepers’ 
experiences in the neighbourhood signified something important about the country – 
what it was I did not know. 
 
The discomfort of not understanding the deeper reasons for why I had been drawn to 
the research topic lingered with me. When the research project for the ACMS ended 
in October 2012, I therefore felt that the data that I had collected needed deeper 
reflection. By carrying out a PhD on this material I hoped to understand why I had 
found certain phenomena particularly disturbing by examining the underlying political 
themes and dynamics that were manifesting in governance efforts. As a result I re-
examined the research material from a theoretical rather than a policy perspective. 
Disengaging from the imperative to act and do something was important as it 
enabled me to engage in a more honest analysis. While it is important to use one’s 
research in the sphere of action to assist victims of trauma, it is also important to 
reflect on traumatic incidents to understand their greater meaning and implications 
for society. Otherwise the more fundamental lessons and warning signs of such 
phenomena could remain overlooked.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
The thesis encounters a number of methodological challenges.  These range from 
assessing what the term ‘governance’ actually means, to finding a theoretical 
framework suited to the interdisciplinary topic. The thesis’ case study methodology is 
also largely based on archived data. Furthermore my positionality as a white middle 
class woman conducting research amongst less privileged research subjects 
	 68	
requires interrogation, as does the ethics of carrying out research involving 
traumatised and marginalised individuals.  
 
This chapter addresses these multiple challenges. It defines the term ‘governance’ 
as the ways in which individuals or bodies exercising a degree of authority attempt to 
steer social order, and explains why the law and society movement, which similarly 
explores legal and regulatory phenomena from a social science perspective, 
provides a suitable theoretical framework for the thesis. The chapter then highlights 
how archived research included a substantial amount of data on governance, and 
how these events mirror dynamics across the country. Thereafter the chapter 
explores how my positionality as a white middle class female researcher, was 
simultaneously facilitative and obstructive to data collection processes. Lastly the 
chapter contemplates the ethics of conducting a research involving marginalised 
groups in context of conflict and violence. It acknowledges that the active role of 
researchers in fieldwork settings can spark conflicts and even give rise to human 
fatalities.  This points to the importance of erring on the side of caution, even if this 
means working with an incomplete data set. Researching people’s trauma is 
nevertheless important, as it can contribute toward shaping policy environments, 
assisting activists working in the field, and better understanding and awareness of 
the deeper social and political shifts underlying to their condition. These are 
important contributions towards addressing the plight of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers in South Africa, as well as reflecting on the country’s current political 
and social direction as a whole. 
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3. Unpacking the shop gevaar: justifications for curbing foreign national spaza 
shops 
 
3.1 Introduction:  
Attempts to govern foreign national spaza shopkeepers in South Africa generally aim 
to curtail their business activities rather than find ways to harness their economic 
potential.  This is primarily because many governance actors ranging from competing 
South African spaza shopkeepers, state officials and political leaders view shops 
more as a threat or gevaar than an asset or opportunity. To understand why shops 
are viewed with consternation this chapter discusses the history of governance 
interventions in the country and the reasons given by governance actors for their 
approaches. It argues that many of the stated justifications for interventions 
(including that foreign national spaza shops cause economic harm, engage in illegal 
activities, and are vulnerable to crime) do not add up and present only a partial and 
at times misleading picture of the challenges posed and faced by foreign national 
spaza businesses.  
 
The chapter then consults various theoretical explanations for why host populations 
often view foreign national traders with fear and anxiety. These theories highlight the 
clannish behaviour of foreign traders (Weber and Bonacich), as well as post-colonial 
political conditions which anchor rights in notions of indigeneity (Fanon and 
Mamdani). The chapter argues that in addition to the abovementioned factors, a key 
force contributing to anxieties over foreign national spaza shops is the boiling socio-
economic discontent of many township residents. This anger is easily inflamed by 
South African spaza shopkeepers and is appeased to a degree by policies that 
prioritise the place of citizens in the spaza market.  	
3.2 Starting at the beginning: Hooda’s news 
Hadis chose to close his shop early at around 8pm on Monday night, instead of the 
usual time of 10pm. The deadline for foreign national spaza shops to shut down and 
leave Masiphumelele township had passed two days prior, and he was concerned 
about rumours of potential violence. This was particularly the case given that South 
African shopkeepers had threatened at a recent community meeting to ‘send their 
	 70	
dogs’ against those shopkeepers whose businesses remained open.94 While some 
traders had complied with the demand fearing attack, he had decided to follow the 
advice of the local police and remain open. They had assured him that he was 
entitled to trade by law, and that they would patrol the area and guard against any 
threats. Hadis usually felt safe and at ease in the neighbourhood, and regularly 
walked its dark, beaten down streets at night to visit friends, one of whom owned a 
television set where he could watch football until late into the evening. But the mood 
in the township had changed over the past two weeks since South African spaza 
shopkeepers had sent out letters informing their foreign national counterparts to 
leave. Several heated meetings had followed where South African spaza 
shopkeepers demanded that police, community leaders, and South African landlords 
assist in the eviction of foreign national spaza shopkeepers from the neighbourhood. 
It had also not become uncommon for customers or strangers in the street to warn 
him that his time in Masiphumelele was almost up. 
 
Hadis had purchased his shop ‘Mandela Cash Store’ two months earlier in June 
2006 from a Somali trader who was leaving Masiphumelele to live in the Eastern 
Cape Province. He had received a fifty percent shareholding in the shop for a price of 
R35,000. R20,000 of this amount came from his personal savings earned by working 
for relatives in spaza shops in Upington and Samora Machel in Cape Town. The 
remaining R15,000 had been loaned to him from friends and family. The shop’s 
corrugated iron structure was connected to his South African landlord’s home, and 
stocked household items ranging from fruit, vegetables, bread, sugar, rice, meat, 
shampoo, and cosmetics. Hadis acquired goods for his shop from several 
wholesalers in the industrial area of Epping, targeting special promotions and the 
lowest prices on offer by wholesalers in the area. These price savings were passed 
on to customers, aided by low mark ups on goods, ‘If you get R6,00 for 1kg sugar, 
that’s just for example, then you need to sell for R7,00 or R8,00, while some other 
people sell it for like R10,00’.95 However as much as these practices benefitted 
consumers in Masiphumelele, they drew the ire of competing South African spaza 
traders who viewed foreign nationals’ low prices as pushing their shops out of the 
market. 
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Hadis had not yet drawn any income from the shop, as the business struggled to 
meet its monthly rental payment of R2,500, and any remaining profits had been 
reinvested back into the business in order to build up its supply of stock and broaden 
the shop’s product range. He and his business partner – a fellow Somali - managed 
to make ends meet by living on the shop premises along with their shop assistant, 
surviving off some of the food items that they stocked. Most dinners comprised sliced 
brown bread with butter, but on some occasions they prepared canned curry and 
bread, or chicken fried with onion and potatoes and boiled with rice. Conveniently, a 
talkative Somali woman named Hooda96 operated a small spaza shop or ‘tuck shop’ 
called ‘Buya Buya’ across the road, where she lived with her Ethiopian husband and 
three children. When short of change or stock Hadis would cross the street and ask 
for her assistance. 
 
The sun had long set by 8pm on the winter’s night of the 28th of August 2006. Hadis 
closed his burglar gate and served a few more customers through its iron bars. He 
checked his watch, and wondered whether to keep the shop open for half an hour 
longer. He had recently failed to negotiate a lower rental amount with his landlord, 
and was worried that he was not going to be able to pay his rent at the end of the 
month. His thoughts were interrupted when he noticed Hooda running hastily across 
the street towards him. This time her visit had nothing to do with their routine shop 
errands. She reached his gate panicked and frightened. Looting had started in 
Masiphumelele she told him, and hurriedly told him the names of shops in the area 
that she had heard had been attacked.  She ran back across the dark street and 
secured herself quickly inside her shop. Hadis slammed his burglar gate shut, locked 
his front door, and phoned the police. The police on the other end of the line sounded 
rushed and distracted. They informed him that they were overwhelmed by looting 
and attacks on shops in the area, but would come through to the shop as soon as 
they could.  
 
As Hadis sat in fear in his shop digesting Hooda’s news, he heard the voices and 
chants of a mob made up of over a hundred people coming closer to his premises. 
He gradually discerned the phrase ‘Hamba Baraka’, meaning ‘go away Somalis’97 																																																								
96	Not	her	real	name.	
97	The	first	Somali	spaza	shop	to	open	in	Masiphumelele	was	called	‘Baraka	Cash	Store’,	which	then	became	a	
colloquial	term	for	Somalis	in	the	neighbourhood.	See	Craig	Timberg	‘Not	So	Welcome	in	South	Africa’	
Washington	Post	1	October	2006,	available	at	http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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being called out by the crowd. A stone slammed against the thin corrugated iron wall 
of his shop and then another, until stones, bricks, pangas and axes began raining 
down on his shop. A group of people shook the shop door and burglar guard, trying 
to break in. At the same time, the shop’s window shattered and arms and hands 
cascaded through, grasping for any items within reach. Hadis and his colleagues 
armed themselves with empty glass bottles and a panga (a type of machete) that 
they kept in the shop. One of his colleagues reached to the window where he hit 
people’s hands with a glass bottle, one injured looter exclaiming ‘Voetsek!’ (get lost!) 
as he pulled his arms back. Some looters climbed onto the shop’s corrugated iron 
roof in an attempt to break in from above. Hadis and his colleagues responded by 
hitting the shop’s walls with glass bottles and their panga to indicate they had 
makeshift weapons and were prepared to fight back. 
 
Fifteen minutes into the chaos, Hadis heard the sound of police vehicles stopping 
outside his shop, accompanied by shouts and the firing of rubber bullets. The mob 
quickly dispersed, evaporating into the surrounding darkness. Ten policemen 
approached the shop, ‘Are you safe?’ one of them asked, and informed the stunned 
traders that a number of shops had been looted that evening. Hadis and his 
colleagues tried to load some of their stock into the police vehicle, but the police 
hesitated ‘look we have a report that some of your brothers are stabbed and you 
know we have life threatening things, so we cannot save the property’.98 Seeing no 
choice but to abandon his shop without any protection, Hadis climbed into the police 
vehicle, turning his back permanently on his life’s savings and possessions, and the 
South African dream as he understood it. 
 
The riots in Masiphumelele were not the only attacks on foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers at the time. Somali community organisations reported that dozens of 
Somali spaza shopkeepers had been killed in various towns and cities in the Western 
Cape between July and September 2006.99 They claimed that these murders were 
orchestrated by competing South African businesses as a means of eradicating 
competition. Police originally attributed the murders to business robberies, but later 																																																																																																																																																														
dyn/content/article/2006/09/30/AR2006093000982.html,	date	accessed	6	June	2012.	
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99	Staff	Reporter	‘Toll	hits	30	after	more	Somalis	murdered’	IOL	News,	4	September	2006,	available	at	
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/toll-hits-30-after-more-somalis-murdered-1.292234#.T89hQu3Q9UQ,	
date	accessed	6	June	2012.	Karen	Breytenbach	‘Somalis	are	'suffering	brunt	of	xenophobia'	IOL	News,	August	7	
2006,	available	at	http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/somalis-are-suffering-brunt-of-xenophobia-
1.288384#.T8-2He3Q9UQ,	date	accessed	6	June	2012.	
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conceded that competing South African spaza shopkeepers may have planned some 
of the attacks.100 Somali spaza shops in Knysna had also been looted earlier in the 
year, resulting in over a hundred Somali shopkeepers being evacuated from the 
area.101 
 
Apart from leaving a permanent impression on the lives of an estimated 71 foreign 
national residents forced to evacuate their shops and homes that night, 102  the 
Masiphumelele riots of August 2006 comprise an enduring marker in a different way. 
Against the backdrop of the chaos emerged possibly the earliest attempt to regulate 
foreign national spaza shops in post-apartheid South Africa. In other words, the 
aftermath of the attacks mark the beginning of a politics of governing foreign national 
spaza traders in the country - a politics that would spread across the city of Cape 
Town, the Western Cape Province, and eventually become a key national-level 
governance dilemma. After the high profile violence and fury in Masiphumelele, 
questions of how to address the perceived threat posed by foreign national spaza 
shops became of heightened importance. As a result, parties ranging from police, 
local councilors, South African and foreign national shopkeepers, NGOs, to local and 
national government members increasingly became engaged in various efforts to 
control the ‘influx’ of foreign shopkeepers and regulate their trade.  
 
3.3 The Masiphumelele intervention  
At the beginning of September 2006, after the dust had settled in Masiphumelele and 
foreign national spaza shops stood empty and vandalised, the office of the Western 
Cape Provincial Premier, Ebrahim Rasool launched an intervention to address the 
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conflict.103  The Office’s Directorate for Social Dialogue and Human Rights appointed 
an NGO named Africa Unite to organise mediations between South African and 
Somali spaza traders in Masiphumelele, and requested Islamic Relief Worldwide to 
assist with emergency relief.104 An official report documenting the process largely 
attributed the strife to the actions of foreign nationals, in particular their ‘influx’ into 
the neighbourhood, and the competition they posed to South African spaza 
shopkeepers, which it perceived as ‘unfair’.105 This was accentuated by the fact that 
Masiphumelele was a low income neighbourhood where competition over resources 
was tight. The report states that similar conflicts were emerging elsewhere, as ‘other 
communities in the Western Cape are up in arms over a perceived take-over by 
Somali refugees and a noticeable threat to their economic survival’.106 It criticizes 
South African landlords that rent properties to foreign nationals, as indifferent 
towards the social and economic aspirations of South Africans.107  
 
in October 2006 Africa Unite held several workshops with community leaders, as well 
as foreign national and South African spaza shopkeepers in Masiphumelele. These 
mediations culminated in an ‘agreement on future business arrangements in 
Masiphumemelele’.108 Whilst the report does not specify the exact content of the 
agreement, foreign national spaza shopkeepers and media reports described that it 
provided that existing foreign national traders could re-enter Masiphumemele on 
condition that no new foreign national spaza shops openned in the township.109 The 
number of foreign national spaza shops permitted to operate was set at 15.110  
 
The report concludes that: ‘the commitment to non-partisanship does not imply that 
interventions [sic] strategies should be neutral with respect to violence, the rule of 
law and constitutional rights’.111 Yet, acting neutral with respect to violence, the rule 
of law and constitutional rights is precisely what the governance outcome entailed. A 
news article quotes a representative of Islamic Relief Worldwide as describing the 																																																								
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outcome as ‘flagrantly unconstitutional’ 112  He explains that ‘Unfortunately the 
Somalis, who wanted to move back to Masiphumelele, had no bargaining power. The 
failure of government to protect them from attacks basically had them agreeing to 
whatever was tabled… I cannot say it was a fair negotiation, but at least there is a 
semblance of peace’.113 Neither did the course of justice play out in respect to the 
violence committed by many South African shopkeepers and residents that night, 
with none meeting any formal punishment or censure for their acts. 
 
3.4 Governance interventions in Cape Town and further afield 
The governance intervention that was introduced in Masiphumelele in late 2006 did 
not end there. Less than two years later, in May 2008, South Africa was struck by 
nation-wide xenophobic riots that left 62 people dead and tens of thousands 
displaced. South African spaza traders in the Strand, about 50 kilometres outside of 
Cape Town, capitalised on the spirit of lawlessness to rid their neighbourhoods of 
foreign national competition by sending out letters to foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers in the area demanding that they close their businesses.114 The fear 
ignited by the notices led to all foreign national residents – not only spaza 
shopkeepers – evacuating the area, with opportunistic residents looting businesses 
while their owners fled.115 A similar occurrence took place in Khayelitsha, which was 
also a site of widespread xenophobic public violence in 2008. A legal aid attorney 
who had been instructed to represent individuals accused of participating in the 2008 
attacks, explained that many of her clients ‘were shopkeepers who felt they loosing 
their businesses because foreigners were selling products at cheaper rates’.116 She 
stated that of the approximately fifty ‘xenophobia’ matters that she handled, 
approximately two thirds related to business competition.117 
 
The violence in Masiphumelele, the Strand and Khayelitsha demonstrated that 
disgruntled South African traders possessed the ability to trigger broader social 
chaos and lawlessness. In other words South African traders’ demands were not 
carefully dealt with, they could incite broader conflict and displacement. This urgency 																																																								
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was heightenned by police suspicisions that certain South African spaza 
shopkeepers were behind a number of murders of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers who had fallen victim to deadly shootings and arson attacks on their 
shops.118 These events likely influenced later governance to mobilisations by South 
African spaza shopkeepers. In August 2008, a South African retailers association 
called ‘Zanokhanyo Retailers Association’ (Zanokhanyo) distributed letters to foreign 
spaza shop owners in Khayelitsha. The letters were dated 22 August 2008 and 
instructed foreign shop owners to close down their businesses from 25 August 2008 
until 14 September 2008, during which period the future of their shops would be 
discussed. 119 In contrast to previous state responses where police only intervened 
after looting and violence had already broken out, police in Khayelitsha took 
preventative measures and immediately arrested Zanokhanyo members who were 
responsible for the letter. 
 
Yet, as in Masiphumelele and the Strand, the police actions in Khayelitsha did not 
culminate in strict punishments for known culprits. Instead the members of 
Zanokhanyo were granted a suspended sentence on condition that they withdrew 
their demands. To ease tensions, the South African Police Service (SAPS) set up a 
mediation process between Zanokhanyo, representatives of the Somali community, 
and the South African National Civic Orgaisation (SANCO), and appointed a 
reverend affiliated to the police station to mediate.120 The process culminated in a 
similar outcome to that of Masiphumelele – namely an agreement dated 27 
November 2008, which prohibited the opening of any new Somali spaza shops in 
Khayelitsha without the approval of the Zanokhanyo Retailers Association and the 
Somali Retailers Association.121  
 
These terms were mirrored in the Gugulethu agreement, which was established after 
threats emerged in the township the following year.  Similarly, in 2011 in the field site 
of Kraaifontein, SANCO called a meeting between Somali and South African spaza 
shopkeepers at Kraaifontein police station, where Somalis agreed to refrain from 
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opening new spaza shops in the neighbourhood.122 In Philippi that same year, South 
African traders sent out letters to South African landlords who rented out their 
premises to foreign national spaza shopkeepers informing them to stop operating 
their shops by 30 June 2011.123  On 6 July they proceeded to forcibly close down 
twelve shops, before police arrived on the scene and halted their actions. 124 
Thereafter police held meetings at Philippi East police station, where South African 
spaza shopkeepers agreed not to resort to violence on the one hand, and Somali 
spaza shopkeepers agreed not to open new shops in the neighbourhood on the other 
hand. South African traders, a Somali community leader and the police would 
monitor the agreement.125 To assist this process, the police conducted an audit of 
foreign national spaza shops in the jurisdiction.126 
 
Such ‘agreements’ soon became the norm in Cape Town’s townships. Informal 
restrictions of foreign national spaza shops were established in Masiphumelele in 
2006, Khayelitsha and the Strand in 2008, Gugulethu in 2009, Bloekombos and 
Wallacedene in Kraaifontein, and Philippi in 2011. Collectively these areas amounted 
to the majority of the city’s black townships. Over the next few years, mobilisations by 
South African spaza shopkeepers saw police and NGOs quickly set up mediations 
between South African and foreign national spaza shopkeepers lest repetitions of 
2006 and 2008 occur. Meetings were mediated by diverse parties ranging from 
NGOs, community leaders, and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR). Other parties such as SANCO, ward councillors, local government officials 
(from the department of economic development, municipal law enforcement services, 
and disaster risk management centre), and provincial and national government 
representatives were often also in attandance. These interventions usually resulted 
in South African retailers accepting that existing foreign national spaza shops could 
remain in operation on condition that foreign nationals (most commonly Somalis)127 
would not open new businesses. Additional prohibitions sometimes accompanied the 
general ban on new foreign national spaza shops.  For example, the Gugulethu trade 
agreement provided that apart from not openning new shops, Somali spaza 																																																								
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shopkeepers had to to fix their prices to match those offered by South African 
shopkeepers, move their shops at least 100m away from South African spaza shops, 
and ensure that their shops did not make up more than thirty percent of the total 
number of spaza shops in the area.128  
 
Comparable trade agreements have been negotiated further afield. Foreign national 
spaza traders in the Saldanha Bay area along the West Coast described similar rules 
governing the spaza market in their neighbourhoods. 129 Media reports also indicated 
that agreements barring new foreign national shops had been entered into in 
Mbekweni in Paarl in 2009, 130 as well as in the Eastern Cape towns of Port Elizabeth 
in 2011 and Bisho in July 2012.131 When conflict arose in Bisho in August 2012 
regarding the implementation of a trade agreement that prohibited new foreign 
national spaza shops from opening, the provincial MEC for local government, Mlibo 
Qoboshiyane, set up a meeting to resolve the tensions, and reached the conclusion 
that ‘the community-imposed limit on foreign shops was justified and would be 
enforced’.132 
 
By the end of 2012 local level informal mobilisations against foreign national spaza 
shops in Cape Town had subsided. Instead political attention shifted to national state 
level. For example, in June 2012, the ANC in the Western Cape called for state 
intervention to restrict the ability of foreign nationals to operate spaza shops in 
townships. The following year the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) published 
a draft Licensing of Businesses Bill aimed at regulating informal businesses in the 
country, and formulated a draft National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy 
(Nibus). In 2014 the State President established a national Department of Small 
Business Development headed by Minister Lindiwe Zulu to strengthen small 
business sectors including the spaza market. During that period Somali community 
activists informed me that little was occurring in Cape Town’s townships in terms of 
mobilisations by South African traders, with only robberies and occasional looting a 
persistent concern.  
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Like local efforts, national level interventions also focussed on curbing foreign 
national spaza shops. For example, in its discussion on foreign national businesses 
in South Africa, Nibus considers the model of Ghana where foreign nationals are 
barred from owning small businesses. 133  Similarly new draft migration policies 
propose prohibiting asylum seekers from operating businesses in the country, and 
only permitting certain asylum seekers to carry out work for an ‘employer’.134 In 
March 2016 the Premier of the North West province, Supra Mahumapelo called for 
the confiscation of all foreign national spaza businesses in the province to be 
confiscated and handed over to South Africans.135  
 
The governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers on local, provincial and 
national levels thus illustrates that many parties view foreign national spaza shops as 
a threat to South African citizens’ interests, and according believe that foreign 
nationals’ abilities to trade should be curtailed, whether via legal, extra-legal, illegal 
means. Before investigating the political processes and contestations involved in 
governance interventions, it is necessary to examine what motivates all these 
attempts to limit foreign national spaza shops in the first place. This involves 
exploring various parties’ justifications for curbing foreign national spaza shops 
contained, as well as considering academic accounts of fears and antagonisms 
towards foreign national small businesses. 	
3.5 Justifications given for curbing foreign national businesses 
When it comes to foreign national spaza shops in South Africa, there were four 
general reasons usually given by governance actors ranging from police, local 
government officials, political leaders, and NGOs to justify the need to curb them. 
First, many South African spaza shopkeepers and state policy makers complained 
that foreign national spaza shops were detrimental to local economies and 
obstructed job creation. Many South African spaza shopkeepers stated that they had 
not been able to compete with foreign national businesses and had to close shop as 
a result.136 Many policy makers felt that there was no space for aspirant shopkeepers 
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in the market, given the number of foreign national businesses in the market. 137 This 
concern was heightened by the belief that foreign national businesses enjoyed a 
number of competitive edges over their South African counterparts, such as 
possessing wider business ‘networks’. 138  Other economic complaints were that 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers sent remittances to their home countries instead 
of spending their income in South Africa, and did not contribute to the state’s fiscal by 
paying taxes.  
 
A second concern frequently mentioned by governance actors was that foreign 
national spaza shops engaged in illegal activities. Apart from tax avoidance, 
governance actors also claimed that shops breached by-laws and licensing laws, and 
that traders sold counterfeit and illegally imported goods.  A third justification often 
given for restricting foreign national spaza shops was that they were heavily prone to 
business robberies. This resulted in the South African Police Service (SAPS) 
demanding stricter regulation of their businesses. Lastly, many local level 
governance actors feared that not curbing foreign national spaza shops would cause 
South African spaza shopkeepers to incite xenophobic attacks against foreign 
national spaza shops, or orchestrate other forms of violence against traders. 
However on closer inspection these factors – competition, illegality, business 
robbery, and threats of violence - did not sufficiently justify the sweeping 
interventions demanded and their potentially damaging impacts. Thus the stated 
reasons for interventions only presented a partial picture of the factors driving 
governance intervention. 
 
When it comes to concerns about foreign national spaza shops’ impact on local 
economies, some worries were legitimate. Many South African spaza shops have not 
been able to compete with foreign national spaza businesses, and have had to close 
shop as a result. For example, the Gugulethu agreement sets out South African 
shopkeepers’ grievances against their Somali counterparts, who they claim had been 
detrimental to their livelihoods. It states:  
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‘Somali traders sell their goods far cheaper than the local traders. They 
[South African spaza retailers] also claim that Somalis would pitch their shops 
closer to the shops of the locals and as their wares are sold cheaper, buyers 
turn to buy from the Somali shopkeepers rather than from the locals. In this 
manner, local shopkeepers are forced to close their shops because they are 
unable to compete with the Somalis.139 
 
Governance actors and residents also perceived foreign national spaza shops’ 
competitiveness as restricting opportunities for South Africans to enter the spaza 
market. A number of residents were concerned that the market was saturated with 
foreign national spaza businesses, and South Africans would thus not be able to 
enter. Furthermore, it was common for foreign national spaza shopkeepers to send 
substantial portions of their incomes back to their home countries to support their 
relatives, rather than spending the entirety of their incomes in South Africa (whether 
this is something they should be criticised for is another question). It is possible that 
many, if not most foreign national spaza shopkeepers did not pay income tax140 – 
although it is likely that a number of traders’ incomes fell below the income tax 
threshold of R75,000 per year, meaning that they were not required to pay any 
income tax.141  
 
However governance actors rarely weighed these potential negative economic 
impacts against the economic advantages that foreign national spaza shops offered. 
While foreign national spaza shop competition may well have contributed to the 
demise of many South African spaza shops, it also created economic opportunities 
for a number of South African spaza traders. In particular, the presence of foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers opened up the prospect for South African spaza 
shopkeepers to rent out their shops and become landlords instead. Practically all 
foreign national spaza traders in the field sites were tenants and did not own the 
properties from which they traded. By leasing out their properties to foreign nationals, 																																																								
139	Gugulethu	agreement	(note	128).	
140	I	cannot	be	certain	either	way,	as	I	did	not	carry	out	research	on	foreign	nationals’	degree	of	tax	compliance.	
141I	did	not	carry	out	research	into	spaza	shop	earnings,	but	anecdotal	encounters	suggested	that	many	traders	
earned	meagre	incomes.	A	Somali	shop	owner	in	Khayelitsha	reported	that	he	earned	approximately	R4,000	per	
month,	half	of	which	he	sent	to	his	relatives	in	Somalia	every	month.	His	yearly	income	thus	fell	far	below	the	tax	
threshold	of	R75,000.	During	a	focus	group	with	ten	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers	from	Khayelitsha,	my	questioning	
was	met	with	 laughter	from	the	participants,	who	thought	that	my	use	of	the	term	‘business’	to	describe	their	
shops	was	amusing.	My	interpreter	explained	‘Now	he	can	see	you	get	suspicious	because	we	laugh.		But	why	he	
said	that	is	because	what	you	thought	and	how	they	are	is	far	different.	I	mean	the	way	that	the	question	of	you	
doing	‘business’	and	the	person	that	is	looking	for	his	daily	food	is	far	from	each	other,	that’s	what	he’s	saying.’ 
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a number of former South African spaza shopkeepers – as well as other township 
residents - were better off through having created passive income streams for 
themselves. For example a landlord in Philippi stated that he used to operate his 
spaza shop himself, but found that his relatives who assisted him stole items from 
the business with the result that he rarely made a profit.  He therefore decided to sell 
the business to foreign nationals for R70,000, and when interviewed in 2011 earned 
a monthly rent of R4,000 from the shop.142 For some becoming a landlord was a 
necessity, for example the wife of a landlord in Philippi East stated that her husband 
was a pensioner who was bedridden, so could no longer operate his shop himself. 
 
Foreign national spaza shops contributed to local economies in other ways.  South 
African consumers reported that foreign national spaza shop prices tended to be 
lower and their services better than South African spaza shops. For example, 
customers noted that foreign national spaza shops offered credit, possessed correct 
change, had shorter queues, sold goods in flexible quantities (e.g. a single tea bag or 
egg as opposed to a whole box), offered ‘hampers’ (bulk collections of goods sold at 
a discount), provided wider product ranges, and tended not to run out of stock. These 
offerings were especially important given that spaza shop customers often struggled 
to afford basic food and household items. Other stakeholders benefitting from foreign 
national spaza shops included wholesalers, suppliers and manufacturers (both large 
and small scale) and South African employees.  For example, the manger of Philippi 
Cash and Carry reported that the wholesaler employed 103 South Africans and two 
foreign nationals (himself (an Israeli national) and a Somali translator).143 In his view 
the growth of foreign shops had expanded his customer base and resulted in higher 
sales, enabling him to hire more South African workers.144 
 
Yet these economic advantages – which governance interventions could undermine - 
were rarely mentioned or explicitly considered by governance actors. For example 
the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Migration (IMC) indicated to the Ad-Hoc Joint 
Committee on probing violence against foreign nationals that ‘foreign nationals were 
dominating trade in certain sectors such as consumable goods in informal 
settlements which has had a negative impact on unemployed and low skilled South 
																																																								
142	Interview,	Philippi	East,	22	November	2011.	
143Interview,	Philippi	East,	12	July	2012.	
144	Ibid.	
	 83	
Africans’. 145  However their analysis does not mention any of the economic 
advantages and contributions of foreign national spaza shops. 
 
It is largely understandable for South African spaza shopkeepers to feel threatened 
by the growth and spread of foreign national spaza shops in South Africa’s 
townships, and for them to mobilise against their new competitors. Competition often 
gives rise to conflict and even violence.  The taxi industry in South Africa is one 
example. Frustration can be aggravated when new competitors are recent arrivals to 
a country. What is not as clear is why this concern so easily outweighed the interests 
of a number of other stakeholders, and why many governance actors went so far as 
to breach the law in order to address the relatively isolated concerns of South African 
spaza shopkeepers. This was particularly confusing since curbing foreign national 
spaza businesses is potentially detrimental to broader local economies and low-
income consumers. Governance policies may have benefitted some South African 
spaza shopkeepers by reducing competition, but they also posed an economic threat 
to many other parties. Given that the local economic context was complex and 
contained multiple participants, it is not clear why governance actors were so driven 
to enforce the will of South African spaza shopkeepers. This suggests that other 
concerns played a role in their responses. 
 
Another reason given by governance actors for curtailing foreign national spaza 
shops related to their alleged involvement in illegal activities. Police officials, local 
authorities and political leaders frequently accused foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers of not paying taxes, being illegal immigrants, not complying with by-
laws and health and safety legislation, not possessing business licenses, acquiring 
unlawful firearms, illegally importing goods, selling counterfeit and illicit goods, and 
engaging in ‘unfair’ trading practices in general. For example, the report of the Ad 
Hoc Joint Committee on Probing Violence against Foreign Nationals states that 
foreign nationals dominate trade in part because their business models discourage 
competition through ‘forming monopolies, evading taxes, avoiding customs and 
selling illegal and expired goods’.146 It recommends better policing of container shops 
																																																								
145	Report	by	the	Ad	Hoc	Joint	Committee	on	probing	violence	against	foreign	nationals,	19	November	2015,	at	
20.	
146	Ibid	at	20.	
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and counterfeit goods, improving the monitoring of business permits and by-laws, 
and ensuring there were not ‘too many licenses in one area’.147  
 
Several senior political leaders repeated this message. At a meeting with small 
businesses in Orange Farm, Gauteng on 2 April 2013, the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, Rob Davies, accused foreign national spaza shops of engaging in unlawful 
practices. He stated that a number of foreign national businesses sold ‘Goods that 
are imported, probably illegally. Bad productivity, are not made in South Africa, that 
are not proudly South African’.148 The Minister of Small Business Development, 
Lindiwe Zulu echoed this sentiment when she called for the tighter regulation of 
foreign national small businesses – claiming that many did not trade in accordance 
with the law.149 Even President Jacob Zuma argued that foreign national businesses’ 
failure to comply with South African laws was responsible for violent attacks against 
them in Gauteng in January and February 2015. At a breakfast briefing he explained 
that: 
 
Nobody was saying ‘we don’t want you in these shops’. Only when this 
incident [i.e. the shooting of a 14 year old alleged robber by a Somali 
shopkeeper with an unregistered firearm] happens, then it triggered that 
problem. … We need to help the foreigners. One - so that they must 
understand that they couldn’t provoke.  Two - they themselves should have 
things within the law.150 
 
However these claims about foreign national spaza shops’ lack of legal compliance 
are mainly inaccurate or exaggerated. Furthermore, governance actors’ lack of 
concern for similar behaviours amongst South African spaza shopkeepers suggest 
there are likely other motives behind calls to increase the regulation of foreign 
national shops.   																																																								
147	Report	(not	145)	at	38	to	39.	
148	Davies	(note	138).	
149	Nompumelelo	Magwaza		‘Minister	calls	for	spaza	shop	dialogue’	Sowetan,	16	April	2015,	available	at	
http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2015/04/16/minister-calls-for-spaza-shop-dialogue?mode=true,	date	
accessed	4	March	2017.	Lindwe	Zulu	interview	with	SABC	‘Laws	regulating	foreign	owned	spazas	must	be	fast	
tracked:	Zulu’	SABC	News	27	January	2015,	available	at	
http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/bfdc37004715bf689b21bf686e648436/Laws-regulating-foreign-owned-spazas-
must-be-fast-tracked:-Zulu-20152701,	date	accessed	4	March	2017.	
150	 Jacob	Zuma	at	The	New	Age	(TNA)	breakfast	13	February	2015 ,	available	at	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0TRWprjhnWY 	
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Foreign national spaza shops were by no means all law abiding. For example, many 
foreign national spaza shops in the field sites did possess unregistered firearms.151 
This was mostly in response to widespread violent crime affecting them, as well as 
their inability to carry registered firearms, as they were not South African citizens or 
permanent residents.152 Furthermore, a number of foreign national spaza shops in 
the field sites sold illicit cigarettes. These were not counterfeit goods, but were mainly 
released on the market by legitimate South African tobacco manufacturers without 
disclosure to the revenue service (tobacco products were heavily taxed in South 
Africa).153 
 
Most other allegations of illegal practices were largely misplaced or ignorant of the 
legal framework governing spaza shops.  While informal street traders, small 
businesses and hawkers often engaged in counterfeit sales of goods, spaza shops 
tended to sell food and household products such as sugar, bread, oil, flour and maize 
meal which was manufactured in South Africa, and purchased from local 
wholesalers.154 Many if not most foreign national spaza shopkeepers resided legally 
in South Africa as asylum seekers or refugees, and were thus entitled to work in the 
country. For instance, in Cape Town by far the majority of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers are Somali nationals who, according to the UNHCR had a refugee 
recognition rate averaging 83.6% between 2001 and 2013.155  
 
Another common allegation against foreign national spaza shops included that they 
engaged in ‘unfair’ business practices. Yet, foreign national spaza shopkeepers in 
the field sites utilised commonplace business practices such as price competition, 
partnerships and catering to customer needs, which were far from ‘unfair’ or 
monopolistic. Foreign national spaza shops in townships also tend to comply with by-
laws. Many if not most zoning schemes in the country governing townships permitted 
the opening of businesses on residential properties (including the erection of 																																																								
151	Police	in	the	field	sites	claimed	that	many	foreign	national	spaza	shopkeepers	possessed	unregistered	
firearms.	Some	foreign	national	spaza	shopkeepers	also	claimed	to	possess	firearms	on	their	premises	to	use	in	
self-defence.	
152	Section	9	of	the	Firearms	Control	Act	60	of	2000.	
153	Tammy	Petersen	‘Most	illicit	cigarettes	now	made	in	SA	–	Sotyu’	News24,	10	November	2015,	available	at	
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/most-illicit-cigarettes-now-made-in-sa-sotyu-20151110,	date	
accessed	4	March	2017.	
154	Observations	in	the	field	sites	and	informal	conversations	with	foreign	national	spaza	shopkeepers.	
155	UNHCR	Statistical	Online	Population	Database,	available	at	
http://popstats.unhcr.org/#_ga=1.3026608.1642008189.1414090050,	date	accessed	on	12	December	2014) 
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shipping containers on private property) so long as the dominant use of the property 
remained residential and the shop did not cause a disturbance to neighbours or 
interfere with the amenity of the neighbourhood.156 Spaza shops were also frequently 
not required to possess business licenses or permits. In Cape Town informal trading 
permits were only needed for businesses operating from demarcated trading bays in 
public spaces such as markets, train stations and pavements. 157  Furthermore, 
business licences were only required for businesses that sold prepared meals, 
prepared food on site (such a hot dog stands, delis and restaurants), or engaged in 
health and entertainment services (such as massage palours).158 According to the 
city’s Evironmental Health department, which issued business licenses, spaza shops 
did not need business licenses because they sold pre-packed foods.159 
 
The Minister of Small Business Development, Lindiwe Zulu, claimed that looting and 
public violence against foreign national spaza shops distracted the public from the 
valid concerns of South African business owners that foreigners did not trade 
according to the law.160 However, in an interview she struggled to explain what 
particular laws they breached, stating ‘That’s why I’m saying we need to fast track 
that, because the regulations are falling short in terms of ensuring that there’s proper 
re-zoning, there’s proper infrastructure’.161  
 
The SAPS was well aware of foreign national spaza shops’ general compliance with 
by-laws. Its input to the Department of Trade and Industry on Nibus, SAPS states: 																																																								
156	Different	laws	govern	township	zoning.	The	Black	Communities	Development	Act	4	of	1984	(BCDA)	regulates	
land	use	in	older	townships,	while	the	Less	Formal	Township	Establishment	Act	113	of	1991	(LFTEA)	regulates	
township	land	use	in	many	newer	townships.	The	BCDA	zoning	scheme	permits	residential	properties	to	be	used	
for	business	purposes.	In	the	Western	Cape	province	LFTEA	areas	have	been	zoned	as	‘informal	residential’	under	
the	provincial	legislature’s	Land	Use	Planning	Ordinance	Act	15	of	1995	(LUPO),	which	also	provides	that	
residential	premises	can	be	used	for	business	purposes	(see	section	6	of	LUPO	scheme	regulations)	These	Acts	
applied	in	Cape	Town	before	1	March	2013.	However	in	Cape	Town	they	were	replaced	by	the	City	of	Cape	Town	
Zoning	Regulations,	which	came	into	effect	on	1	March	2013.		These	regulations	were	subsequently	replaced	by	
the	City	of	Cape	Town	Municipal	Planning	By-Law,	2015.	Both	the	zoning	regulations	and	later	zoning	by-law	
permit	the	establishment	of	businesses	on	most	township	properties	in	the	city.	
157	Section	8,	City	of	Cape	Town:	Informal	Trading	By-Law,	Provincial	Gazette	No.	6677,	20	November	2009,	
available	at	http://openbylaws.org.za/za/by-law/cape-town/2009/informal-trading/,	date	accessed	26	January	
2015.	
158City	of	Cape	Town	Environmental	Health	Department	webpage	titled	‘licensing	and	certification’,	available	at	
https://www.capetown.gov.za/en/CityHealth/EnviroHealth/FoodQualityandSafety/Pages/LicencingandCertificati
on.aspx,	date	accessed	20	January	2015.	
159	Interview,	City	of	Cape	Town	environmental	health	officials,	Bellville,	2	June	2014.	
160	Magubane	(note	15).	
161	Lindwe	Zulu	interview	with	SABC	‘Laws	regulating	foreign	owned	spazas	must	be	fast	tracked:	Zulu’	SABC	
News	27	January	2015,	available	at	http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/bfdc37004715bf689b21bf686e648436/Laws-
regulating-foreign-owned-spazas-must-be-fast-tracked:-Zulu-20152701,	date	accessed	4	March	2017.		
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Some of these informal businesses [i.e. businesses which are not regulated 
in terms of the Business Act or White Paper] are operated on private 
premises and thus cannot be charged in terms of contravention of the by-law 
on Street Trading, as it does not apply to private premises and this makes it 
difficult to implement and ensure strict compliance by SAPS.162 (Parenthesis 
in the original) 
 
Many local SAPS officials and law enforcement authorities interviewed in Cape Town 
emphasised that spaza shops did not require business permits as zoning schemes 
permitted them to open businesses in townships. The station commander of 
Khayelitsha police station explained in 2011 that Khayelitsha was a ‘free trade area’ 
and that shops therefore did not require re-zoning in order to operate. The following 
year at a meeting between Somali and South African spaza shopkeepers in 
Khayelitsha a representative from the City of Cape Town’s municipal law 
enforcement department informed traders and police present at the meeting that: 
 
Khayelitsha is not regulated and no trading plan has been submitted for the 
area. In the absence of a trading area, the area is deemed a free trading 
area.  Because it’s a free trade area we cannot tell people not to trade. 163 
 
He went on to emphasise that the state had little power to interfere with economic 
activities taking place on township residents’ private properties: 
 
All former disadvantaged areas, i.e. black areas, are exempted from the Land 
Use Planning Ordinance. Therefore no re-zoning is needed for business. So 
any business can run from a property, RDP or container, and people do not 
need to apply for re-zoning…. I want to stress: we should start pointing 
fingers at ourselves.  They are not setting up shop on city land, but in your 
yards.164 
																																																								
162	Nibus		(note	133)	at	69.	
163	Speech	at	meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers,	Lingelethu	West	police	station,	
Khayelitsha,	20	March	2012.	
164	Ibid.	
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Furthermore, to the extent that foreign national spaza shopkeepers engaged in 
unlawful behaviour (for example not paying tax, not possessing business licenses or 
breaching by-laws), it did not appear as though South African spaza shopkeepers 
behaved any differently. In fact, anecdotal examples suggested that South African 
spaza shops complied even less with some laws than their foreign counterparts.  For 
example, at a meeting between South African and Somali spaza shopkeepers in 
Khayelitsha in 2012, the chairman of the meeting complained that ‘There is a by-law. 
You need permits issued by local government.  Unfortunately local people are not 
tending to permits, only Somalis’.165 Although the chairperson of the meeting was in 
some ways incorrect - there was in fact no by-law in Cape Town requiring spaza 
shops to possess permits, and Somali traders had in actuality been incorrectly issued 
and charged fees for informal trading permits that they did not need 166  - the 
chairperson’s remark nevertheless demonstrated that foreign nationals in the area 
had made greater efforts to comply with the law (or what they thought was the law) 
than their South African counterparts. On a similar note, a study of 64 Somali and 65 
South African spaza shopkeepers in Motherwell township in Port Elizabeth found that 
South African spaza shops were less likely to be registered for income tax than 
foreign national shops.167 In particular 74% of Somali shopkeepers surveyed were 
registered for income tax, while only 17% of South African spaza shopkeepers were 
registered.168  
 
South African spaza shops in the field sites and beyond engaged in widespread 
cartel behaviour including threatening their competition, ordering foreign competitors 
to close down their businesses, and in some cases allegedly murdering their 
competitors. This contributed to the emergence of anti-competitive informal trade 
agreements between South African and foreign national traders in Cape Town’s 
townships and other towns and cities. In their case study of spaza shopkeepers in 
Delft South, Cape Town, Charman et al argue that price-fixing and collusive 
																																																								
165	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers,	Lingelethu	West	police	station,	Khayelitsha,	
20	March	2012	
166	Somalis	claimed	that	Nombasa	Kolo	at	the	Fezeka	Municipal	office	in	Gugulethu	had	issued	them	with	issued	
informal	trading	permits	for	a	monthly	fee	of	R150.	One	Somali	community	representative	claimed	that	he	had	
assisted	over	100	traders	in	applying	for	permits	at	the	municipal	office.	
167	Abdu	Sh	Mohamed	Hikam	‘An	exploratory	study	on	the	Somali	immigrants’	involvement	in	the	informal	
economy	of	Nelson	Mandela	Bay’	2011	masters	dissertation,	Nelson	Mandela	Metropolitan	University.		
168	Ibid	at	75.	
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behaviour was the norm amongst South African spaza traders.169 Yet governance 
actors were not particularly concerned about these unfair business practices. This is 
reflected in the Competition Commission’s failure to investigate the 2009 price fixing 
agreement in Gugulethu.170 In contrast the Commission launched a market inquiry 
into the economic activities of foreign national retailers in 2016. 
 
The state has even gone out of its way to prevent foreign nationals from complying 
with the law by attempting to obstruct them from acquiring business licenses. For 
example, in 2012 foreign national spaza shopkeepers in the Limpopo province 
complained that they could not access business permits from their local municipality, 
as the staff at the municipal office had repeatedly told them that foreign nationals did 
not qualify.171 When the matter went to court, the Limpopo Department of Economic 
Development, Environment and Tourism maintained that it was willing to grant 
permits, but a whole range of other state officials and departments argued that 
granting permits to asylum seekers and refugees was unlawful and unconstitutional. 
These included the Minister of Police, the Minister of Home Affairs, the National 
Police Commissioner, and the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs. 172  The 
Supreme Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the foreign national traders and declared 
that they were entitled to apply for business or trading licenses.  
 
Some state authorities went so far as to flout the law themselves in their efforts to 
regulate foreign nationals spaza shopkeepers. This was evident in Cape Town where 
between November 2011 and February 2013 police fined foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers in terms of non-existent legislation titled the ‘Local Authorities Act 19 of 
1974’.  In some cases traders were arrested and detained for several hours until the 
early hours of the morning or the following evening. Fines ranged between R1,000 to 
R2,000. This was despite the fact that spaza shops in Cape Town did not require 
business licenses or trading permits.173  Senior police leaders’ endorsement of local 
informal regulatory arrangements that discriminated against foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers, flouted competition laws, and were contractually unenforceable also 
indicated that they were not heavily concerned with the content of and correct 																																																								
169	Charman	et	al	(note	26)	at	51.	
170	Mtyala	(note	10).	
171	Somali	Association	of	South	Africa	v	Limpopo	Department	of	Economic	Development,	Environment	and	
Tourism	(48/2014)	ZASCA	143	(26	September	2014)	at	para	13.	
172	Ibid.	
173	See	notes	156	to	159.	
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application of laws.174 
 
Thus calls for foreign national spaza shopkeepers to comply with the law did not 
seem fully genuine. Assertions of illegality were often unfounded or inflated, and 
were accompanied by positive measures to prevent compliance. At the same time, 
authorities own flouting of the law, and their general indifference towards South 
African spaza shops’ legal noncompliance suggest that demands for greater legal 
enforcement of foreign nationals’ spaza shops were not primarily concerned with 
illegal behaviour per se. 
 
The SAPS also called for the curbing of foreign national spaza shops because of the 
high rate of robbery affecting their businesses. While foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers in the field sites fell victim to a number of different forms of crime 
including xenophobic looting, and threats and attacks by competing South African 
shopkeepers, business robbery was the most common form of crime affecting their 
shops. Police argued that the expansion of foreign national spaza shops had 
contributed to exponential upsurges in business robbery in the country. The SAPS’s 
published crime statistics showed that over the past decade the number of business 
robberies in the Western Cape province increased from 110 cases in 2005/2006 to 
2,218 cases in 2014/2015.175 Nationally business robberies increased from 4,384 
cases to 19,170 over the same period. 176  These robberies disproportionately 
targetted foreign national spaza shops.  For example, in February 2012, Western 
Cape Police Commissioner Arno Lamoer stated in the SAPS Western Cape Annual 
Report that: 
 
The proliferation of ‘Spaza’ shops linked to the influx of foreign nationals, 
particularly in townships throughout the Province, has resulted in an upsurge 
in business robberies and attacks on owners of the ‘Spaza’ shops.177 
 																																																								
174	For	example,	at	meetings	in	Khayelitsha,	the	agreement	was	supported	by	the	minister	of	police,	the	
provincial	commissioner	of	police,	and	the	special	advisor	to	the	minister	of	police.		
175	SAPS	2015	crime	statistics,	available	at	
http://www.saps.gov.za/resource_centre/publications/statistics/crimestats/2015/crime_stats.php,	date	
accessed	4	March	2017.	
176	Ibid.	
177	Prologue	by	Lieutenant	General	AH	Lamoer	in	‘South	African	Police	Service	/	Western	Cape’	Annual	Report	
2012/2013	at	2.	
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National police reports also emphasised that foreign national spaza shops were 
frequently targets of business robberies. The SAPS’s analysis of national crime 
statistics for 2012/2013 stated that the majority of business robberies in the country 
(apart from Kwa-Zulu Natal and Gauteng) ‘involve informal businesses such as 
spaza/tuck shops and/or taverns. In some areas the majority of such businesses 
belong to foreign small traders...’178 
 
Foreign spaza shops were vulnerable to robberies for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
police in the field sites reported that shops were cash businesses and contained 
consumer goods such as cigarettes and airtime, which were easy to convey and 
resell. In contrast, other township businesses such as hair salons, mechanics and 
fruit and vegetable stalls did not contain the same degree of cash and conveyable 
consumer goods. An Angolan shoe repairman in Philippi East exclaimed ‘what are 
they going to take from me? I only have old shoes’.179  
 
A further feature that contributed to foreign national spaza shops’ vulnerability to 
crime was their general social alienation, resulting in traders not enjoying the same 
degree of community protection as South African spaza shops. Many community 
structures in the township field sites were actively involved in investigating crime and 
punishing offenders, and had to a great extent usurped the role of the police and 
formal justice system. Their efforts were usually coordinated by street committees, 
which were small residents’ groups that existed on most streets. The majority of 
street committees fell under the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), 
a national umbrella organisation that represented township civic groups on street, 
area, ward, township, province and national levels.  
 
Degrees and types of activity varied from place to place. Some residents in the field 
sites described that their street committees cooperated with the formal justice system 
by investigating local crimes and handing suspects over to the police. In other areas, 
residents and local leaders almost exclusively dealt with crime with the state playing 
almost no role. For example, in the shack settlement of Thabo Mbeki in Philippi East 																																																								
178	SAPS:	An	analysis	of	the	national	crime	statistics:	Addendum	to	the	annual	report	a	2013/2014	at	p11,	
available	at	
http://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annual_report/2013_2014/crime_statreport_2014_part1.pdf,	
date	access	19	April	2016.	
179	Interview,	Philippi	East,	10	February	2012.	
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residents regularly attended local meetings where neighbourhood issues were 
discussed. A special committee of about 13 members was responsible for 
marshaling street patrols and receiving criminal cases. Suspected criminals were 
always granted a hearing where they were given an opportunity to defend 
themselves, and if found guilty were subjected punishments including beatings, 
banishment, and in severe cases, death. In Pola Park, Philippi East, residents stated 
that street committees were dysfunctional and existed only in name. As a result 
suspected criminals were frequently subjected to mob beatings, without matters 
being taken up by any organized community platforms. Punishments were often 
brutal and tortuous. For example, in Harare, Khayelitsha residents reported that 
victims of vigilante ‘justice’ were often beaten to death with ‘half bricks’ or fell subject 
to necklacing (forcing a tired filled with petrol or paraffin around a person’s neck and 
setting it alight). A policeman in Kraaifontein reported that punishments in his 
jurisdiction included dripping melted plastic on alleged criminals, or forcing them to sit 
in the sun for extended periods of time. 
 
Yet, when it came to crime affecting foreign national spaza shopkeepers in the field 
sites, the response of South African residents and street committees was muted. 
This was not necessarily due to overt and hostile xenophobia against them, but more 
an outcome of systemic social and political marginalisation. Foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers fell below most township social or political radars. For example, many 
residents appreciated the services offered by foreign national spaza shops, but had 
paid little thought to crime and other challenges affecting these businesses. The vast 
majority of foreign national spaza shopkeepers in Cape Town were Somalis whose 
families lived outside of townships in white Afrikaans or coloured neighbourhoods. 
These shopkeepers – being Muslim, Somali speaking, and from East Africa - meant 
that they generally did not share the same language, or cultural and religious 
background as residents. As a result they did not attend the same places of worship, 
and were inhibited from socializing at South African venues due to dietary laws. 
Foreign spaza shopkeepers also frequently relocated in response to crime, and were 
tenants rather than homeowners. Residents therefore saw them as temporary 
sojourners, rather than long-term inhabitants with a stake in the community. Foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers furthermore rarely participated in street committee 
activities. Of the 71 Somali traders interviewed on access to justice only three 
regularly attended local street committee meetings. Most stayed away due to 
concerns over their safety, feelings that they would not be welcome, or because of 
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long working hours. Overall the relationship between residents and shopkeepers was 
that of shopkeeper and customer, rather than friend or neighbour. 
 
As a result many residents in the field sites felt removed from the lives of foreign 
shopkeepers, and did not think that problems affecting foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers were an urgent concern of theirs. A Khayelitsha resident described that:  
 
We don’t help them because they don’t help us. We are not really concerned 
about their problems because they are very separate from us. If someone 
were to kill them, we would never even know.180 
 
Foreign national spaza shopkeepers who approached local street committees 
leaders in the aftermath of crime were usually offered little assistance beyond the 
extension of condolences. A South African resident in Philippi East explained that 
street committees could not be held completely responsible for their inaction, as 
committees mobilised in response to local outrage. This did not occur when crimes 
targeted foreigners making it difficult for them to act.181 A group of youth in Philippi 
East described robbing foreign national shops repeatedly because neither the police 
nor community leaders intervened.182 The lack of community response therefore left 
many foreign spaza shops on a back footing when it came to their safety.  
 
The SAPS responded to robberies affecting foreign national spaza shops by calling 
for heightened regulation of these businesses. Police alleged that lack of regulatory 
compliance by foreign national spaza shops in townships contributed to increasing 
business robbery rates against them. 183  For example, the SAPS’s 2012 Crime 
Overview states that police efforts towards tackling business robberies had been 
hampered by ‘compliance issues’ relating to ‘Registration with Trade and Industry, 																																																								
180	Interview,	Khayelitsha	South	African	resident,	Endlovini,	Khayelitsha,	6	February	2011.	
181	Interview,	South	African	resident,	Lower	Crossroads,	Philippi	East,	25	January	2012.	
182	Interview,	group	of	South	African	youth,	Philippi	East,	12	December	2011.	
183	Sapa	‘Foreigners	streaming	into	Western	Cape’	News24,	8	February	2012,	available	at	
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Foreigners-streaming-into-Western-Cape-20120208,	date	accessed	
3	June	2015.		Sue	Segar	‘Extra	laws	needed	to	tackle	foreigner	influx’	Cape	Argus,	9	February	2012,	available	at	
http://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/extra-laws-needed-to-tackle-foreigner-influx-1.1230663#.VW7TTlyQdUQ,	date	
accessed	3	June	215.	Wyndham	Hartley,	‘Illegal	foreign	business	owners	a	soft	target	for	criminals’	BDay	Live,	9	
February	2012,	available	at	http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2012/02/09/illegal-foreign-business-owners-a-soft-
target-for-criminals;jsessionid=2068B6759A426AF8F3EE8AC73C0B6B0C.present2.bdfm?service=print,	date	
accessed	3	June	2015.	
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SARS, Municipal By Law Enforcement’. 184 This sentiment was shared across a 
number of provinces. The Western Cape Provincial Commissioner of Police Arno 
Lamoer complained that the increase in foreign national spaza shops was 
contributing to business robberies and that local authorities were not doing enough to 
ensure that shops were permitted and complied with by-laws.185  
 
In addition to calling for heightened regulation of foreign national spaza shops, the 
SAPS engaged in a number of regulatory operations targeting foreign national spaza 
shops. For example, in July 2012 the Limpopo Commissioner of police instructed 
police to crack down on informal businesses that were trading without licenses. The 
operation was termed ‘Operation Hardstick’ and saw hundreds of foreign nationals 
fined for not possessing business permits, and their products confiscated, in what 
traders’ claim involved the selective enforcement of the law.186  That same month in 
Maropong in the North West, police fined and confiscated the goods of 100 foreign 
national spaza traders.187 A SAPS Lieutenant in the province justified the raids as 
follows: 
 
If a R100 is stolen from a spaza shop it becomes part of house breaking 
statistics in the province. Illegal taverns also contribute to high crime statistics 
and alcohol related crime, it is for this reason that several operations 
throughout the province have seen many foreign nationals who operate 
business illegally arrested’.188 
 
Similarly, between November 2011 and February 2013 police regularly raided foreign 
national spaza shops across Cape Town and fined shops for trading without a 
license.189 As mentioned, this was despite the fact that spaza shops did not require 
																																																								
184	SAPS’	2012	Crime	Overview	at	62.	
185	Segar	(note	183)	and	Hartley	(note	183).	
186	‘South	Africa	police	target	foreign	traders	in	Limpopo’	Irin	News	17	August	2012,	available	at	
http://www.irinnews.org/report/96130/south-africa-police-target-foreign-traders-limpopo,	date	accessed	4	
March	2017.	Carmel	Rickard			‘Court	victory	for	asylum	seekers’	GroundUp,	6	October	2014,	available	at	
http://www.groundup.org.za/article/court-victory-asylum-seekers_2324/,	date	accessed	4	March	2017.	
187	Valerie	Cilliers	‘Court	rules	on	spaza	shops’	Northern	News,	24	August	2012,	available	at	
http://www.noordnuus.co.za/details/24-08-2012/court_rules_on_spaza_shops/14634.	Date	accesses	12	
December	2013.	
188	Ibid.	
189	Interviews	with	foreign	national	spaza	shopkeepers	from	Khayelitsha,	Gugulethu,	Observatory,	Elsies	Rivier	
and	Philippi.	
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business permits or licenses to operate.190 Police officers at the Woodstock police 
station defended their arrest and detention of two Somali grocery shopkeepers 
working in Observatory, stating that senior officials were concerned that the high rate 
of business robbery in the province would make the government look bad.191 
 
However, despite the SAPS’s stated intentions, the goal of heightened regulation 
could not have been only to protect shops from robberies. This is because 
compliance with laws (real or fictional ones) does not make businesses easier to 
monitor. For example, registering with SARS, possessing a business license, or 
adhering to environmental health regulations would not have prevented businesses 
from being robbed or make shops easier to patrol. This suggests that the SAPS’s 
goal was not primarily to protect shops, but rather to reduce the number of shops by 
closing down noncompliant businesses. This would result in fewer shops for police to 
monitor as well as fewer outlets for criminals to rob.  
 
Yet, combatting crime normally does not involve targeting victims. Instead police 
would usually be expected to investigate and crack down on perpetrators. The SAPS 
placed little emphasis on prioritising, investigating and prosecuting business 
robberies affecting foreign national spaza shopkeepers, and perpetrators enjoyed 
relative impunity for their actions. When exploring police and prosecutors’ responses 
to crimes affecting foreign national spaza shopkeepers in Kraaifontein, Khayelitsha 
and Philippi East in 2010 and 2011, foreign victims of business robberies reported 
very little progress in their cases if any. Victims described that police had opened 
cases, and occasionally made arrests, but suspects were released and no further 
action had followed. Of approximately 38 foreign national spaza traders who reported 
having been robbed (some repeatedly), none of them experienced any successful 
prosecutions. Police respondents highlighted a number of barriers to conducting 
effective investigations including language barriers and frequent relocation of 
shopkeepers, but did not mention any deliberate strategies to over come these 
problems. Such a strategy could have involved improving intelligence gathering, 
hiring more effective translators, or keeping in better contact with foreign national 
victims. 
 																																																								
190	See	notes	156	to	159.	
191	Inquiry	with	Woodstock	police	official	at	Woodstock	police	station	in	February	2013.	
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Police seemed far more preoccupied with clamping down on foreign national spaza 
shops that fell victim to business robberies, than deliberately crafting interventions to 
bring offenders to book. These lacklustre efforts at investigating and prosecuting 
business robberies suggested that police concerns over business robbery rates 
affecting foreign national spaza shops could not be the only factor driving their calls 
for greater regulation.  
 
A fourth commonly stated reason for limiting foreign national spaza shops was the 
risk that their continued expansion could see them fall victim to further xenophobic 
public unrest or murders orchestrated by South African spaza shopkeepers. South 
African shopkeepers frequently threatened to unleash violence and anarchy should 
their demands relating to foreign national spaza shops not be met. This was evident 
in the text of many informal trade agreements.  The introduction to the 2009 
Gugulethu agreement describes that South African spaza traders distributed leaflets 
in Gugulethu calling for Somali traders to leave the area ‘or else they will face 
unpleasant consequences’. 192  Meetings were subsequently called to ‘warn the 
Gugulethu public against any action that could incite one section of the population 
against another’.193 When Somali traders attempted to withdraw from the negotiation 
process, the agreement states that the: 
 
‘UNHCR requested to ask for another meeting, to enable it to have a 
discussion with the Somalis and to explain to them the need to co-operate 
with the local traders in order to avert any ugly situation from happening.’194 
 
Similarly a 2012 communiqué signed by a Zanokhanyo Retailers Association and the 
Somali Retailers Association in Khayelitsha sets out that informal trade agreements 
were entered into in a number of townships (namely Khayelitsha, Lower Cross 
Roads, Nyanga, Gugulethu, Du Noon and Delft) in order to ‘bring peace, mutual co-
existence and cohesion following the unfortunate and tragic event of 2008’. The 
communiqué then warns that failure to enforce the agreement ‘will breed anarchy in 
our community’.  
 																																																								
192	Gugulethu	agreement	(note	128).	
193	Ibid.	
194	Ibid.	
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South African traders and their representatives also threatened violence at meetings. 
At a meeting in March 2012 in Khayelitsha, a mediator arguing on behalf of South 
African shopkeepers, emphasised that: 
 
We need to work this out before it gets ugly.  I just heard that there are 
problems in Plettenberg Bay and that there is xenophobia happening there.  
We do not want that in Khayelitsha and our townships.195 
 
Governance actors often highlighted these risks of violence as reasons for why 
informal agreements barring new foreign spaza shops were necessary. For example 
the SAPS’ inputs to Nibus state that: 
 
In order to reduce xenophobia associated with foreign national traders, there 
is a need for the strategy to influence the type of businesses that foreign 
nationals should run and the demarcated areas where these businesses 
should be active.196  
 
However, as was the case with business robberies, police tended to emphasise 
tighter regulatory controls over foreign national spaza businesses, more than 
demonstrating strong responses and clear strategies toward various threats towards 
and lootings of their shops. Foreign national spaza shopkeepers in the field sites 
reported that when police arrived on the scenes of mob lootings, they were only 
prepared to evacuate shopkeepers, and not protect their property.  This often meant 
that businesses were destroyed and shopkeepers’ investments were lost. When 
police did arrest looters, they were quickly released, and no further action was taken.  
One foreign national spaza trader described how police assisted him in retrieving 
several goods by accompanying him to various looters’ homes. However they did not 
institute any criminal action against those found in possession of his stolen items.197 
In some cases of looting, police simply stood by and did nothing when called upon to 
intervene, or even worse participated in looting themselves.  
 																																																								
195	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers	at	Lingelethu	police	station,	Khayelitsha,	20	
March	2012.	
196	Nibus	(note	133).	
197	Interview,	Khayelitsha	Somali	spaza	trader,	Mitchells	Plain,	8	January	2011.	
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Police also did little in response to threats and other attacks by competing South 
African shopkeepers ranging from intimidation to orchestrated assassinations. South 
African retailers associations often sent threatening leaflets to Somali shopkeepers 
or their landlords informing them to close down their businesses.198  In some cases 
such as in Masiphumelele in 2006 and Philippi East in 2011, they proceeded to 
forcibly close down foreign national spaza shops once the deadline arrived. Yet only 
in Khayelitsha in 2008 were South African traders prosecuted for such activities, 
albeit receiving merely a suspended sentence. 
 
Foreign national spaza shopkeepers were not only at risk of having their shops 
looted. Many in the field sites in Cape Town fell victim to orchestrated murders. This 
was particularly the case in Kraaifontein and Philippi. While some of these murders 
occurred during the course of apparent business robberies, others involved traders 
being shot and killed without having been robbed, suggesting alternative motives for 
their killings. Furthermore in 2010, a number of traders in Philippi were killed or 
injured in arson attacks on their shops, which involved assailants throwing lit bottles 
of paraffin into foreign national spaza shops while their occupants were asleep 
inside.  
 
Of the four police stations covered by the research (namely Phillip East, Kraaifontein 
Khayelitsha (‘Site B’), and Harare police stations) only Kraaifontein police station 
made deliberate efforts to prioritise the orchestrated murders of foreign national 
spaza shopkeepers. This came in response to a number of killings of foreign national 
spaza shopkeepers in the area in 2010. A police investigator at the station was 
tasked with investigating all criminal cases relating to spaza shops and collected 
crime intelligence from community members. His investigation culminated in the 
arrest of four South African traders and seven unemployed youth, who were 
connected to 33 criminal cases involving attacks on foreign national spaza shops in 
the station’s jurisdiction.199 The suspects were denied bail and detained for several 
months, but the case fell apart when a key state witness (one of the youths) refused 
to testify in court, and errors were found in the police’s ballistics evidence.200 The 
police detective handling the matter stated that although the station’s investigation 
had not culminated in prosecutions, the arrests had been effective in preventing 																																																								
198	This	occurred	in	Khayelitsha	in	2008,	Gugulethu	in	2009,	Kraaifontein	in	2010,	and	Philippi	East	in	2011.	
199	Interview,	Kraaifontein	police	detective,	Kraaifontein,	13	January	2011.	
200	Ibid.	
	 99	
further attacks. He stated that: 
 
Somalis are no longer as afraid of South African shopkeepers because police 
are harsher than before and the police approach is different…  If something 
starts like that we want it to stop. We will go right to the people we arrested 
before and detain them again.  They got such a fright after this.201 
 
Somali shopkeepers confirmed that orchestrated attacks on Somali spaza shops had 
ceased since the police interventions.202 In fact an informal trade agreement was 
entered into in Kraaifontein a year after orchestrated murders had ceased. The police 
detective explained that the agreement was the outcome of political pressure by 
SANCO and South African traders, who realised after the arrests in 2010 that they 
could not utilise violence to rid themselves of competition.203 
 
Khayelitsha experienced far fewer incidents of orchestrated crime against Somali 
traders than Philippi and Kraaifontein. Of the fifteen Somali respondents interviewed, 
none described incidents that reflected features of orchestrated attacks, such as 
assassination style killings or their shops set alight. Although police suspected that 
some business robberies could be connected to disputes over competition, they 
stated that they did not have any clear evidence to prove it.204 Members of the 
Somali Retailers Association similarly stated that orchestrated crimes were not 
common in Khayelitsha, apart from a spate of three murders that took place shortly 
after a contentious meeting with South African traders in October 2010.205 A Somali 
spaza shopkeeper from Khayelitsha remarked: 
 
Khayelitsha is the only area where at least we have a friendship with the 
black people.  At least it’s somewhere I can go any time… In Khayelitsha I 
can drive any time I want, even if it’s midnight because I know the people.206 
																																																								
201	Interview,	Kraaifontein	police	station	detective,	Kraaifontein,	1	December	2011.	
202	Interview,	Kraaifontein	Somali	representative,	Bellville,	12	December	2011.	Interview,	Kraaifontein	Somali	
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205	Somali	Retailers	Association	representatives,	Mitchells	Plain,	1	November	2010.	
206	Khayelitsha	Somali	community	activist,	Mitchells	Plain,	6	July	2012.	
	 100	
 
Somali spaza traders believed that they were less susceptible to orchestrated attacks 
in Khayelitsha, as they enjoyed a greater degree of community support than in 
Philippi and Kraaifontein.  This was because of the long-standing presence of Somali 
shopkeepers in Khayelitsha (entering as early as early as the mid-1990s before local 
traders came to see them as a threat), as well as Somali community outreach efforts 
in the aftermath of the 2008 xenophobic riots which enabled them to form close 
relationships with community members and SANCO leadership in the township. A 
Somali community leader stated that these efforts ended in 2009 as a result of 
extortion by South African community leaders, whose increasing demands for 
donations from the Somali community became ‘kind of protection fee at the end of 
the day’.207   
 
Informal trade agreements prohibiting new foreign national spaza shops did work to a 
degree in preventing orchestrated attacks on foreign national spaza shopkeepers, as 
they temporarily appeased South African spaza shopkeepers. Yet, one would think 
that attempting to prevent crimes such as intimidation, looting and murder in this way 
– i.e. through unlawful and discriminatory mechanisms - would be a last case 
scenario for governance actors, to be turned to after all other efforts failed. This was 
not the case. As the above shows Somali spaza shopkeepers reported that police did 
not invest significant efforts into investigating and prosecuting looters. Neither did 
police confront South Africans for threatening foreign national businesses and 
attempting to close down their shops. The example of Kraaifontein police station’s 
prioritized investigation, as well as the 2008 community outreach programme in 
Khayelitsha furthermore also show that informal trade agreements were not the only 
option available when it came to addressing and preventing orchestrated attacks on 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers. This suggests that further factors contributed 
towards the desires amongst governance actors to establish trade agreements 
governing respective townships, other than concerns for the safety of foreign national 
spaza shopkeepers. 
 
The various reasons given by governance actors for calling for increased regulation 
of foreign national spaza shops therefore do not add up and present a complete 
picture. Curbing foreign national businesses to protect South African spaza 																																																								
207	Telephone	interview,	Somali	Retailers	Association	representative,	23	July	2012.	
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shopkeepers from competition poses significant risk to local economies. Foreign 
national spaza shops were also not a hotbed of illegal activity as claimed by 
authorities - or at least not more so than South African spaza shops. While robberies 
affecting foreign national spaza shops were a concern for governance actors, 
methods to address such crime such as reducing shop numbers through strict 
enforcement of real and fictional laws seem suspect, as they were not accompanied 
by coherent attempts to target criminals themselves. Lastly, the prevention of looting, 
intimidation and murders of foreign national spaza shopkeepers were often not 
accompanied by police actions aimed at rooting out instigators and perpetrators of 
such attacks, suggesting the existence of other factors playing a role in the 
establishment of these regulatory arrangements. 
 
3.6 Understanding the foreign national shop threat: the people as gevaar 
Further investigation is therefore required to comprehensively grasp the shop gevaar 
in South Africa. This task entails considering how other theorists have interpreted 
similar phenomena in other eras and regions. This is because the current shop 
gevaar in South Africa is not unique in time and place.  South Africa has witnessed 
previous eras of accentuated fears over ‘foreign traders’. In 1921 the government of 
the Union of South Africa established an ‘Asiatic Enquiry’ in response to complaints 
about the ‘inroad of Asiatics’208 (primarily individuals of Indian decent) in business 
and trading sectors in South Africa.  The enquiry’s report lists a number of 
grievances against Asiatic traders, many of which echo the recent types of 
complaints leveled at foreign national spaza shopkeepers. These include that 
Asiatics:209 
 
• Send their money out of the country instead of spending it where they earn it. 
• Are a source of danger to the public health owing to their unclean habits. 
• Carry on businesses, which should be carried on by Europeans, and close 
avenues of employment, which should be open to Europeans. 
• Produce nothing in the Transvaal, and do not consume the produce of the 
country, but import their requirements from India. 
• Form " rings " to keep out European competitors. 
																																																								
208	Report	of	the	Asiatic	Commission	Inquiry,	1921	at	para	1.	
209	Ibid	at	para	108.	
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• Their religion, language, colour, mode of thought, ideals, manners and 
customs are entirely different to those of Europeans; they cannot be 
assimilated and their presence is a menace to European supremacy. 
• Their standard of trading and methods of business are different to those of 
Europeans in the following respects: 
o The owner of the business and his shop assistants all usually reside 
on the premises. 
o They pay lower wages to their assistants than Europeans. 
o They evade the laws regulating hours of trading. 
o They habitually give short weight and adulterate foodstuffs. 
o They thus succeed in underselling European traders. 
 
Almost three decades later Indian shopkeepers fell victim to widespread violence 
during the 1949 ‘Durban riots’,210  where mostly Zulu assailants attacked Indian 
homes and businesses in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
Fears towards foreign national or minority group traders are also not distinctive to 
South Africa. Weber, writing in the early 20th century in Germany, sets out the 
predicament of ‘pariah peoples’ such as ‘impecunious wandering peddlers’,211 which 
he states are found throughout the world.212 For him ‘pariah people’ denotes: 
 
… a distinctive hereditary social group lacking autonomous political 
organization and characterized by internal prohibitions against commensality 
and intermarriage originally founded upon magical, tabooistic, and ritual 
injunctions. Two additional traits of a pariah people are political and social 
disprivilege and a far-reaching distinctiveness in economic functioning.213 
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He also describes pariahs living in a ‘diaspora’ where their situation is ‘legally 
precarious’.214 In Weber’s view pariah status is not necessarily imposed on pariah 
groups, but can arise from voluntary segregation stemming from religious or moral 
beliefs.215 He states that despite being subject to entrenched subordination, pariah 
people perceive themselves as possessing a special ‘honour’, which is tied to a belief 
in a better future beyond their present conditions.216 This is evidenced in Hindu 
pariah castes’ beliefs in a reincarnation or the Jewish faith in messianic salvation.217 
Weber concludes that pariah groups are generally scorned by society, and their 
presence is usually only tolerated by virtue of their economic indispensability.218  
 
Weber’s reference to diasporic and largely cloistered communities living in legal 
uncertainty mirrors the conditions experienced by foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers in contemporary South Africa, who as asylum seekers and refugees 
generally only enjoy temporary and uncertain residency in the country, and lack 
formal political representation. In Cape Town foreign national spaza shopkeepers 
tended to congregate in ethnic enclaves in neighbourhoods such as Bellville and 
Mitchells Plain rather than live amongst South African communities. While Weber 
describes these groups being at best ‘tolerated’ and at worst ‘despised’ by resident 
communities, he does not explain why this is the case. 
 
Writing in the 1970s, Bonacich analyses the condition of ‘middleman minorities’ with 
greater focus on why they are commonly viewed as a threat.219  She argues that an 
essential condition of these groups is that they are ‘sojourners’ rather than 
permanent settlers. 220  They either intend to return to a homeland, or have a special 
attachment to an ancestral homeland. They need not be foreign nationals, but they 
are usually migrants, or descended from migrants. She describes that middleman 
minorities are ‘middlemen’ in the sense that they concentrate themselves in trade 
and commerce occupations. Bonacich believes their orientation towards their 
homeland inhibits them from assimilating into surrounding communities. Instead 
middleman minority groups segregate themselves from host communities by sending 
their children to separate schools and residing in distinct neighbourhoods.  																																																								
214		Weber	(note	36)	at	934.	
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In Bonacich’s view, conflict between the middleman minorities and the host societies 
stem from two factors, namely ‘economic matters’ and ‘solidarity’. She describes that 
their economic activity tends to draw conflict from their clientele, competing 
businesses, and labourers. She illustrates this through the Durban riots of 1949, 
which she believes arose out of a situation where Indian landowners were extracting 
exorbitant rent form African tenants, and demanding increased prices for basic food 
items such as flour and sugar from African shop customers. Bonacich also believes 
that the solidarity found amongst middleman minority groups aggravates host 
societies who view them as ‘clannish, alien, and unassimilable’.221 As a result host 
societies perceive them as disloyal to host nations and economically parasitic. She 
argues that the extremity of host responses to middleman minorities arises from host 
society’s difficulties in dislodging middleman groups, due to groups’ economic and 
organisational power. She states that: 
 
The difficulty of breaking entrenched middleman monopolies, the difficulty of 
controlling the growth and extension of their economic power, pushes host 
countries to ever more extreme reactions. One finds increasingly harsh 
measures, piled on one another, until, when all else fails, "final solutions" are 
enacted.222 
 
While economic competition between South African and foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers has already been discussed as a factor contributing to the shop gevaar, 
Weber and Bonacich introduce a new element contributing to conflict, which is 
middleman minorities’ tendency not to assimilate into host societies. Similarly in 
South Africa, foreign national spaza shopkeepers’ general lack of familiarity with host 
communities contributes to antagonisms towards them. Apart from heightening to 
their vulnerability to crime, foreign national spaza shopkeepers’ social and political 
isolation played a part in generating negative perceptions towards them. For 
example, many residents complained that foreign traders did not contribute anything 
to the community. This claim is illustrated by the Gugulethu agreement, which states 
that ‘Somalis always keep to themselves and are insensitive to what is going on in 
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the community. They do not contribute to community work in terms of sanitation, 
sports and other social issues concerning the community’.223  
 
A number of grievances amongst residents towards foreign national spaza also 
stemmed from a lack of contact and familiarity with foreign nationals spaza 
shopkeepers. For example, many residents complained that foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers were unhygienic because brushed their teeth with a ‘stick’, would serve 
customers dressed in a blanket, and washed themselves with just a bucket or cup.  
Traders explained that these were traditional Somali customs, namely using a 
particular type of stick called a ‘Miswak’ to clean their teeth, wearing a sarong at 
home, and washing one’s hands and feet with a bucket of water before daily prayers. 
In more severe cases residents believed that foreign national spaza shopkeepers’ 
perceived success was due to witchcraft or sorcery, or feared that shopkeepers were 
plotting against the community because they would congregate in groups at night. 
Thus the social alienation of foreign national spaza shopkeepers in the field sites 
contributed to South African residents’ fears of and intolerance towards them, much 
like Weber’s description of ‘pariah people’, and Bonacich’s analysis of ‘middleman 
minority’ groups. The shortcoming of Bonacich’s account is that she sees hostility 
towards middleman minorities as mainly a result of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers’ behaviours (i.e. their economic pursuits and solidarity). In doing so she 
overlooks how surrounding socio-political contexts can also lead populations to turn 
on these groups. While middlemen minorities may exhibit similar lifestyle patterns, 
settled communities do not all respond to middleman minorities in the same way. For 
example, not all host societies view middleman minority groups as ‘disloyal’ or 
economically extractive, and attitudes towards them may vary from appreciation, 
acceptance, and indifference to acute hostility. This points to broader socio-political 
dynamics at play when it comes to host populations’ general attitudes and responses 
to them. Thus focussing on the actions of foreign traders can only provide an partial 
picture of why diverse governance actors view foreign national spaza shops as a 
threat.  
 
Fanon and Mamdani explore wider socio-political factors in greater deal in their 
analyses of xenophobia towards immigrant traders in post-colonial Africa. Both 
theorists view animosity towards foreign national traders across the continent as not 																																																								
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necessarily being a result of traders’ actions (such as failing to assimilate or 
heightening economic competition), but rather as an outcome of post-colonial identity 
politics. Fanon describes nationalist violence against foreign traders as one of the 
‘pitfalls of national consciousness’, which emerges in the aftermath of political 
liberation, where claims for democracy transform into claims for ‘nationhood’.224 This 
outcome is largely driven by the nation’s new middleclass who seek to step into the 
shoes of the middleclass of the former colonizing country by demanding 
nationalization in the form of transferring ‘into native hands of those unfair 
advantages which are a legacy of the colonial period’.225 This nationalism begins to 
take on racist features and spreads across the broader population. Soon the ‘mass of 
the people’ turns against Africans of other nations who they compete with in towns, 
just as the national bourgeoisie turn on Europeans.226 Fanon states that: 
 
The working class of the towns, the masses of unemployed, the small 
artisans and craftsmen for their part line up behind this nationalist attitude; but 
in all justice let it be said, they only follow in the steps of their bourgeoisie. If 
the national bourgeoisie goes into competition with the Europeans, the 
artisans and craftsmen start a fight against non-national Africans. In the Ivory 
Coast, the anti-Dahoman and anti-Voltaic troubles are in fact racial riots. The 
Dahoman and Voltaic peoples, who control the greater part of the petty trade, 
are, once independence is declared, the object of hostile manifestations on 
the part of the people of the Ivory Coast.227 
 
Like Fanon, Mamdani believes that antagonism towards ‘subject races’ is a legacy of 
the racist policies under colonialism. He describes that during colonialism, the law 
divided populations into natives and non-natives.  Natives were then divided into 
ethnicities ruled by custom, while non-natives were divided into races (such as 
Europeans, Asians, Arabs and Hamites) ruled by civil and legal rights.  Subject races 
(although colonized) fell under the latter system. For him subject races were: 
 
… either nonindigenous immigrants, like the Indians of East, Central and 
Southern Africa, or they were constructed as nonindigenous by the colonial 																																																								
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powers, such as, for example, the Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi. In contrast, 
subject ethnicities were indigenous. Finally, subject races usually performed a 
middleman function, in either the state or the market, and their position was 
marked by petty privilege economically and preferential treatment legally.228 
 
Mamdani argues that after colonialism indigeneity become the basis for rights, justice 
and entitlement. As a result post-colonial nations became fixated with defining who 
was indigenous and who was not. For Mamdani violence against and expulsions of 
subject races in the aftermath of colonialism were a result of efforts by those 
considered ‘indigenous’ to grasp their entitlements. He states that at a later stage 
‘natives’ turn on each other in their quest to increasingly define who is indigenous. As 
a result even those living in their ancestral land can come to be defined as non-
indigenous. 
 
Fanon and Mamdani thus view animosity towards foreign national traders as more 
the result of surrounding societal factors than the actions of traders themselves. In 
particular they see it as an outcome of post-colonial political conditions where notions 
of rights and ownership are rooted in indigeneity. This results in the popular targeting 
of not only European colonists and settlers, but all groups considered foreign or 
immigrant – including immigrant and foreign national traders.  
 
Similarly in South Africa, notions of rights linked to indigeneity contribute to hostilities 
towards foreign national spaza shopkeepers. This is because, as in other post-
colonial countries, many South Africans view the post-apartheid project as that of 
liberating indigenous black South Africans from poverty and economic inequality, 
which is largely a legacy of colonial and apartheid regimes. For example in his recent 
state of the nation address, President Jacob Zuma announced that: 
 
Political freedom alone is incomplete without economic emancipation… What 
do we mean by radical socio-economic transformation? We mean 
fundamental change in the structure, systems, institutions and patterns of 
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ownership, management and control of the economy in favour of all South 
Africans, especially the poor, the majority of whom are African and female.229  
 
Later that evening at an ANC rally he explained:  
 
We need to change the economy of this country radically. We the blacks who 
are a majority, but we’re they have [sic] very little to do with the economy. 
And that is the task of the ANC.230 
 
Furthermore the Department of Small Business Development’s general strategic 
orientation emphasises the logic that the economic emancipation of black South 
Africans should be prioritised. In her department budget speech, the Minister of 
Small Business Development, Lindiwe Zulu explained that: 
 
Twenty years since our freedom, the participation of black people in the 
country’s economy still leaves much to be desired. Radical economic 
transformation is about turning this ugly picture on its head’. She added that 
‘South Africa, should, in its ownership, management and skills, reflect the 
active and meaningful participation of Africans in particular, and black people, 
in general.231 
 
In line with this thinking, many South African spaza shopkeepers saw foreign national 
spaza shopkeepers an obstruction to their attempts at liberating themselves from 
poverty. For example, at a meeting in Khayelitsha in 2012, a South African trader 
remarked that ‘Titus [the municipal law enforcement department’s representative] is 
trying to oppress the black people in this province as much as he can… It is not true 
that we have xenophobia, we just want to benefit from the fruits of our revolution’.232 
Another South African trader compared the growth of Somali spaza shops to settler 																																																								
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colonialism: ‘They [Somalis] come here rich, they find us poor and take advantage of 
us. It’s the same as when Jan van Riebeek came here – it’s exploitation’.233 For 
these traders the entry of foreign nationals interfered with their rights and 
entitlements as members of a formerly oppressed indigenous racial group.  
 
While notions of rights linked to indigeneity or racial identity can heighten hostilities 
towards foreign national spaza shopkeepers, it does not fully explain why 
governance actors responded with such radical and urgent action such as by-
passing normal legislative routes and breaching the law. This is especially the case 
given that acute hostilities towards foreign national spaza shops were felt mainly by 
South African spaza shopkeepers - not by the general populace as a whole (as 
assumed by Bonacich, Fanon, and Mamdani) - and most residents (including those 
adverse towards foreign national traders) took no active an interest in the issue.  
 
In the field sites, South African spaza retailers’ sentiments received mixed support 
from surrounding communities. South African residents interviewed generally 
showed appreciation for the low prices and efficient services that foreign spaza 
shops offered. Many described multiple benefits of foreign national spaza shops 
including offering lower priced goods, efficient service, and having longer opening 
hours than South African shops. Some went so far as to offer open praise and 
admiration for foreign national spaza shopkeepers. A Kraaifontein resident described 
that ‘foreign spaza shopkeepers have nothing but respect for residents. They keep 
their premises very clean, take out dirt bins and clean the street. They give a lot of 
credit because they know what struggling is about’.234 A resident in Philippi East also 
commended shopkeepers stating that ‘Somali traders will still sell if I’m 10 cents 
short, but not Xhosas. This is why I like Somali shops. When they came they didn’t 
take anyone’s shop. They never actively closed down anyone’s shop’.235 Another 
nearby resident stated that ‘If it were up to me I’d make bigger facilities for foreigners 
to thrive because as business people they create avenues for growth and the 
community benefit a lot’.236   
 
Even some self-professed criminals who claimed to have targeted foreign national 																																																								
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spaza shops made positive remarks about these businesses. A group of youth in 
Philippi East who stated that all they saw when they looked at foreign national spaza 
shops were ‘dollar signs and the potential for quick cash’237 stated that if there were 
no other factors they would chase away foreign national traders because they 
competed with South Africans.  However, on the whole they felt that the shops were 
of use to the community because of their low prices, convenience, and efficient 
services (for example, they could buy a scoop of sugar for R2,00, and shops opened 
early in the morning and closed late at night).238 Another youth in Philippi East 
explained that foreign national spaza shops offered many benefits including good 
customer service, low prices, and would still sell goods even when one could not 
afford the full price.  However at the same time he stated that every time he saw a 
Somali spaza shop he only thought of breaking in.239 
 
This is not to say that residents in the field sites were free of any antagonism towards 
foreign businesses. A significant number of residents harboured various degrees of 
resentment. The most common complaints amongst residents related to the 
perceived lack of personal hygiene amongst foreign shopkeepers and low food 
quality – especially bread, which many residents remarked had an odd smell. But a 
further frequent concern amongst South African residents was the perceived 
restriction of business opportunities for South Africans. Many residents viewed 
foreign national spaza shops as restricting avenues for South African economic 
mobility. A resident in Better Life, Philippi East explained that ‘I have no problem with 
Somalis, but they should not have twenty shops in Better Life alone because it 
cancels the chances of local South Africans’.240 In Lower Crossroads, Philippi East, a 
resident described that ‘Locals cannot have self-initiated businesses because 
foreigners took over the market’.241 Similarly a Khayelitsha resident stated that her 
community liked foreign spaza shops because of their operating hours and affordable 
prices, but also felt threatened because ‘they take away opportunities’.242 Some 
township residents therefore saw foreign spaza shops as problematic not necessarily 
because they caused direct economic harm, but rather because they restricted 
potential avenues for the economic mobility of South Africans. A few residents were 
extremely hostile towards foreign national spaza shopkeepers. For example, a 																																																								
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Gugulethu resident compared them to snakes, 243  and a Philippi East resident 
accused foreign national spaza shopkeepers of cursing the neighbourhood with 
misfortune.244 
 
However, these concerns – even when negative - were usually peripheral, and were 
not treated by residents as urgent priorities. The vast majority of residents reported 
that foreign national spaza shops had never been discussed at their local 
neighbourhood meetings. Whether they liked or disliked shops (or somewhere in 
between), all residents concurred that the main protagonists mobilising against 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers were South African shopkeepers who were 
concerned about competition.  
 
Thus unlike Bonacich, Mamdani and Fanon who view antagonisms towards foreign 
national small businesses as held more or less evenly amongst members of host 
societies, individuals’ hostilities towards foreign national spaza shopkeepers in the 
field sites differed largely between depending on their personal economic and 
political interests at stake. To understand desires to curb foreign national spaza 
shops it is necessary to look at broader socio-political contexts and the interests of 
different actors involved.  
 
It is not surprising that many assume that desires to curb or remove shops are evenly 
felt amongst members of host societies. This is because large segments of general 
populations often do turn on foreign national, immigrant or minority group shops. 
Residents in the field sites frequently attacked foreign national spaza shops during 
the course of strikes, xenophobic riots, and service delivery protests. Incidents of 
South African spaza shopkeepers inciting public unrest occurred in Masiphumelele in 
2006 and in the Strand in May 2008. On other occasions, local political leaders 
encouraged residents to attack shops. For example in February 2015, Ses’kona 
People’s Rights Movement leaders defended their members’ looting of foreign 
national businesses in Philippi East, by claiming that a Somali national had driven 
into a Ses’kona protester in Bellville.245 However, a Khayelitsha community activist, 																																																								
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as well as an NGO worker described that lootings carried out by Ses’kona members 
were usually pre-planned, as members had been reminded to bring bags along with 
them to protests: ‘People were told that go and have your bags there, we’re going to 
loot’.246 Not all lootings were orchestrated. Sometimes residents turned on foreign 
national spaza businesses spontaneously during protests without needing any 
organized incitement.247  
 
While such attacks demonstrate widespread xenophobic disregard towards foreign 
national traders, they are not necessarily a marker of acute popular antagonism. 
Though mob attacks on foreign national spaza shops entailed racist and xenophobic 
selection of targets, their direct motivations related more to general frustration with 
life circumstances than to hardened discontent towards foreigners per se. Poverty 
compounded with widespread social and political disillusionment creates thriving 
conditions for lawlessness in many townships. Residents stated that these factors 
more than acute dislike of foreigners motivated attacks on their shops. A Khayelitsha 
resident explained that: 
 
In an informal settlement you find people who are very frustrated because of 
the conditions we live in, no space, no electricity, no water. Most people living 
in an informal settlement have an anger issue. They’re always frustrated. And 
then you find lots of people are sitting there doing nothing. So now you come 
there and say let’s go to that shop. Or just one person starts to throw stones. 
It just takes one person, most of the time they do not plan.248 
 
A Philippi resident similarly described that township residents were easy to incite: 
 
… when there is something untoward happening in a typical township it 
catches the attention of the community, like paraffin being poured on a flame. 
The rest of the community will not be aware of what is happening and they 																																																																																																																																																														
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will not necessarily be interested in getting to know what is happening.  They 
will want to bring a tire to burn as well.249 
 
A Khayelitsha resident blamed community leaders for encouraging residents to turn 
on foreign businesses in contexts of ‘social crisis’ such service delivery protests. He 
said that leaders ‘chased away foreigners’ in order to show residents that they were 
effective, but that ‘ordinary people don’t care’.250 This mirrors Misago’s emphasis on 
the central role of local political leaders in the generation of xenophobic riots.251 
 
Many stated that looting was also a matter of opportunism: ‘If I don’t take that samp 
someone else will. Even landlords loot because at the end of the day we cannot stop 
these looters, so let’s take something for ourselves as well’.252 Likewise, a Philippi 
resident described that: ‘… those youth who were being involved are youth who see 
an opportunity for grabbing what there is to grab from a Somali shop’. 253  A 
Khayelitsha resident who had confronted a police officer after he had participated in 
looting stated that the police officer defended his actions by claiming that all he had 
taken was ‘just soap’.254 
 
Foreign national spaza shopkeepers make particularly easy targets for opportunists 
and those wishing to express their built up anger over their social conditions. As 
already mentioned, shopkeepers generally fall outside of township social and political 
life and were not considered part of the ‘community’. Residents in the field sites 
described that relationships between shopkeepers and their customers were mostly 
remote and commercial in nature. This contributed to community responses to crime 
affecting foreign spaza businesses being muted. Weak police and justice system 
interventions further compounded shopkeepers’ vulnerability. Shops were therefore 
largely defenceless, making them easy targets to turn on.  
 
But there is more to these outbursts of violence. Expressing discontent and 																																																								
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frustration through looting and public violence against foreign national spaza shops is 
not only a means of venting anger, accessing free goods or ridding neighbourhoods 
of foreigners (for those so-inclined). It also serves to communicate socio-economic 
dissatisfaction to political leaders – especially those occupying influential state 
positions. Approximately a quarter of the population of South Africa is unemployed 
(and just over a third of the population when using the expanded rate),255 and over 20 
percent of South Africans live below the food poverty line.256 South Africa also has 
one of the highest Gini-coefficients in the world making it one of the economically 
unequal countries globally.257 As Zuma declared in his state of the nation address 
‘Twenty two years into our freedom and democracy, the majority of black people are 
still economically disempowered. They are dissatisfied with the economic gains from 
liberation’.258  
 
Foreign national spaza shops have symbolic power in township neighbourhoods. 
They reflect a form of economic mobility that continues to elude a number of South 
Africans. This is evident in residents’ concerns over foreign shops’ apparent seizure 
of business ‘chances’ and ‘opportunities’. By attacking symbols of economic mobility, 
residents hope to draw attention their stagnant social circumstances, and the fact 
that newly arrived non-citizens seem to be better off than them. A Khayelitsha 
resident described that ‘People are angry with the government and by committing 
xenophobia they think that maybe government will pay attention and meet their 
needs.’ 259  Many foreign national spaza shopkeepers agreed, and commonly 
described the motivations for attacks on their businesses as ‘attention’ from the 
government. The popular violence against foreign national spaza shops is thus also 
a call to political leaders and state institutions to address and accelerate the 
economic plight of South African township inhabitants. This is especially the case 
given that political promises to advance the economic liberation of black South 
Africans have largely remained unmet. This violence and discontent amongst the 
people, so easily triggered by local political and business leaders, threatens the state 																																																								
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and senior politicians, and feeds their urge to curb the activities of foreign national 
spaza shops.  
 
South African spaza traders leverage this political fear by threatening to incite local 
residents against foreign national businesses. While foreign national spaza shops 
may be the targets of such anarchy, the message being sent by local residents who 
participate in attacks is primarily to the state and the political party leaders. In 
particular it is less an attempt to seize businesses from foreign nationals, and more 
an expression of popular discontent and disillusionment in the state’s ability to deliver 
economic change. This is the real gevaar – the rage of the people against the 
country’s political establishment. In response to the popular targeting of foreign 
national spaza shops, political and state actors scramble to find ways of showing 
their commitment to the economic cause of township residents – by clamping down 
on these same shops. By acting against foreign national spaza shops, political 
leaders and state officials achieve three feats. First they appease frustrated residents 
by indicating that they are putting the ‘people’ first. This is summed up by the Minister 
of Small Business Development’s statement that ‘Foreigners need to understand that 
they are here as a courtesy and our priority is to the people of this country first and 
foremost.260 
 
Secondly such action also appeases South African retailers and decreases their 
likelihood of inciting further popular rage and threatening the political status quo. 
Third, targeting foreign spaza shops tacitly attributes township economic woes to 
migration and the economic activities of foreign nationals. The Inter-Ministerial 
Committee on Migration (IMC) linked the xenophobic violence in Gauteng and 
KwaZulu-Natal in 2015 to economic constriction caused by foreign national 
businesses, stating that: 
  
… the primary cause of the violence against foreign nationals is the increased 
competition arising from the socio-economic circumstances in South Africa. 
This was illustrated by statistics showing a growth in the number of unskilled 
immigrants entering the country since 2008. This is in the context of slowing 
economic growth and a decline in unskilled job creation. This has been 																																																								
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heightened by a decade of poor implementation of immigration and border 
controls.261 
 
Accordingly the IMC recommended interventions such as reviewing the country’s 
migration policy, prioritising economic growth and job creation in townships and rural 
areas, and auditing and licensing informal business.262 It also launched ‘Operation 
Fiela’ (meaning ‘sweep clean’ in Sesotho), which, while supposedly aimed at 
‘eliminating criminality and general lawlessness from our communities’ 263 
disproportionately targeted foreign nationals and saw thousands of foreigners 
arrested and deported.264 The Minister in the Presidency, Jeff Radebe explained: 
‘Through Operation Fiela we are claiming our communities so that our people can 
live in peace’.265  
 
Instead of declaring its fear of the people, political leaders and state actors 
emphasise a fear of shops, and with that an array of misinformed or partial reasons 
to constrict them – including competition with South African traders, their alleged lack 
of legal compliance, and crime affecting their shops. While the actions of foreign 
national traders (as emphasised by Bonacich), as well as postcolonial expectations 
linked to race and indigeneity (as stressed by Fanon and Mamdani) play a role in 
generating hostilities towards foreign national spaza shops, the shop gevaar in South 
Africa is also an outcome of weak formal state institutions faced with rising popular 
discontent. As a result informal political groupings use their ability to incite local 
discontent against foreign national spaza shops (as well as other targets such as 
clinics, schools, and busses) as a bargaining chip against an unstable state authority. 
When examining the problematisation of foreign national traders in postcolonial and 
developing countries it is therefore necessary to not only investigate the actions of 
traders or the nature of postcolonial identity politics. The trigger sparking anxieties 
towards shops can ultimately lie in the make up of their political spheres – i.e. in the 																																																								
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competition between fragile state institutions, and local informal locations of political 
power in the context of poverty and economic stagnation. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Political leaders and state officials involved in the governance of foreign national 
spaza shopkeepers offered numerous reasons for their interventions. Generally four 
core motivations were mentioned namely that foreign national spaza shopkeepers 
caused economic harm to South Africans, engaged in unfair and illegal activities, 
were often targeted by robbers, and that failure to curb their shops could lead to 
looting or violent attacks on them. However, these explanations do not fully add up. 
While foreign national spaza shops threatened many South African spaza 
shopkeepers’ livelihoods, a number of parties benefitted from their presence 
including landlords and consumers. These stakeholders collectively outnumbered 
South African spaza shopkeepers. It was also unlikely that foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers engaged in more illegal or unfair practices than South African spaza 
shopkeepers. Furthermore, heightening the regulation of victims of crime is 
questionable way of protecting them, especially in the absence of clear efforts to 
target offenders. Likewise attempting to prevent attacks on foreign national 
shopkeepers through unconstitutional and unlawful measures would at least be 
accompanied by a series of other initiatives aimed at reducing such threats such as 
taking effective action against perpetrators of threats, looting and murder. 
 
While Bonacich, Fanon and Mamdani offer further explanations for desires to limit 
shops, namely that the solidarity found amongst foreign national traders threatens 
host societies, and that perceptions of rights linked to indigeneity cause ethnic and 
national groups to seek ways to rid their localities of shops operated by outsiders, a 
further dynamic contributes to the shop gevaar in South Africa. In particular, 
governance actors’ anxieties over foreign national spaza shopkeepers is a response 
to socially dissatisfied citizens, who have found foreign national spaza shops a useful 
means to garner attention from the state.  
 
Thus the shop gevaar is not about any substantial mischief having been conducted 
by foreign national spaza traders. Interventions are also not primarily aimed at 
protecting shopkeepers’ lives and properties. Rather the threat relates to the 
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widespread anger of township residents who feel the promises of democracy have 
been unfulfilled. When they target foreign spaza shops they are communicating their 
discontent to an anxious state and political leadership. These actors in turn attempt 
to act against shops in order to show their commitment to the needs of South African 
citizens, dissuade South African shopkeepers from further incitement, and divert 
attention away from themselves and their own shortcomings. 
 
The following chapter explores how the governance of foreign national spaza traders 
plays out in practice. It observes how social discontent and economic interests play a 
key role in these interventions and the political dynamics involved. To better 
understand this state of affairs, the chapter examines the theories of Arendt, 
Foucault and Agamben who all argue that the elevation of economic concerns in the 
political sphere is characteristic of the modern age. It assesses the strengths and 
weaknesses of their accounts in relation to the thesis’s investigation of the political 
implications of governance activities in a post-colonial and developing world context. 
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4. The politics of life: Theories of the social and their applicability to the 
governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers in South Africa 
 
Note here, too, the depoliticisation of politics in the treatment of the alien-as 
spectre, of their displacement into a technicist discourse about demography 
and economic sociology, about health and disease, about social pathology 
and criminality.266 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The task of curbing foreign national spaza shops is easier said than done. The ways 
in which governance actors (ranging from police, South African spaza shopkeepers, 
community civic groups, foreign national community representatives, and mediators) 
envisioned their interventions rarely panned out as intended. Instead governance 
efforts encountered a number of challenges, including protests by landlords, local 
level bribery, and legal constraints.  Despite these conflicting goals, most parties 
actively engaged in governance shared a preoccupation with economic concerns and 
interests more than forwarding political rights and freedoms. 
 
This chapter investigates the varied and contested actions and goals of different 
governance actors and explores how they reflect a political sphere that is guided 
more by economic interests than political and constitutional values such as 
inclusivity, equality and dignity. In this way governance reflects features of Arendt, 
Foucault and Agamben’s theories of ‘the social’ or ‘biopolitics’, which argue that 
politics in the modern age has seen the entry of private economic concerns of the 
home enter the political sphere.  
 
However, these theories were formulated in very different contexts to that of post-
apartheid South Africa. Arendt, Foucault and Agamben were located in western 
industrialised countries when developing their theories.  This influenced their theories 
in several ways.  For example, they all largely presuppose the political sphere as 
being located in centralized and bureaucratic nation states. In contrast the South 
African political sphere is characterized by a large degree of informality and localized 																																																								
266	Comaroff	and	Comaroff	(note	23)	at	650.	
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and autonomous groupings of political power.  South Africa also confronts 
postcolonial legacies of racial oppression, widespread poverty and economic 
inequality.  The chapter therefore sets out Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s accounts 
of the social and assesses their applicability to the thesis topic, which focuses on the 
politics of governance activities in a postcolonial and developing world context. 
 
4.2 Attempts to govern foreign national spaza shops 
In response to the perceived threat posed by foreign national spaza shopkeepers, 
state actors including the police, the national Department of Trade and Industry, as 
well as the Department of Small Business Development have all sought to intervene 
and restrict the ability of foreign national spaza shops to operate. However in practice 
this task confronts a number of obstacles. The current legal framework governing 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers in the country makes it difficult for state actors to 
clamp down on foreign national spaza shops. The country is a signatory to the 
Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and has enacted legislation 
that permits asylum seekers and refugees to live and work in the country. The 
constitution also protects foreign nationals, as rights such as the right to equality and 
dignity apply to all people in the country whether or not they are citizens.   
 
Furthermore, while spaza shops tend to be characterized as ‘informal’ businesses (in 
the sense that many are not registered with formal institutions), they do not 
necessarily operate illegally. Until recently, township zoning schemes in Cape Town 
permitted the operation of shops and businesses from residential premises, so long 
as the dominant use of the property remained residential and they did not cause a 
nuisance.267 Many other townships across the country are regulated by the still 
existing apartheid law titled the ‘Black Communities Development Act 4 of 1984’, 
which permits the operation of businesses on residential premises.268 At the same 
time spaza shopkeepers in Cape Town are not required to possess business permits 																																																								
267	Clause	6.4.1	(a)	of	the	Zoning	Regulations	under	the	Land	Use	Planning	Ordinance	15	of	1985	(Lupo)	sets	out	
that	properties	zoned	as	Informal	Residential	Zones	may	utilise	properties	for	business	purposes	on	condition	
that	the	dominant	use	of	the	property	remains	residential,	the	use	will	not	be	disturbing	to	neighbours,	or	
interfere	with	the	amenities	of	the	direct	neighbourhood.	New	zoning	regulations	governing	Cape	Town	came	
into	effect	in	March	2013.	These	were	replaced		by	the	City	of	Cape	Town’s	Municipal	Planning	By-Law	of	2015,	
which		permits	the	establishment	of	‘house	shops’	as	additional	use	rights	of	the	property,	subject	to	conditions	
set	out	under	section	26	and	28.		
268	4.9.1	(a)	of	the	Act’s	Town	Planning	Scheme	states	that	‘any	occupier	of	any	unit	of	accommodation	may	
utilise	such	unity	for	any	social,	religious,	occupational	or	business	purpose	subject	to	the	following	conditions:	(i)	
the	dominant	use	of	the	property	shall	remain	residential;	(ii)	the	use	concerned	shall	not	be	disturbing	to	
neighbours;	and	(iii)	the	use	concerned	shall	not	interfere	wit	the	amenity	of	the	neighbourhood’.	
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or licenses.269 Local authorities therefore cannot easily turn to by-laws and zoning 
schemes to evict traders. Even in instances where by-laws do require spaza shops to 
possess licenses, the state would be obliged to apply the law with equal measure 
against South African businesses, which would do little to quell local conflicts. These 
legal dilemmas facing governance actors were summed up by Minister of Small 
Business Development, Lindiwe Zulu’s plea to South African spaza shopkeepers that 
‘‘The Bill of Rights protects them, the constitution protects them, so how do we 
integrate them? Make them understand the law?’270 
 
The state has on many occasions attempted to change this formal regulatory state of 
affairs. However, its efforts to adapt or reinterpret current policy have been met with 
court cases, which the state lost. Government attempts to prevent asylum seekers 
and refugees from working have run into conflict with the constitution, as courts have 
maintained that asylum seekers’ and refugees’ rights to dignity would be undermined 
by wholesale prohibitions against them working (whether as employees or business 
owners), as they could be left indigent as a result. In the Watchenuka case, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal found that a general prohibition by the Standing Committee 
for Refugee Affairs against asylum seekers undertaking employment in the country 
was an unjustifiable ‘invasion of human dignity’.271 Similarly the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in the Somali Association of South Africa272 case ruled that a blanket ban 
against asylum seekers and refugees engaging in self-employment was also an 
affront to their dignity as it risked condemning ‘the appellants to a life of humiliation 
and degradation’.273 Therefore foreign national spaza traders’ general compliance 
with township trading laws (whether in respect of zoning schemes or licensing and 
permitting by-laws), as well as constitutional barriers to adapting or selectively 
enforcing laws against foreign national spaza shopkeepers, make utilising the formal 
legal system and its enforcement mechanisms an unviable option for governance 
actors. This however does not illustrate that governance actors have been motivated 
and guided by the country’s constitutional framework and political rights principles in 
their strategies. Instead the constitutional dispensation is viewed more a hurdle and 
obstacle forced on them as a consequence of litigation instituted by opposing civil 																																																								
269	See	notes	(156	to	159).	
270	Lindiwe	Zulu,	quoted	in	‘Call	to	regulate	spaza	shops’	Star,	(staff	reporter)	3	February	2015,	available	at	
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/call-to-regulate-spaza-shops-1.1812745#.VW73UlyQdUQ,	date	
accessed	4	March	2017.	
271	Minister	of	Home	Affairs	and	others	v	Watchenuka	and	another	2004	(4)	SA	326	(SCA)	At	para	33.	
272	Somali	Association	of	South	Africa	case	(note	171).	
273	Ibid	at	para	43. 
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rights groups. For example, it was only as a result of a court action brought by 
foreign national community groups that were represented by Lawyers for Human 
Rights that state actors ceased their practice of depriving foreign national spaza 
shops of business licenses in Limpopo province and closing down their businesses. 
 
The absence of formal legal options has resulted in governance actors ranging from 
state officials to local political leaders choosing alternative regulatory strategies that 
did not rest on formal legal pretexts. Informal governance is a useful means of 
establishing rules without needing to overcome legal and constitutional hurdles 
entailed in passing or applying legislation. In the field sites in Cape Town, local level 
governance interventions often took the form of informal trade agreements between 
South African and foreign national spaza shopkeepers that were aimed at resolving 
South African shopkeepers’ antagonism towards foreign national spaza shops. 
These agreements entailed foreign nationals agreeing to cease opening new spaza 
shops in certain areas, and sometimes also obliged them to fix their prices, keep an 
agreed distance away form South African spaza shops, or only own a restricted 
percentage of businesses in a neighbourhood.274  
 
Negotiations leading to these agreements were precipitated by protests by South 
African spaza shopkeepers, who organised themselves into retailers associations 
such as Siyakha Business Trust in Masiphumelele, Zanokanyo Retailers Association 
in Khayelitsha, the Khulani Small Business Association in Kraaifontein, and the 
Lower Crossroads Business Forum in Philippi East. A number of South African spaza 
shopkeepers wielded significant local political power in the field sites. Police in 
Philippi East and Kraaifontein described that mobilisations against foreign national 
spaza shopkeepers were led by South African ‘big bosses’, who owned a number of 
local businesses ranging from spaza shops to shebeens, bottle stores, fisheries, and 
butcheries. These individuals were often politically influential, with many being 
members of political party branches and participating in South African National Civic 
Organisation (SANCO) structures. For example, when South African shopkeepers 
mobilised against foreign national spaza shopkeepers in Philippi East in 2011, they 
sent out threatening notices to landlords under the banner of SANCO. In Kraaifontein 
South African ‘big bosses’ also occupied leadership positions within SANCO. When 
police investigated a spate of murders of Somali spaza shopkeepers in the township, 																																																								
274	Gugulethu	agreement	(note	128).	
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they therefore raided the offices of SANCO, as well as the local ward councillor since 
the ‘big bosses’ under investigation were also SANCO leaders.  
 
State representatives (such as police, councillors, and local departments of 
economic development) along with NGOs and community organisations presided 
over trade negotiations between foreign nationals and South African spaza 
shopkeepers in the field sites and further afield,275 and frequently supported their 
regulatory outcomes. This is illustrated through a series of meetings I attended in 
Khayelitsha in March and April 2012 that were aimed at addressing South African 
traders’ complaints that Somali traders had opened new shops in violation of a local 
trade agreement barring any new spaza shops. The agreement had been entered 
into in 2008 after South African spaza retailers belonging to Zanokhanyo Retailers 
Association sent out threatening notices to foreign national spaza shopkeepers in 
Khayelitsha. The notices, which were dated 22 August 2008 informed foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers to close their businesses for 21 days during which  ‘all 
matters regarding your existence in our communities are being discussed’.276 In 
response to the notices police arrested several Zanokhanyo leaders and kept them in 
custody until they were prepared to enter into negotiations with their foreign national 
counterparts. The outcome was an agreement dated 27 November 2008 and signed 
by Zanokhanyo and the Somali Retailers Association, which stated that: ‘Both 
Zanokhanyo and Somali committee must approve all new shops opening in the 
Khayelitsha vicinities, in order to prevent unprecedented clashes of businesses 
which might result in conflicts’.277 Although the written agreement did not specifically 
refer to foreign national spaza shops, Somali retailers, police and community 
members stated that in practice it was aimed at curtailing foreign national 
businesses. Somali spaza traders stated that they would face severe local backlash 
were they to request a South African business to close shop, and police in Harare 
police station stated that South Africans were free to open as many businesses in 
Khayelitsha as they wished. 
 
However, over the next few years many Somali traders continued opening new 
businesses in spite of the agreement. In March 2012, infuriated members of 
																																																								
275	See	notes	129	to	131.	
276	Original	Letter	(note	119)	
277	Copy	of	agreement	(note	121)	
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Zanokhanyo drove in a convoy of ‘about thirty people in ten cars’278 to several Somali 
owned shops in Khayelitsha and attempted to forcibly close down the shops. When 
intercepted by the police, the South African traders argued that they were simply 
enforcing the trade agreement.279 In response to the protest, local police organised a 
meeting at Lingelethu-West police station on 7 March 2012. Lingelethu-West police 
station is a barren faced-brick building just off Spine Road, a main traffic artery in 
Khayelitsha. The meeting was held in a small community hall at the station, where 
invited representatives sat on a podium at the front of the hall and an audience of 
about 80 people were sitting white plastic chairs spread out below. On the podium 
sat the meeting chairperson, Reverend Mfundisi ‘Templeton’ Mbekwa, two Somali 
community representatives, two South African retailers’ representatives, and 
Sibongile Mbotwe, the Special Advisor to the Minister of Police. About ten Somali 
Spaza shopkeepers attended the meeting - most of whom arrived together in a small 
group about half an hour into the meeting. The chairperson, Reverend Mbekwa, 
began the meeting by setting out the reason for why it had been called. He explained 
that: 
 
The businesses are enough now and there is no help from law enforcement.  
Shopkeepers now feel like they must take it upon themselves. They went to 
the shops which were given notice and which were still standing. Where is the 
agreement?  They therefore took it upon themselves and closed the shops.280 
 
Mbekwa then set out the meeting’s agenda: 
 
The Agenda today says ‘how can we limit the influx of new shops and monitor 
systematically’.  How valid is the 2008 agreement.  Is it doable? How best can 
we do it with the help of government? Once it gets ugly we can do this before 
it happens.281 
 
																																																								
278	Interview,	Somali	Retailers	Association	representative,	21	August	2012.		
279	Interview,	Khayelitsha	community	activist,	Rondebosch,	28	April	2015.	
280	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers,	Lingelethu	West	police	station,	Khayelitsha,	7	
March	2012.	
281	Ibid.	
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Thereafter Mbekwa invited Mbotwe to address the crowd. However instead of setting 
out the formal legal framework governing businesses in the township, Mbotwe urged 
shopkeepers and community leaders in Khayelitsha to respect the agreement, 
stating that: 
 
The beauty of Khayelitsha post-2008 is this agreement.  We must ask the 
Somalis to give an audit of shops in 2008 and we start from there. Then we 
go to the community and speak to them.  We say we want to avoid 2008 and 
we therefore reached an agreement. The police will come and make sure the 
agreement is enforced in each and every community.282 
 
A question and answer session followed where South African spaza shopkeepers 
voiced their frustrations about foreign national spaza and highlighted the need to 
work more closely with community structures and the police. Towards the end of the 
meeting some Somali community representatives started questioning the legality 
agreement. For example, a Somali community leader queried whether it was legal to 
limit the shops of ‘minority group of people’. Another Somali community 
representative stated that ‘I would like to highlight that we want a lasting solution for 
the conflict and we as the Somali Association of South Africa would like to contribute 
our side to get a peaceful procedure to the conflict, which don't violate our rights and 
those of our South African counterparts’. This drew the ire of a number of South 
Africans in attendance, with one member of the crowd shouting that: 
 
That Somali man is arrogant because they have money to buy their way. You 
undermine leaders in our country.  You are provoking us and you better stop 
that.  The reason for this meeting is to minimize Somali shops. 
 
Thereafter the meeting descended into angry shouts and loud chatter, with one 
attendee raising a spear and threatening to assault one of the Somali traders who 
had spoken. Thereafter Mbekwa officially closed the meeting with a promise that a 
follow up meeting would be called soon. Despite clear confusion about the law, as 
well as direct and open threats against a number of foreign national spaza 																																																								282	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers,	Lingelethu	West	police	station,	Khayelitsha,	7	
March	2012.	
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shopkeepers in attendance, police officials and SAPS leaders present at the meeting 
remained silent on or sidestepped these issues. 
 
Not all state officials and departments involved in the governance of foreign national 
spaza shops in Khayelitsha supported the informal regulatory arrangement in the 
township. Although having previously participated in legally questionable fining of 
foreign national shops for not possessing business licenses,283 the municipal law 
enforcement department from the City of Cape Town, which was tasked with 
enforcing by-laws, objected to the local trade agreement. At a follow up meeting held 
on 20 March 2012, a representative from the department read a prepared statement 
that announced that the department could not shut down and remove new foreign 
national spaza shops in the township, as Khayelitsha was a ‘free trade area’ where 
residents were permitted to operate businesses on private properties. The statement 
ended: 
 
Lastly I want to read ‘Foreign nationals and their human rights’: - Foreign Nationals are entitled to be treated equally before the law 
and have their human rights protected. - They have the right to move about freely. - To work as long as they have a valid permit. - Students are allowed to perform part time jobs. - They are entitled to conduct businesses if they have proper 
refugee papers. - They are entitled to access public services such as health and 
education. 
 
I ask the meeting to respect this because it was not drawn up by me, but by 
the government.284 
 
Predictably this advice was not well received by South African retailers in 
attendance. A South African shopkeeper threatened: ‘The 2008 agreement is being 																																																								
283	Informal	conversations	with	police	in	Kraaifontein.		
284	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers,	Lingelethu	West	police	station,	Khayelitsha,	7	
March	2012.	
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forsaken because of the perception it has no legal status.  This breeds anarchy. If 
you say the 2008 agreement is not going to be implemented you are breeding 
anarchy’.285 Another shopkeeper more measuredly observed that ‘There seem to be 
two different laws.  Mr Titus [from the municipal law enforcement department] deals 
with the laws of this country.  However there are also the laws of the people as to 
how things work in the locations, which brings in clashes’.286  
 
At a general meeting between Khayelitsha residents and police leaders the following 
week, police representatives continued calling for the implementation of the trade 
agreement in Khayelitsha. In particular, the national Minister of Police, Nathi 
Mthethwa called for the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between foreign national 
and South African spaza shopkeepers to be renewed. 287  The Provincial 
Commissioner of Police, Arno Lamoer concurred with the minister emphasising that 
the ‘MOU’ needed to be ‘respected and honoured… Let’s find a way of ensuring that 
the understanding works rather than regulation by the government’.288 
 
At a further meeting held on 18 April 2012 more discussion ensued about the legality 
of the informal trade agreement. General Molo, representing the SAPS appealed that 
residents stop renting out their properties to foreign nationals and complained that 
foreign national shops needed to be permitted. When a municipal law enforcement 
official raised the point that spaza shopkeepers did not require permits, Molo replied: 
‘The problem is to define a business. Let’s stop talking about regulating. The point is 
you need a structure with a toilet to have a business. You can’t have a business in a 
shack’.289 He added that: 
 
We can’t have businesses in a house or shack or sleep in the business… We 
will arrest the person and go to the municipality because the law allows us.290 
 
																																																								
285	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers,	Lingelethu	West	police	station,	Khayelitsha,	7	
March	2012.	
286	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers,	Lingelethu	West	police	station,	20	March	
2012.	
287	Meeting	between	police	leaders	and	Khayelitsha	community	at	Lookout	Hill,	Khayelitsha,	29	March	2017.	
288	Ibid.	
289	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers,	Lookout	Hill,	Khayelitsha,	18	April	2017.	
290	Ibid.	
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As mentioned, Khayelitsha’s zoning schemes allow businesses to operate from 
private residential premises. This point was repeatedly raised at meetings by law 
enforcement officials, but almost completely ignored by police, the chairperson of the 
meeting, and South African spaza shopkeepers in attendance. These parties refused 
to publicly acknowledge and emphasise the formal legal framework governing spaza 
shops in Khayelitsha, let alone pay lip service to the political and constitutional rights 
of foreign nationals.  
 
Apart from overseeing informal trade agreements, police in Cape Town also engaged 
in unlawful fining operations against foreign national spaza shops. Between 
November 2011 and February 2013, foreign national spaza shopkeepers from 
townships and neighbourhoods across Cape Town ranging from Khayeltisha, 
Kraaifontein Gugulethu, Elsies Rivier and Observatory reported having been fined by 
police. Their fines, which ranged from R1,000 to R1,500, gave the reason of ‘trading 
without a licence’ and cited ‘the Local Authorities Act’, which did not exist.291 Some 
traders were doubly confused by the fact that police informed them that they were 
being fined for keeping their shops open too late. At a meeting in Khayelitsha the 
Chairperson reiterated that that foreign national spaza shopkeepers had been fined 
for being open too late: ‘All shops should be closed at 9pm and open at 6pm… Police 
are invited to investigate and fine the shops after 9pm.’292 Foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers in Elsies Rivier described that police eventually ceased fining them, and 
instead entered their shops and pepper sprayed them for operating past the police-
set curfew time.  
 
Police fining operations varied from place to place. In Gugulethu traders reported that 
police politely issued fines and left, while in Elsies Rivier and Observatory police 
arrested traders and drove them to local police stations where they were held in 
custody for several hours. It is likely that the Provincial Commissioner of Police 
ordered the operations. For example Somali traders in Elsies Rivier stated that the 
station commander of Ravensmead police station had informed them at a meeting 
that the Provincial Commissioner of Police had ordered the fining of foreign-owned 
																																																								
291	Fines	cited	the	‘Local	Authorities	Act	19	of	1974’.	However	no	Act	exists	in	South	Africa	under	the	title	‘Local	
Authorities	Act’.		‘Act	19	of	1974’	does	exist,	but	it	is	titled	the	‘Subdivision	of	Agricultural	Land	Amendment	Act’	
and	does	not	relate	to	trading	licenses.	
292	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers,	Lookout	Hill,	Khayelitsha,	18	April	2017.	
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shops.293 Similarly, police sector managers in Philippi East stated that their orders 
came ‘from above’.294  
 
Police conduct at meetings in Khayelitsha as well as fining operations throughout 
Cape Town illustrate that political rights and democratic notions of the rule of law 
were far from the minds of senior police leaders. In fact General Molo’s assertions in 
Khayelitsha of what the law ‘allows’ did not only show a lack of interest in the 
country’s constitutional framework and political rights principles.  It demonstrated a 
highly pliable attitude towards the law in general – almost as though he was entitled 
to decide the content of the law as he spoke. In other words the law was whatever 
senior leaders said it was, only to be corrected in the event of threats of formal legal 
action.295 This shows both an abandonment of the values of the constitution (which 
includes the principles of the rule of law and equal treatment before the law) as well 
as a culture of regulatory informality, where social rules do not only arise from 
legislation, but also from decrees made by senior political leaders. While these 
leaders may not have the support of the legislature and formal courts, they have the 
support of South African shopkeepers, and confront little resistance from local 
communities. This phenomenon is mirrored in Chatterjee’s notion of ‘political society’ 
in postcolonial states where state actors attend to the at times unlawful claims of 
informal political groupings out of recognition of their socio-economic needs as well 
as out of political expediency.296 
 
Residents – the largest stakeholder group – rarely participated in spaza shop 
negotiations. In Gugulethu and Philippi residents were unaware of informal 
agreements that governed spaza shops in their neighbourhoods. In contrast some 
residents in Khayelitsha were familiar with informal spaza shop rules. However, this 
was not through attending negotiations, themselves, but having been informed of 
negotiation outcomes after the fact by SANCO representatives. While some 
residents in Khayelitsha felt sympathetic towards local shopkeepers and supportive 
of any arrangements that could promote peace and business opportunities for South 
Africans, others criticised the restrictions as they viewed foreign spaza shops as 
providing convenient services to local residents and landlords. Nevertheless whether 																																																								
293	Interview,	Somali	trader,	Cravenby,	28	September	2012.			
294	Interview,	Philippi	East	police	officers,	Philippi	East,	22	November	2011.   
295	As	occurred	in	Khayelitsha	in	2009	when	shopkeepers	hired	attorneys	to	represent	them	against	local	police	
who	attempted	to	close	down	their	shops	(see	Chapter	three).	
296	Chatterjee	(note	32)	at	40.	
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they wished foreign national businesses to remain or leave, their reasoning was 
usually economic more than political.  It related to the perceived economic benefits 
foreign national spaza shops offered the local community, rather than the political 
values such as equality before the law, dignity and plurality.  
 
While informal trade agreements and police fining enabled actors to circumvent the 
law, informality has its own shortcomings. While many informal trade agreements 
were entered into in Cape Town and further afield, few lasted into the long term. 
There were many reasons for this. Firstly agreements’ lack of formal legal authority 
meant that informal rules were difficult to enforce, as parties could not turn to police 
or courts. Instead South African and foreign national spaza shopkeepers found 
themselves having to close down new foreign national spaza shops themselves, 
which was a challenging task. In Masiphumelele, a Somali shopkeeper stated that he 
had tried to enforce the agreement prohibiting new foreign national spaza shops 
against a new Ethiopian trader, who argued that the agreement did not apply to him. 
After repeated confrontations, the Ethiopian trader laid charges of intimidation 
against him at the local police station, which spelled the end of his efforts to block 
new competitors.297 
 
The Khayelitsha agreement of 2008 also almost immediately suffered a number of 
hurdles due to its lack of enforceability. Parties to the agreement falsely assumed 
that Somali community representatives would be able to effect its terms. However 
Somali community representatives complained that new Somali spaza shopkeepers 
frequently ignored their requests to close down their businesses. A Somali Retailers 
Association representative complained that there was little that he could do to close 
down new Somali shops in Khayelitsha:  
 
Because if it [the agreement] was in 2008 and this person comes in 2009, he 
says ‘No I was not there when you were doing this agreement, so I want to do 
my own thing’.… and he has a right from the government. He will show you 
the paper that says he has a right to go and seek employment, study and 
work. So it becomes a problem for you to stop him.298 
 																																																								
297	Interview,	Masiphumelele	Somali	trader,	Masiphumelele,	2	February	2012.	
298	Interview,	Somali	Retailers	Association	representative,	Bellville,	10	January	2011.	
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He added that police attempts to close down new Somali shops in Khayelitsha in 
2009 were also hindered when several Somali traders hired attorneys to intervene. 
Their attorneys argued that South Africa was a free market, and that their clients 
were not party to the agreement, after which the police then ‘got advice from seniors 
telling them to pull out’. 299  Thereafter police ceased becoming involved in 
enforcement. A police sector manager in Khayelitsha likewise described that Somalis 
hired lawyers as a check on police activities stating ‘They have lawyers. If you search 
without a warrant they bring lawyers to the police station’.300 Police attempts at fining 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers for trading without a license (or exceeding 
curfews) also proved unsuccessful, as their fines - which cited fictional legislation - 
were not valid in law.301 When traders went to defend their cases in court, court 
officials told them that their matters had been dropped, and the news quickly spread 
via word of mouth that the fines were invalid. As a result foreign national spaza 
traders came to simply ignore their fines. 
 
South African spaza shopkeepers in Khayelitsha also encountered resistance when 
trying to close down shops themselves. For example, when Zanokhanyo Retailers 
Association attempted to forcibly close down ten Somali shops in Town Two, 
Khayelitsha in March 2012,302 the son of one of the affected landlords protested the 
closure of the shops and organized a small following to resist their efforts. When 
Zanokhanyo representatives later approached the local police station for assistance 
local police informed them there was nothing they could do.303 
 
The 2009 Gugulethu agreement faced a different challenge. The detailed 
arrangement prohibiting new foreign national spaza shops, fixing their prices, moving 
shops 100m away from South African shops and setting the percentage of foreign 
shop numbers at 30 percent fell apart early on when a new shopping centre named 
‘Gugulethu Square’ opened in the centre of the township. 304   The shopping centre 
housed a both a Shoprite and a Spar supermarket, all within walking distance of local 
residents,305 and which were not party to the price fixing agreement. As a result 																																																								
299	Interview,	Somali	Retailers	Association	representative,	Bellville,	26	October	2011.	
300	Interview,	Khayelitsha	police	sector	manager,	Khayelitsha,	23	August	2012	
301	See	note	291.	
302	Interview,	Khayelitsha	community	activist,	Rondebosch,	28	April	2015.	Telephone	interview,	Somali	Retailers	
Association	representative,	21	August	2012.	
303	Interview,	Khayelitsha	community	activist,	Rondebosch,	28	April	2015.	
304	Interview,	Gugulethu	Somali	trader,	Gugulethu,	1	February	2012.	
305	Ibid.	
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surrounding spaza shops chose to abandon their higher fixed prices in order to 
compete and stay in the market.306  
 
A further key obstacle to informal trade agreements came from South African 
landlords who resisted attempts to prevent them from leasing their shop premises to 
foreign nationals. In contrast to South African spaza shopkeepers, landlords 
generally drew little sympathy from governance actors. Senior state officials and 
mediators overseeing trade negotiations often viewed landlords as traitors to their 
communities, and the leasing out of property to foreign shopkeepers as a 
phenomenon that needed to be eradicated. For example, a Provincial Government 
report on the 2006 conflict in Masiphumelele states that: 
 
Landlords operate from a different power base as the ordinary person who is 
landless. Landlords also have the power to abuse this privilege, which might 
often lead to an attitude of oblivion with regard to the aspiration for social and 
economic justice.307  
 
A General Molo from the SAPS explained at a meeting between foreign national and 
South African spaza shopkeepers in Khayelitsha that the blame for the expansion of 
foreign national spaza shops in the area lay with South African landlords. He 
contended that: 
 
‘We are faced with an internal problem. The problem is with the people of 
Khayelitsha. The people of Khayelitsha are giving land to foreigners and hire 
containers to foreigners. That is the problem. When we talk about the influx 
we’re lying. It’s the business people hiring to foreigners’.308 
 
Despite their negative reputation amongst political leaders involved in governance, 
South African landlords nevertheless were frequently able to block local level 
interventions to drive out foreign national businesses from township neighbourhoods. 																																																								
306	Interview,	Gugulethu	Somali	trader,	Gugulethu,	1	February	2012.	
307	See	note	103	at	47.	308	General	Molo	of	the	SAPS	addressing	meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers,	
Lookout	Hill,	Khayelitsha,	18	April	2017.	
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Like South African spaza shopkeepers, many landlords wielded local economic and 
political power. For example, when South African shopkeepers tried to drive foreign 
spaza shops out of Philippi East in 2011, a prominent ‘shebeen’ (township bar) 
owner and landlord of a foreign run spaza shop negotiated on behalf for foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers and their landlords.309 Landlords similarly influenced 
local civic structures such as SANCO. When SANCO held a meeting in Philippi East 
about foreign national spaza shops, no decision could be made because 
shopkeepers were split between those who operated shops themselves and those 
who had rented their shops to foreign tenants.310 This was further complicated by the 
fact that many landlords were SANCO members.311 SANCO in in Khayelitsha was 
similarly divided. At a meeting between foreign national and South African spaza 
shopkeepers in the area, a Somali community representative complained that ‘On 
the one side SANCO says the shops must close, but the other side says the shops 
must not close’.312 A councillor in Khayelitsha explained that most SANCO members 
did not want to remove new Somali shops because landlords were benefitting from 
rent.313 Likewise, a SANCO ward chairperson in Khayelitsha explained that ‘the 
problem is that if I keep the agreement [preventing new foreign national spaza shops] 
and try to implement it I am seen as going against the landlords’.314 Landlords’ 
economic interests were therefore a key stumbling block for enforcing informal trade 
agreements. 
 
Sometimes local residents also resisted efforts to close down shops. This was not so 
much out of consideration for the law or foreign traders’ rights, but mainly for 
personal economic reasons. A Khayelitsha community activist explained that a 
number of residents in her neighbourhood initially supported the efforts South African 
traders to remove foreign national competition, but then changed their minds: 
 
For two days people were supporting the local shop owners when they were 
closing shops down because there was an opportunity for them to loot. But 
then on the third day things changed. Up to now, the people now who are 																																																								
309	Interview,	Philippi	East,	22	November	2011.	
310		Interview,	SANCO	member,	Lower	Crossroads,	Philippi	East	20	January	2012.	
311	Ibid.	
312	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers,	Lingelethu	West	police	station,	20	March	
2012.	
313	Interview,	Khayelitsha	ward	councillor,	Khayelitsha,	22	June	2012.	
314	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers,	Lingelethu	West	police	station,	20	March	
2012.	
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looting shops say ‘but now what about us?’ The people who are renting shops 
started to stand up for themselves and say ‘no you are not going to let these 
guys do it because at the end of the day its our homes now that they’re 
breaking’. So then now we’ve got another march. From the same ones that 
were looting, they say ‘No we’re defending the Somalians’.315 
 
Efforts to regulate foreign national spaza shops at local levels were also allegedly 
compromised by alleged bribery. Foreign national and South African shopkeepers in 
the field sites accused each other of bribing local leaders to advance their interests. 
For example, South African traders in Khayelitsha lambasted foreign national spaza 
traders for allegedly bribing police, community policing forums, street committees 
and SANCO leaders, to allow them to open new shops in contravention of the 
informal agreement. 316  Somali shopkeepers in Khayelitsha and Kraaifontein 
complained that local leaders extorted them by continually requesting ‘donations’ and 
personal financial assistance such as contributing to relatives’ funeral costs and 
paying their children’s school fees.317 A leader of the Somali Retailers Association 
described that when he turned down further requests from SANCO leaders in 
Khayelitsha for donations he was informed via a text message that he was ‘playing 
with fire’.318 Foreign spaza shopkeepers also suspected that mediators were being 
bribed by South African spaza shopkeepers to sway governance outcomes in their 
favour. Bribery or extortion therefore also likely impacted on the enforcement of 
informal agreements in the field sites. 
 
Lack of legal enforcement mechanisms, supermarket competition, resistance by 
South African landlords and some residents, and allegations of bribery therefore 
prevented informal trade agreements from being consistently and fully implemented. 
These inhibiting factors did not stem from any particular concern over asylum 
seekers’ or refugees’ rights and livelihoods, but related to how their economic 
footprint was perceived. 
 
																																																								
315	Interview,	Khayelitsha	community	activist,	Rondebosch,	28	April	2015.	
316	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers,	Lingelethu	West	police	station,	7	March	2012.	
317	Somali	community	representatives	in	Kraaifontein	claimed	that	after	meeting	a	local	ward	councillor	about	
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318	Telephone	interview,	Somali	Retailers	Association	representative,	23	July	2012.	
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Despite much sympathy for the plight of South African spaza shopkeepers, both 
formal and informal governance mechanisms offered them little recourse. This 
situation necessitated South African trader to lobby the state to come up with new 
formal regulatory frameworks. In doing so relied on their membership of local civic 
groups, business chambers such as the National African Federated Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (Nafcoc) and political party connections. These calls 
gradually paid off. Murmurings about new national policy developments first occurred 
in July 2011, when during a visit to Khayelitsha, the national police commissioner, 
Bheki Cele, complained about foreign national businesses in the area and stated 
‘One day, our people will revolt, and we’ve appealed to DTI [Department of Trade 
and Industry] to do something about it’.319 The matter was raised again early the 
following year in ANC’s March 2012 national policy conference discussion document, 
which suggested that asylum seekers be barred from operating spaza shops in 
townships.   
 
In June 2012 the ANC in Western Cape announced that it would push to cut the 
number of foreign national spaza shops in the country during the ANC’s upcoming 
policy conference – stating that the demand originated from its township branches.320 
These efforts appear to have born fruit following year when in March 2013 the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) published a draft Licensing of Businesses 
Bill. At the time, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Rob Davies, explained that the 
Bill would be used to curb the activities of foreign national ‘tuck shops or whatever’ 
that failed to act in accordance with the law.321 However, the Bill was met with a cold 
reception across all sectors of South African business, as it required all businesses in 
South Africa - from large corporations to street hawkers - to possess business 
licenses, which could potentially have stifled economic activity in the country. Those 
found engaging in unlawful practices could face penalties of up to ten years 
imprisonment.322 The DTI subsequently carried out public consultations in a number 
of provinces, but little ever came of the proposed legislation.  
 																																																								
319	Quoted	in	Quinton	Mtyala	‘Cele’s	xenophobic	outburst’	Cape	Times,	7	October	2011,	available	at	
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Then in March 2014, the DTI once again gave signals of further policy interventions 
when it unveiled the National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (Nibus). The 
strategy identified ‘Legal and Regulatory Environment’ as a key intervention to 
address the ‘foreign trader challenge’. The document describes the challenge as 
encompassing:  
 
… evidence of violence and unhappiness, trading in illegal and illicit goods 
(e.g. contrabends) [sic], social protection (towards decent work in the sector), 
intellectual property, particularly for indeginous [sic] business etc.323 
 
Nibus states that in developing its legal and regulatory strategy, examples were 
drawn from countries such as Ghana where foreign nationals are prohibited from 
opening small businesses. Yet the document says very little as to what its legal and 
regulatory strategy will be. It only mentions that the DTI will make ‘appropriate follow-
ups and provide strategic inputs into two of the Bills currently being processed, 
namely the 2013 Licensing of Business Bill’324  (not mentioning the second bill under 
consideration). It explains that the ‘issue of addressing the plight of foreign traders 
will be dealt with during these engagementgs [sic]’.325 
 
Nibus was subsequently taken over by the national Department of Small Business 
Development, which was established after the 2014 national elections to generate 
job opportunities in the small business sector in line with the National Development 
Plan.326  The plan, which was launch in August 2012 by the National Planning 
Commission, sets out the country’s vision to elliminate poverty and reduce inequality 
by 2030, and rests largely on the expectation that small and medium sized 
enterprises will create 90 percent of new jobs in the country.327 The Minister of Small 
Business Development, Lindiwe Zulu, stated that the idea of creating the ministry 
came in response to lobbying by South African small businesses, in particular by the 
National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc), an organisation 
																																																								
323	Nibus	(note	133)	at	10.	
324	Ibid	at	30.	
325	Ibid	at	30	to	31.	
326	Somalian	businesses	a	great	example	for	South	Africans	–	Lindiwe	Zulu’	City	Press,	27	May	2014,	available	at	
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	 137	
claiming a membership of 150 000 mostly ‘black’ businesses.328 Matodzi Liphosa, the 
CEO of Nafcoc, described the Department as the organisation’s ‘brainchild’,329 and 
identified two key threats to Nafcoc’s constituency as foreign national businesses 
and the growth of shopping malls.330   
 
The formal regulation of foreign national spaza shops became of greater urgency 
after the outbreak of widespread xenophobic violence Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal in 
January and April 2015. The violence in Gauteng was precipitated by the shooting of 
a fourteen year-old boy by a Somali spaza shopkeeper in Snake Park Soweto, who 
was allegedly part of a group attempting to rob his shop.331 Attacks against foreign 
nationals erupted in KwaZulu-Natal a few months later in March 2015 after King 
Goodwill Zwelithini delivered a speech at a ‘moral regeneration’ event in Pongola, 
where he berated foreign national businesses as dirty and untidy, and called on 
foreigners to leave the country, stating ‘we ask that immigrants must take their bags 
and go where they came from’.332 President Jacob Zuma responded to the attacks by 
appointing an Inter-Ministerial Committee of 14 ministers to examine the ‘broader 
management of migration’ and to work with wider society to address what he saw as 
the ‘underlying socio-economic causes of the tensions’ between South Africans and 
foreigners. 333  He emphasized that the government was obliged to address 
complaints raised by South African citizens, which included the displacement of 
South African small traders by foreign nationals.334 Lindiwe Zulu similarly called for 
the development of laws governing foreign national shops to be ‘fast tracked’.335  
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In this context the department of Home Affairs developed and published the draft 
Refugees Amendment Bill of 12 October 2015, which is the first post-apartheid 
attempt in law to significantly and specifically curtail the ability of asylum seekers and 
refugees to operate businesses in the country. Unlike earlier state attempts to stem 
foreign national businesses, the current Bill comprises a new legal framework 
governing refugees and asylum seekers in the country. In particular it completely 
bars asylum seekers from establishing businesses, and only permits them the right to 
work for ‘an employer’ in restricted circumstances.336 However, once again the state 
appears to overlook the plight of those who could be left without any means to 
support themselves. The Bill states: 
 
If, after assessment, it is found that an asylum seeker is unable to sustain 
himself or herself and his or her dependents, as contemplated in subsection 
(6), that asylum seeker may be offered shelter and basic necessities provided 
by the UNHCR.337 (Emphasis added) 
 
By stating that asylum seekers who cannot support themselves or their dependents 
‘may’ be offered shelter and basic necessities, rather than ‘shall’, the Bill envisions 
that providing basic support to asylum seekers is only optional. Job seeking is 
difficult for many asylum seekers who grapple with language barriers, possess only 
temporary residency permits, and hold qualifications, which are frequently not 
recognised by many South African employers. At the same time the Bill makes no 
explicit provision for social support for those unable to find employment as a result of 
being excluded from engaging in entrepreneurial activities. Such a provision will 
therefore likely once more be an uphill legal battle for the state, as it again leaves 
open the possibility that many asylum seekers could be forced into destitution. This 
in turn will arguably compromise their constitutional rights.  As the Supreme Court of 
Appeal emphasised in the Somali Association case: 
 
When, during argument before us, we enquired of counsel what was to 
happen to destitute asylum seekers and refugees, no answer was 
forthcoming. There appeared to be some suggestion that, regrettably, some 
persons might be left to their destitution. This attitude is unacceptable and 																																																								
336	Section	15	of	the	draft	Refugees	Amendment	Bill	of	August	2015.	
337	Ibid.	
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contrary to constitutional values.338 
 
At the same time some political leaders have called for even further measures to be 
taken against foreign national businesses. In March 2016 the Premier of the North 
West province called for all foreign national spaza shops in his province to be 
confiscated and handed over to South Africans.339 On the eve of Human Rights day 
and the anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre, the Secretary General of the 
African National Congress, Gwede Mantashe, attempted to explain the Premier’s call 
by stating that many nations in Africa ‘say small businesses must be the preserve of 
that nation. Because small business constitute incubator for business people of the 
country’[sic]. 340  These pronouncements, which pay little heed to the historical 
observations of Fanon and others,341 again illustrate how the economic interests of 
nationals enjoy a key position in the South African political sphere.  
 
While legislative developments are slowly underway, the state has attempted to 
assuage South African spaza traders and small business leaders by implementing 
strategies to support South African township businesses and informal traders 
associations. For example, in June 2014 the Gauteng provincial government 
launched a Revitalisation of the Township Economy Strategy.342  The draft strategy 
document identifies foreign shopkeepers as a challenge facing township enterprises, 
which have experienced a ‘hostile take-over by foreign entrepreneurs’. 343  The 
strategy will see R1 billion invested in township business infrastructure over five 
years, and will see the provincial government prioritise the procurement of goods 
from township areas. 344 Further support to the spaza market included the hosting of 																																																								
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a spaza summit in March 2016, and developing partnerships between grocery retail 
giant Pick n’ Pay ad spaza shopkeepers, through enabling spaza shops to tap into in 
Pick n’ Pay’s distribution channels.345 
 
State support to the spaza sector also comes in the form of technical and financial 
assistance to informal retailers associations. 346  In particular Nibus entails close 
cooperation between the state and informal retailers associations through 
interventions such as improving the capacity of informal traders associations, and 
relying on them in the role out of the DTI’s products and services.347 Furthermore the 
Minister of Small Business Development, Lindiwe Zulu, called for a larger budget for 
her department, as ‘many requests from small and medium enterprises - largely 
owned by black people - are financial’.348  
 
Nafcoc also stands to benefit from state support. The chamber is participating in 
North West Premier’s ‘village, township and small dorpies’ enterprise development 
strategy, which will see the provincial government partner with Nafcoc to set up four 
massive wholesalers in the province. These wholesalers will provide low cost goods 
to South African spaza shops and will be backed by state surety and guarantees 
worth R200 million.349 These forms of support and cooperation between the state, 
spaza businesses and their representative associations will not only assist the spaza 
sector, but also improve relations between frustrated retailers, lobby groups and the 
state.  
 
The ways in which governance interventions have unfolded over time demonstrate 
that attempts to curb foreign national spaza shops have been constrained and 
relatively unsuccessful.  Landlords often stymy local informal agreements, as they 																																																								
345	South	African	government	media	statement	‘MEC	Lebogang	Maile	outlines	progress	on	township	economic	
revitalisation’	23	Jun	2015,	available	at,	http://www.gov.za/speeches/mec-lebogang-maile-media-briefing-key-
priorities-economic-development-and-agriculture-and,	date	accessed	5	March	2017.	Gauteng	Province	website	
‘Gauteng	Hosts	Spaza	Shops	Summit’	28	March	2016,	available	at	
http://www.ecodev.gpg.gov.za/MediaDesk/News/Pages/Gauteng-Hosts-Spaza-Shops-Summit.aspx,	date	
accessed	5	March	2017.		
346	Nibus	(note	133)	at	33.	
347	Ibid	at	28.	
348	Sibongile	Maputi	‘South	Africa:	Small	Business	Development	Budget	Inadequate,	Committee	Hears’	AllAfrica	
10	May	2016,	available	at	http://allafrica.com/stories/201605101504.html,	date	accessed	5	March	2017.	
349	Tshehle	(note	339).	Tsholofelo	Mathibedi	‘Govt	throws	lifeline	to	spaza	owners	in	N	West’	SABC	News	12	April	
2016,	available	at		http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/a0b1e4004c60b5dc81d0f79ffda8f5e4/Govt-throws-lifeline-to-
spaza-owners-in-N-West-20161204,	date	accessed	5	March	2017. 
	 141	
view them as conflicting with their own economic interests. Agreements also lack 
legitimate enforcement mechanisms. National leaders have engaged in lengthy 
processes of formulating policy plans, and intend to amend the country’s refugee 
regime, but these efforts may not pass constitutional muster. What these governance 
efforts share in common is a preoccupation with the economic concerns of different 
South African stakeholders. While state officials seek to appease South African 
shopkeepers’ anxieties over competition, other actors such as residents, landlords, 
or local leaders seeking to extract bribes participate to advance their own varied and 
competing economic interests. While constitutional limits have been enforced to a 
degree, most governance actors treat the constitution more as an inconvenient 
restriction to be skirted informally if possible, rather than as a set of principles that 
they seek to champion. This political climate of economic contestation, devoid of 
substantial reference to political rights values reflects important political themes in 
contemporary South Africa. 
 
4.3 Theorising the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeeper: Arendt, 
Foucault and Agamben 
 
We, the people of South Africa, Recognise the injustices of our past; Honour 
those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land; Respect those who have 
worked to build and develop our country; and Believe that South Africa belongs 
to all who live in it, united in our diversity. 350 
 
These words appear on the preamble of the South African constitution, which was 
passed not in 1787, as was the case with the American constitution, but just over 20 
years ago in December 1996. Yet, governance methods and strategies relating to 
foreign national spaza shops reflected few of these principles. While South African 
law predominantly remains consistent with political rights principles set out in the 
constitution, governance actors to a large degree prioritised economic interests or 
expediency over these principles when devising interventions. For example, state 
representatives frequently condoned informal agreements that undermined the rule 
of law and discriminated against foreign nationals. A number of South African traders 
were prepared to loot, murder or threaten their competition to advance their business 
interests, and NGOs and the UNHCR mediated agreements that undermined refugee 																																																								
350	Preamble	of	the	South	African	Constitution	(note	17).	
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and asylum seekers rights, despite having the advancement of human rights 
amongst their core mandates.  All these efforts elevated the economic demands of 
South African spaza shopkeepers over the political rights concerns. Only the city’s 
law enforcement department and a few foreign national community representatives 
explicity showed discomfort with the fact that interventions entailed discriminating 
against certain groups in the basis of their nationality and ethnic origin. When 
referred to, the constitution was seen more as an inconvenient hurdle or a source of 
provocation against South African traders, than of a set of shared goals to forward.  
 
Economic concerns were not only at the forefront of governance interventions in 
respect of foreign national spaza shopkeepers. They also made up a vital component 
of the general logic of broader society. For example, many township residents were 
prepared to attack and loot foreign national spaza shops to demonstrate their 
economic discontent to political leaders. These interests overrode those relating to 
the rights and well being of traders. Even those objecting to and stymying 
governance interventions did not do so not out of concern for polttical freedoms and 
constitutional rights, but rather for personal economic reasons.  For instance, 
landlords complained about potential loss of rent and the destruction to their 
properties by looters, and many community leaders could be relied on on condition 
that their pockets were adequately lined. Economic factors, not political freedoms lay 
at the crux of their decision-making. These forms of reasoning and mind-sets – 
largely devoid of political rights principles and constitutional concerns – saw further 
conflicts emerge between the differing economic interests of varied stakeholders.  
 
These dynamics indicate that the constitution’s foundational principles of ‘dignity, 
equality and freedom’351 were not aligned to the demands and beliefs of wide sector 
of South African society. They signalled a break with the values so prevalent in the 
country’s early years of democracy, and reflects that diverse segments of South 
African society see overt discrimination against specified groups, not as repugnant, 
but as a necessary and justifiable way of ensuring social harmony. Instead many 
governance strategies reflected an apartheid-era sentiment of separate development 
where business rights in certain neighbourhoods became designated to certain 
population groups. Only this time these arrangements were not formally legislated, 																																																								
351	Section	7(1)	of	the	Constitution	states	that		‘This	Bill	of	Rights	is	a	cornerstone	of	democracy	in	South	Africa.	It	
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but overseen informally through NGOs, local civic bodies, and state departments 
alike. This has implications for political freedom in South Africa, as regimes that 
discriminate against certain groups, flout the law, and show a lack of concern for 
diversity and people’s basic dignity, inhibit people’s engagement in public affairs as 
free and equal participants.  
 
Instead of the constitutional and political rights values set out above, the governance 
of foreign national spaza shopkeepers demonstrates that the South African political 
sphere has become largely preoccupied with economic questions, which frequently 
override the inclusive and liberatory values of the anti-apartheid struggle and the 
country’s early democracy. This scenario is not specific to South Africa and the 
governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers. A number of theorists have 
described that the entry of private economic concerns into the political sphere as a 
general phenomenon of the modern age. In particular Arendt’s theory of the ‘social’ 
and Foucault and Agamben’s accounts of ‘biopolitics’ all critique how matters relating 
to sustaining life now feature strongly in the political realm.  Although they used 
distinct terms, all three theorists base their theories on the same notion that ancient 
Greek distinction between the public sphere of politics and the private realm of the 
household has become blurred in modern times. The former realm was traditionally 
housed political speech and action, while the latter domain encompassed all 
economic matters related to the maintenance of life and the survival of the species. 
 
For example, Arendt argues that the ‘social’ sphere is a consequence of the ancient 
Greek philosophical distinction between the public and private spheres having 
become obscured in modern times. She states that: 
 
The distinction between a private and a public sphere of life corresponds to 
the household and the political realms, which have existed as distinct, 
separate entities at least since the rise of the ancient city-state; but the 
emergence of the social realm, which is neither private nor public, strictly 
speaking, is a relatively new phenomenon whose origin coincided with the 
emergence of the modern age and which found its political form in the nation-
state.352 
 																																																								
352	Arendt	The	Human	Condition	(note	33)	at	28.	
	 144	
She describes that this phenomenon, that is: ‘The emergence of society—the rise of 
housekeeping, its activities, problems, and organizational devices—from the 
shadowy interior of the household into the light of the public sphere, has… blurred 
the old borderline between private and political’.353  
 
Similarly, Foucault argues that ‘biopolitics’ is the phenomenon of political power 
taking on role of ‘administering life’.354 He states that: ‘For millennia, man remained 
what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political 
existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living 
being in question’.355Agamben also describes ‘biopolitics’ as the blurring of the 
ancient Greek distinction between the private and public spheres. For him ‘the entry 
of zoē. into the sphere of the polis - the politicization of bare life as such - constitutes 
the decisive event of modernity and signals a radical transformation of the political-
philosophical categories of classical thought’. 356  While South African theorists 
frequently emphasize the role of economic concerns in the treatment of foreign 
nationals in the country,357 detailed theories of the social – as set out by Arendt 
Foucault and Agamben - have not been explored in detail in this context. It is this 
theoretical orientation that guides the thesis in examining the political implications of 
the governance of foreign national spaza businesses.  
 
However, all three theorists were or are based in the West and never claimed that 
their theories had broader application than Europe and America. This calls for an 
urgent revisit of their theories to assess the degree to which they address key 
features of governance in postcolonial and developing countries such as South 
Africa. Furthermore because their accounts of the social vary in terms of subject 
matter and style, it is also necessary to investigate which of their theories are most 
suitable to the thesis’s focus on the political implications of governance activities. The 
following sections thus set out Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s theories of the 
social, and examine their applicability to the thesis’ topic and context. 
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4.4 Arendt’s theory of the social 
For Arendt the social is a hybrid realm, which is formed when concerns regarding the 
sustenance of life flow from the private sphere of the household into the public 
sphere traditionally reserved for political engagement. She argues that the social 
realm has come to the fore in the modern age and takes the political form of the 
nation state. At the same time, Arendt shows that the modern era, while dominated 
by social forms of government, has also witnessed bold exhibits of political action. 
She sees these forms of authentic politics as occurring most vividly during the course 
of revolutions and popular uprisings. However she argues that these revolutions 
have largely failed at founding political freedom and instead tend to culminate in 
different social forms of government instead. Arendt’s theory of the social therefore 
encompasses revolutionary and emancipatory scenarios, in order to understand why 
and how they relinquish their political goals and give rise to social realms instead. 
This is of importance to understanding why the governance of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers reflects a general absence of political rights values, and instead 
exhibits new notions of emancipation and liberation founded on aspirations for 
economic survival and mobility. 
 
4.4.1 Arendt’s distinction between the private and public spheres 
Arendt’s account of the social realm draws on the ancient Greek distinction between 
the private and public spheres. She states that in ancient Greece the private realm 
was traditionally the realm of the family and household, where people were driven by 
their physical needs and concerned with the maintenance of human life. The realm 
was ordered in a hierarchical way as the household head traditionally ruled over the 
rest of the family.  
 
Arendt describes that in contrast to the private realm, the ancient Greek public realm 
(epitomised by the Greek polis) provided a space where people engaged in political 
deliberation regarding matters relating to the common world. Because the public 
realm was preoccupied with matters relating to common human affairs, it excluded 
private concerns that were solely connected to the purpose of making a living and 
sustaining life.358 Furthermore, for Arendt the ancient Greek public realm was a realm 
of equality in the sense that participants were equal on the level of peers, neither 																																																								358	Arendt	The	Human	Condition	(note	33)	at	37.	
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having to rule nor be subject to rulership. For her, political action is inspired by 
shared principles rather than private interests, and possesses the goal of public 
freedom.359 She states that unlike motives, principles inspire form ‘without’ and ‘are 
much too general to prescribe particular goals’.360 
 
Arendt links the private and the public realm to three fundamental activities of life (the 
vita activa), namely labour, work and action. 361  In her view labour and work 
traditionally belonged in the private sphere, as they were concerned with the 
sustenance of life or the making of useful or necessary objects.362   She states that 
the activity of labour corresponds to life, as it produces sustenance necessary to feed 
and maintain the human body’s life processes. The activity of work corresponds to 
the human condition of ‘worldliness’, which for Arendt means the stable, lasting man-
made world of ‘things’. 363 In contrast Arendt believes that ‘action’ - the highest 
activity of the vita active - is located in the political sphere whose primary activities 
were speech and action. She states that to act denotes ‘to take initiative, to begin, to 
set something into motion’.364 This can only occur through interacting and engaging 
with other people. Action therefore corresponds to the human condition of plurality ‘to 
the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world’.365 Conversely ‘to 
be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act’.366 Arendt argues that action is 
closely associated to freedom, as she equates freedom to the ability to act. Only by 
engaging in action through speaking and acting in the presence of others can one 
experience freedom. Thus ‘to be free and to act are the same’.367 
 
Action is also closely aligned to Arendt’s concept of power, as she holds that power 
arises when individuals come together to engage in action.368 For her, power is not 
necessarily associated with the state or a sovereign, but can exist whenever people 
congregate to act in concert.369 Arendt distinguishes power from other means of rule 
including strength, which exists in a singular object or person; authority, which is 																																																								
359	Hannah	Arendt		‘What	is	freedom?’	in	Hannah	Arendt	Between	Past	and	Future	(1961)	Viking	Press,	New	York	
151	to	152.	
360	Ibid	at	152.	
361	Arendt	The	Human	Condition	(note	33)	at	12.	
362	Ibid	at	12	and	13.	
363	Ibid	at	7.	
364	Ibid	at	177.	
365	Ibid	at	7.	
366	Ibid	at	188.	
367	Arendt	‘What	is	freedom?’	(note	359)	at	153.	
368	Ibid	200.	
369	Hannah	Arendt	On	Violence	(1970)	Houghton	Mifflin	Harcourt	Publishing	Company,	New	York	at	43	to	46.	
	 147	
vested in a person or office; and violence, which is instrumental in nature as it uses 
implements to multiply or substitute natural strength.370 Through emphasising action 
in her analysis of freedom and power, Arendt reveals that no political condition is 
preordained or irresistible.  She states that ‘historical processes are created and 
constantly interrupted by human initiative, by the initium man is insofar as he is an 
acting being’.371  
 
Arendt holds that because political action in the ancient Greek public realm entailed 
speech and debate, the public realm excluded violence.372 She argues that the use of 
violence to ‘command rather than persuade’373  was a pre-political phenomenon, 
which was used to overcome necessity and enter the public realm – for example by 
forcing people to become slaves. The absolute rule of despots therefore mimicked 
the household, and did not comprise political action. In other words: ‘absolute, 
uncontested rule and a political realm properly speaking were mutually exclusive’.374  
 
Arendt’s reliance on the ancient Greek distinction between the private and public 
realms is not without problems, primarily because the majority of people in ancient 
Greece were excluded from participating in politics. 375 Arendt states that entry into 
the political realm in ancient Greece depended first of all on conquering necessity 
and freeing oneself from the demands of the household, as well as owning a house 
and thereby having location in the world.376 Those who were subject to the urgencies 
of life, such as women (who engaged in giving birth), slaves (who participated in 
labour to support life) and the poor (who were subject to the needs of their bodies) 
were excluded from the polis and partaking in political action. She states that private 
wealth was a condition for admission to the public life because it assured that the 
owner was not tied down with issues relating to sustaining his life, and was free to 
engage in public affairs. However, even those who possessed wealth could exclude 
themselves from the public realm should they chose to pursue further riches instead 
of relying on their wealth to lead a political life.377  
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A number of scholars have criticised Arendt’s description of ancient Greek 
curtailments on people’s entry to the public realm as elitist.378  To a degree this 
criticism is correct. Arendt does not criticise or specifically distance her theory from 
the problematical aspects of the ancient Greek city-state. At the same time her 
political theory should not be taken as an attempt to directly mirror the ancient Greek 
city-state. Her reference to the Greek polis was instead intended as a metaphor to 
draw on, rather than a literal aspiration.379 For her, ‘The polis, properly speaking, is 
not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it 
arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people 
living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be’.380 Furthermore, 
the political vision that she develops in On Revolution differs markedly from ancient 
Athens. In particular she argues for the establishment of a political realm that is open 
to all who have a passion for public freedom and wish to participate. Exclusion from 
such a sphere would be voluntary, as those who are not interested in political matters 
could choose to not involved themselves. Therefore in contrast to the Greek city-
state, Arendt’s political theory, which draws on certain classical Greek political 
principles, is relatively inclusive and does not specifically exclude women, the poor, 
or the property-less from political life (as was the case in ancient Greece).  
 
Arendt’s distinction between the private and political sphere has also been intensely 
criticised as naïve and destructive.381 In The Human Condition Arendt articulates a 
strict separation between the public and private spheres and problematically 
contends that: 
 
The fact that the modern age emancipated the working classes and the 
women at nearly the same historical moment must certainly be counted 
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among the characteristics of an age which no longer believes that bodily 
functions and material concerns should be hidden.382 
 
Wellmer views Arendt’s efforts to concretise a distinct political and private realm as 
‘the great weakness of her political theory’.383 He argues that the public sphere 
cannot simply ignore issues relating to the economy, and social justice. Fraser 
believes that Arendt’s distinction depoliticises important social issues, and that needs 
are subject to far more varied and contested interpretations than Arendt 
acknowledges.384 
 
In the late modern era of widening economic inequality, globalisation, and 
heterogeneity, it would be ridiculous to exclude key issues such as race, gender, 
sexuality, the economy and poverty (which Arendt on many occasions categorises as 
‘private’) to the domain of the household and out of sight from the public and political 
sphere. Arendt’s early categorical exclusions of bodily and hence in her view private 
issues (such as poverty, race and gender) from the political sphere are thus highly 
problematic. 
 
However, a careful analysis of Arendt’s work over time suggests that her initial strict 
distinction between private and political matters becomes more nuanced. Instead of 
her rigid categorical exclusion of gender and labour issues from the political realm 
set out in The Human Condition, she eventually envisions these issues as falling 
within the political realm so long as they are political in nature, i.e. that they are 
debateable, inspired by broad principle, and are linked to the political goal of public 
freedom.385 In her essay ‘Reflections on Little Rock’386 Arendt suggests that the 
division between the private and public sphere is more complex and that certain 
issues may in fact have both private and public aspects.  For example, she states 
that the issue of marriage can be private or public depending on the context, and 																																																								
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argues that if marrying one’s chosen spouse brings one in conflict with the law (for 
instance in the case of interracial or gay marriage), the issue becomes a political 
matter, relevant for public debate and action.387 
 
Similarly in On Revolution, Arendt maintains that poverty can arouse the political 
principle of solidarity out of which individuals can ‘establish a community of interest 
with the oppressed and exploited’.388 She also states that poverty can be the result of 
political factors such as exploitation, evident in slave economies and violent 
expropriations during early capitalism.389 These discussions reveal that Arendt does 
not view poverty as completely separate form political concerns and can have 
political dimensions. 
 
A decade later at a conference in 1972 Arendt again demonstrated a far more 
nuanced account of the division between the public and political realms. Here she 
reformulated her account of political issues, and described them as matters that are 
debatable and cannot be solved with certainty. She contrasted this with private 
administrative issues, which she viewed as matters that can be conclusively 
settled.390 To elaborate, she stated that the question of whether adequate housing 
demands integration is a political question, while the factual need of adequate 
housing itself is a social issue. She further maintained that seemingly ‘private’ or 
‘social’ concerns such as education, health or urban problems could have political 
sides to them.391  Thus Arendt’s taxonomical distinction between the public and 
private sphere, which characterises her earlier work in The Human Condition evolves 
over time to encompass the a more careful, complex and flexible approach to 
understanding the public and private spheres and their contents. Unlike the largely 
untenable separations between the public and private spheres in her earlier work, 
these latter understandings offer constructive tools for examining the concepts of the 
private and political. 
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4.4.2 Arendt’s social realm  
In Arendt’s view the classical Greek distinction between the public and private realms 
has become blurred in modern times. This is because private administrative matters 
relating to the sustenance of life have intruded upon the public realm, which was 
traditionally reserved for political speech and action. As a result she argues that the 
public realm has become transformed into a ‘social’ realm, which is neither strictly 
public nor private. Arendt describes that the term ‘social’ is of Roman, not Greek 
origin and referred to the mere companionship that people shared by virtue of being 
limited by the needs of biological life. The rise of the social has caused both political 
and private spheres to decline, as populations become increasingly preoccupied with 
the demands of society, which Arendt defines as a ‘super-human family’.392  People 
thus have lessening regard for the intimacy of the household or the political realm of 
debate and distinction. Arendt describes that the social realm finds its political form in 
the nation-state, where ‘we see the body of peoples and political communities in the 
image of a family whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a gigantic, 
nation-wide administration of housekeeping’.393  
 
Members of society are not equal on the levels of peers. Instead like a family, they 
exist as members of a household living under the despotism of the household 
head.394  Arendt describes that society bases itself on social codes and rules that 
‘tend to "normalize" its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous 
action or outstanding achievement’.395 In her view, modern society has evolved to a 
point where mass membership and the strength of unanimous interest and opinion 
have meant that one-man rule is no longer required. Instead members of society are 
ruled by ‘nobody’ in the form of bureaucracy. For her, this rule by nobody ‘is not 
necessarily no-rule; it may indeed, under certain circumstances, even turn out to be 
one of its cruellest and most tyrannical versions’.396  
 
In Arendt’s subsequent writing, she uses the examples of the French and American 
revolutions to explore how revolutionary struggles for political freedom become 
subsumed by private administrative concerns and turn social. She shows that while 																																																								
392	Arendt	The	Human	Condition	(note	33)	at	29	
393	Ibid	at	28.	
394	Ibid	at	40.	
395	Ibid.	
396	Ibid.	
	 152	
social realms share certain core characteristics, they can emerge in varied ways and 
take dramatically different forms. In post-revolutionary America, the social took the 
form of mild limited constitutional government, whereas in post-revolutionary France 
(and in Arendt’s view all other post-revolutionary aftermaths) it materialised as a one-
party dictatorship fed by uprisings of the poor and characterised by violent purges. 
Arendt examines why this was the case by studying the actions of revolutionary 
leaders and the contextual forces that weighed on them. This has resonance for 
many post-colonial countries, where, as depicted by Fanon,397 the initial political 
goals of liberation struggles have frequently become overwhelmed by the economic 
demands of newly emancipated citizens. Similarly the governance of foreign national 
spaza shopkeepers in South Africa exhibits increasing disillusionment with 
constitution principles, and a growing frustration amongst South Africans with the 
slow pace of economic redress in the post-apartheid era.  
 
4.4.3 Arendt’s concept of revolution  
Arendt argues that despite their political goals, revolutions have so far merely 
produced in two forms of social government – limited constitutional government on 
the one hand, and one-party dictatorships on the other. By far the most common 
outcome has been the latter, with only the American revolution culminating in less 
disastrous limited constitutional government. She states that:  
 
It is true that wherever the revolution was not defeated and not followed by some 
sort of restoration the one-party dictatorship, that is, the model of the professional 
revolutionary, eventually prevailed…398 
 
To understand how the social manifests in the aftermath of liberation and revolution, 
Arendt examines the divergent courses of the French and American revolutions. For 
Arendt the two key features of revolution are the goal of founding freedom, along with 
novelty, in the sense of starting something completely new. She believes the goal of 
founding freedom is achieved via the enactment of a constitution that establishes a 
durable public space where people can engage in political speech and action. This is 
because for her ‘political freedom, generally speaking, means the right “to be a 																																																								
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participator in government”, or it means nothing’.399 The constitution of freedom 
involves both the act of ‘constituting’, which encompasses widespread public 
engagement and deliberation in framing a constitution, as well as a constitution in the 
sense of a final document. Importantly, in her view (and quoting Wolfgang Kraus) ‘the 
people should endow the government with a constitution and not vice versa’.400 
 
Arendt describes that only in America were revolutionary actors able to complete the 
revolution by founding a lasting constitution through widespread public debate and 
engagement. This was partially due to the absence of what she terms the ‘social 
question’ (or the predicament of poverty) in the country. Consequently revolutionary 
actors never became distracted from their original political goals. Arendt believes that 
revolutionists were not swayed by the presence of slavery, as ‘slavery carries with it 
an obscurity even blacker than the obscurity of poverty; the slave, not the poor man 
was wholly overlooked’.401  
 
Apart from not being burdened by mass poverty, American revolutionists’ political 
experience also made them better suited to constituting freedom.  Arendt argues that 
in America public freedom was a lived experience drawn from diverse organised 
political bodies. This created a platform for the American constitution to be debated 
clause-by-clause from local to national levels. It also meant that the authority of the 
framers of the Constitution was never doubted, as it was directly derived from 
subordinate authorised bodies that existed on district, township and county levels.402  
 
Arendt argues that conversely, French revolutionary leaders confronted a nation that 
struggling with severe poverty and widespread hunger. This resulted in leaders 
needing to prioritise the urgent needs of the poor above building political institutions. 
She describes that at the same time the ability of revolutionary leaders in France to 
establish a lasting constitutional order was further weakened by their lack of practical 
political experience, as leaders derived primarily from the ‘hommes de lettres’ (or 
men of letters), whose political background – unlike American revolutionists - was 
based in theory and learned accounts from classical Greece. As a result Arendt 																																																								
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believes that the French constituent assemblies did not draw on widespread public 
engagement and organisation in drafting their constitutions, and their members’ 
authority was constantly in question.403  
 
Although Arendt describes the American revolution as a success, she argues that the 
country eventually diverted from its original revolutionary ambitions. Thus merely 
securing a constitution does not guarantee the perpetual realisation of the goals of 
revolution. Arendt believes that in order for revolutionary achievements to last, the 
spirit of the revolution – or in other words the original principles that inspired 
revolutionists - must be kept alive. She describes these principles as ‘public freedom, 
public happiness, public spirit’.404 For her, despite America’s success at completing 
its revolution, the country failed to preserve the spirit of the revolution, which caused 
the gains of the revolution not to last. As a result both the French and the American 
revolutions eventuated in social realms that were largely preoccupied with advancing 
the economic concerns and welfare of citizens. 
 
4.4.4 Post-revolutionary social realms: Limited constitutional government and 
one-party dictatorships 
In order to understand the post-apartheid political context in which the governance of 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers takes place, it is useful to consider Arendt’s 
account of post-revolutionary politics. Arendt describes that despite their original 
political ambitions, the revolutions in France and America eventually brought about 
governments that were social in nature. Although the American revolution succeeded 
in founding a constitution through intense public deliberation, the country soon 
stagnated into what she terms ‘limited constitutional government’. At the same time, 
the predicament of poverty saw the French revolution transform into an ‘uprising of 
the poor’ and eventual one-party dictatorship. In both scenarios private concerns and 
interests eventually seeped into political spheres, transforming their nature and 
seeing the advent of social realms. This has relevance for contemplating the South 
African political sphere, which similarly emerged out of struggle for political 
emancipation, only to thereafter confront acute socio-economic dilemmas. 
 
Post-revolutionary America: Limited constitutional government 																																																								
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For Arendt the simple enactment of a constitution does not per se signify the 
successful completion of revolution. In her view constitutional government alone is 
simply a form of ‘limited government’, as it amounts to ‘nothing more or less than 
government limited by law, and the safeguard of civil liberties through constitutional 
guarantees’.405 She states that limited government can be traced back possibly as far 
as the Magna Charta and feudal rights in Europe, and forms the foundation of not 
only constitutional government, but a range of governments, including limited 
monarchy, where laws curtail monarchical powers. 406  In Arendt’s view, limited 
government in no way seeks to set out the ‘new revolutionary powers’ of the people, 
but simply aims to limit the power of government. She argues that this type of 
constitutionalism is the goal of rebellions, not of revolutions, in that rebellion (the first, 
violent stage of revolution) aims at liberation, while revolution aims to found freedom. 
For her constitutional rights and civil liberties are essentially identical to freedom of 
movement, as they mean no more than ‘freedom from unjustified restraint’.407 
 
Arendt views the American constitution as the only example of a truly revolutionary 
constitution, as it sought not only to limit the power of the state, but also to establish 
a space where freedom could be exercised. This involved not only setting limitations 
on state power (as in the case of limited government), but also on the power of 
society.408 She quotes James Madison’s statement that: 
 
It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the 
oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the society against the 
injustice of the other part.409 
 
This essentially necessitated protecting minority groups from the power of the 
majority through constitutional checks and balances. Such checks and balances 
went beyond the protection of civil liberties, or the traditional separation between the 
legislative, executive and judicial arms of government. Arendt describes that their key 
feature was their generation of a new centres and distributions of power. This was 
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necessary because ‘Power can be stopped and still be kept intact only by power’.410 
She states that American drafters realised that power could not only be checked by 
laws, as laws could always be overturned by the power of the majority. Furthermore, 
even in the hypothetical case that laws could withstand the power of the majority, 
they operated in a way to limit and decrease power, rather than enhance it. Thus 
Arendt argues that the American principle of separation of powers entailed building a 
mechanism into government, which generated power without allowing it to overrun 
other centres of power.411 This was achieved through the establishment of a republic 
based on separate federal governments, whose power was unconnected to the 
central government. In Arendt’s view the distribution of varied opposing powers 
creates more power, not less.412 Thus she argues that the greatest revolutionary 
achievement of America’s constitution was that it abolished sovereignty from its 
system of state power. For her this was vital to the success of the revolution, as ‘in 
the realm of human affairs sovereignty and tyranny are the same’.413  
 
Arendt argues that subsequent revolutions have overlooked the revolutionary 
element of constitution making (i.e. the founding of freedom) exhibited in America, 
partly because so many failed revolutionary upheavals ended in some form of ‘limited 
government’. She states that in many former colonial countries post-independence 
constitutions were not an outcome of revolution, but were instead:  
 
… imposed, on the contrary, after a revolution had failed, and they were, at 
least in the eyes of the people living under them, a sign of defeat, not of its 
victory.  They were usually the work of experts…  Their purpose was to stem 
the tide of revolution, and if they too served to limit power, it was the power of 
the government as well as the revolutionary power of the people whose 
manifestation had preceded their establishment.414 
 
Arendt therefore believes that it is important to distinguish between constitutions that 
are adopted because of the failure by a people to constitute their own government, 
and the American constitution, which was a result of a peoples’ deliberate effort at 																																																								
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founding their own political space of appearance. Even though they may appear 
similar, imposed constitutions generally set out to limit power, and are weakened by 
widespread popular mistrust towards them. 415   
 
While America succeeded in enacting a truly revolutionary constitution, Arendt 
believes that its potential was never fully realised, and like many failed revolutionary 
upheavals, the form of government that eventually emerged in the country was 
‘limited constitutional government’. She argues that this was an outcome of the 
failure to identify and remember the ‘treasure’ of the revolution, namely the sense of 
‘public happiness’ and ‘public freedom’ gained from engaging in political affairs. 
Arendt argues that American citizens soon forgot these enjoyments when confronted 
with scores of newly arrived immigrants seeking the promise of affluence and riches. 
Public happiness took on a new meaning and was reconceived as the pursuit of 
purely private happiness. Arendt states that as a result, freedom in America became 
increasingly understood as freedom from politics, rather than engaging in public 
affairs. 416 Public concerns were seen as falling within the domain of the state, while 
the place of the citizen was located in his or her private life, whose ideals became 
‘abundance and endless consumption’.417 Instead of engaging in the political sphere 
as envisioned by the drafters of the constitution, Americans understood constitutional 
laws as protecting their private lives from state interference and advancing their 
individual welfare. Happiness became located in the home, and entailed the 
accumulation and display of private wealth, rather than appearing and distinguishing 
oneself in the public realm.418 
 
Arendt believes that the public passivity that accompanies limited government can 
lead to the erosion of political freedoms. So far this had been averted in America, 
where she says  ‘revolutionary notions of public happiness and political freedom’ 
have never altogether vanished from the scene, due to the strong constitutional 
foundations that the founders were able to establish.419 However, she suspects that 
these foundations may possibly yield to the pressures of wealth, as they yielded to 
the pressures of poverty and misfortune in Europe. 
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Thus Arendt describes that in America the public political realm became invaded by 
‘private’ administrative concerns, turning it ‘social’. Instead of revolutionary 
constitutional government, Americans eventually settled for limited constitutional 
government, and the happiness of society became seen as the 'only legitimate object 
of good government'.420 Arendt states that the principles that eventually came to 
dominate American politics were: 
 
… civil liberties, the individual welfare of the greatest number, and public 
opinion as the greatest force ruling an egalitarian, democratic society. This 
transformation corresponds with great precision to the invasion of the public 
realm by society; it is as though the originally political principles were 
translated into social values.421  
 
Revolutionary France: Uprising of the poor and one party-dictatorship 
Arendt describes that the social realm that emerged in the aftermath of the French 
revolution was sharply contrasted to that of America. This was because the French 
revolution occurred in a context of mass poverty, with the result that once political 
liberation was achieved, the attention of revolutionary actors quickly shifted to the 
dire economic conditions of the populace. In Arendt’s view this signalled the 
premature ending of the French revolution, which for her amounted to a failure, as it 
unleashed an uprising of the poor that culminated in a one-party dictatorship 
characterized by terror and violent purges. The resulting dictatorship was social in 
nature as political leaders believed that the welfare of the people was the primary 
purpose of political engagement, and that the ‘substance of politics was not action 
but administration’.422 Arendt argues that dictatorships are the inevitable fate of all 
revolutions that break out in contexts of widespread poverty.423 She therefore argues 
that the ‘social question’ (or the predicament of poverty) is a key factor determining 
the outcome of revolutions.  
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To understand how precisely the ‘social question’ leads revolutionary struggles for 
political freedom to one-party dictatorships, Arendt studies the thinking and actions of 
revolutionary leaders. She argues that unlike the American revolutionary leaders, 
French revolutionists struggled to be seen as ‘one of the people’ as they tended to be 
men of letters rather than of action, and did not share the same economic 
background as their followers. This gave rise to a legitimacy crisis amongst 
revolutionary leaders in France crisis once liberation once political liberation was 
accomplished. 
 
In Arendt’s view the French revolutionists needed to find a way to relate themselves 
to the cause of the poor if they wished to retain credibility. This was achieved through 
‘virtue’, which meant ‘to have the welfare of the people in mind, to identify one’s own 
will with the will of the people’.424 Virtue necessitated having compassion for the poor, 
by possessing the ability to suffer with them. Arendt argues that the leaders’ newly 
discovered virtue and realigned wills caused them to divert their attention from 
establishing institutions to support a republic towards focussing on the direct needs 
and wants of the people. For Arendt, the uniting of wills between the leadership and 
the poor was further enabled through the identification of a common enemy. This 
enemy was the particular will and interest hidden within each citizen, which stood in 
opposition to the general will of the people. Arendt argues that all revolutions that 
have been inspired by the French revolution presuppose ‘that the interest of the 
whole must automatically, and indeed permanently, be hostile to the particular 
interest of the citizen’.425 
 
Arendt describes that this celebration of selflessness and compassion for the poor 
spelled disaster for the French revolution, as it introduced sentiments and passions 
into the political realm. The emotion of compassion negated reason, as thought and 
inner dialogue were seen as selfish and inhibiting people from loosing themselves in 
the suffering of the poor. 426 Arendt argues that when the leaders of the French 
revolution declared their compassion for the poor the emotion they were in fact 
experiencing was not compassion, but pity. In her view compassion cannot be felt for 
a collective body, as co-suffering entails relating to individuals in their singularity. 
Compassion is also not eloquent, but mute, awkward and expressed in gestures 																																																								
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rather than in words.427 Pity entails being sorry, but not struck in the flesh.  Unlike 
compassion, pity can depersonalise groups and classes, and reach out to the 
masses, thereby becoming overwhelmed by an ocean of suffering. This boundless 
suffering, which existed within the souls of the revolutionary leaders, as well as 
amongst the France’s masses, resulted in leaders loosing the capacity to hold onto 
specific considerations and principles, and reality more generally. Arendt states that 
Robespierre was the first to introduce pity-inspired virtue to the political sphere in 
France, with the result that laws and justice were overrun by emotion and violence.428 
Arendt argues that ‘Pity, taken as the sprig of virtue, has proved to possess a greater 
capacity for cruelty than cruelty itself’.429 
 
Arendt describes that from this point on the French revolution disintegrated into civil 
war and violent chaos. Unlike the American revolution, which founded freedom 
through building lasting institutions, the French revolution went down the path of 
lawlessness inspired by the virtue of unrestricted pity for the suffering of the poor. 
Furthermore Arendt argues that revolutionary leaders could not fully shake off their 
individual wills and interest, resulting in them not being able to live up to their 
professed virtue. As a result the French political sphere became swamped with 
hypocrisy and paranoia. The revolution therefore eventually not only targeted the 
hypocrisy and corruption at the Court at Versailles and of French high society, but 
also turned against the political deliberations of Constituent Assembly. Arendt 
describes that in reaction to the apparent hypocrisy of the Court and Constituent 
Assembly, the revolutionary leaders saw the poor and those that showed 
compassion towards them as naturally good. 430  However, she argues that the 
danger in this is that absolute goodness knows no middle ground and cannot engage 
in persuasion and negotiation or make sense of laws. It therefore can only act 
violently in response to perceived evil.  
 
Arendt believes that instead of creating a climate of virtue and goodness, the 
celebration of the suffering of the poor as the purest form of virtue triggered the 
malheureux (the ‘unfortunate’) of France to transform into the enragés (the 
‘enraged’). This was because rage is ‘the only form in which misfortune can become 																																																								
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active’.431 However, for Arendt, rage cannot lead to any positive transformation of 
society. This is because the inspiring principle of rage is vengeance, not freedom, 
and furthermore because rage is impotent and becomes active when impotence 
reaches its final stage of despair.432  
 
Through their attempts to address the immediate needs of the poor, revolutionary 
leaders in France transformed the political realm into a social one. Arendt states that 
‘Since the revolution had opened the gates of the political realm to the poor, this 
realm had indeed become “social”’.433  However the social realm that emerged in the 
aftermath of the revolution in France differed markedly from the American one. 
Instead of merely entering into the political realm, private household concerns 
completely overwhelmed the political sphere in France. Arendt explains that:  
 
… with the downfall of political and legal authority and the rise of revolution, it 
was people rather than general economic and financial problems that were at 
stake, and they did not merely intrude into but burst upon the political domain. 
Their need was violent, and as it were prepolitical; it seemed that only 
violence could be strong and swift enough to help them.434 
 
Arendt argues that this sudden appearance of rage and violence in France created 
conditions for the emergence of the social in the form of the one-party dictatorship, 
rather than limited constitutional government. She asserts that the institutions of 
freedom, which materialised during the course of the French revolution in the form of 
popular assemblies, became replaced by the party, which revolutionists saw as the 
best suited to liberating citizens from poverty.435  
 
Arendt concludes that uprisings of the poor and the eventual dictatorships that follow 
are the curse of all revolutions that break out in circumstances of extreme poverty, as 
revolutionary leaders cannot help but try to solve the problem of mass poverty with 
political means. The result is that far from founding freedom, or liberating the poor 																																																								
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from necessity, such revolutions unleash misery and descend into terror instead.436 
This because the ‘force’ of poverty outweighs that of oppression: 
 
What has always made it so terribly tempting to follow the French Revolution 
on its foredoomed path is not only the fact that liberation from necessity, 
because of its urgency, will always take precedence over the building of 
freedom, but the even more important and more dangerous fact that the 
uprising of the poor against the rich carries with it an altogether different and 
much greater momentum of force than the rebellion of the oppressed against 
their oppressors. This raging force may well nigh appear irresistible because 
it lives from and is nourished by the necessity of biological life itself.437 
 
Arendt is therefore not only interested in describing the social realm, she also seeks 
to understand the types of social spheres that emerge in the aftermath of revolutions, 
in particular because they differ so significantly revolutionists’ original political 
ambitions. The governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers in South Africa 
reflects many of the above themes. For example, the struggle against apartheid 
eventually culminated in the establishment of a constitution that to an extent ‘limits’ 
state actors’ ability to intervene and curb foreign national spaza shopkeepers.  At the 
same time many political formations have regrouped around socio-economic causes, 
and frequently demonstrate their frustration or ‘rage’ through violent demonstrations 
– including xenophobic riots against foreign national spaza shops. These actions 
appear to mirror the chaos brought about by the enragés in revolutionary France. 
 
4.5 Other theories of the social: Foucault and Agamben  
Foucault and Agamben both explore how the modern age is characterised by the 
blurring of the boundaries between the private and public spheres. Like Arendt they 
describe how private matters relating to the sustenance of life have entered the 
public sphere, which was previously reserved for political deliberation. Although 
Agamben believes that life was never completely excluded from the political sphere 
(on the contrary he believes it was implicitly included by virtue of its exclusion), he 
argues that modern age has seen it move away from the fringes of the political 
domain and overlap with political life.  																																																								
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Foucault never appeared to have been aware of Arendt’s theory of the social and 
referred to the phenomenon ‘biopolitics’, a term that was later adopted by Agamben. 
Their analyses differ somewhat from Arendt’s in that they are less concerned with 
how the social or biopolitics impacts on the political sphere of freedom and action. 
Rather than lamenting the decline of authentic politics (i.e. the ‘treasure’ of 
revolutions), Foucault and Agamben emphasise how social realms control and 
regulate individual bodies and collective populations and entail biological notions of 
belonging that rest on racism and exclusion. This has implications for analysing the 
governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers, which similarly involves a 
preoccupation with the lives of South African traders, to the detriment of those of 
foreign national shopkeepers. 
 
4.5.1 Foucault and biopolitics 
In the 1970s Foucault identified a phenomenon, which he termed ‘biopolitics’ and 
defined as ‘power over life’.438 It rests on his observation that in the modern age the 
classical notion of politics has been reversed. He argues that political power - instead 
of comprising a higher and additional activity to the life process - is now centrally 
concerned with managing and controlling the life functions of the human species.439 
In this way Foucault’s account of biopolitics largely mirrors Arendt’s description of the 
social, which similarly entails the entry of private concerns relating to life into the 
political sphere.  
 
According to Foucault political power traditionally lay in a sovereign’s right to decide 
the life or death of his subjects. This came in the form of ‘taking life or letting live’. 
However, he argues that since the 19th century, power has become preoccupied with 
nourishing and ordering life. 440  Foucault describes that political struggles have 
responded to this new system of power by adapting traditional notions of rights. He 
states that:441  
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The "right" to life, to one's body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of 
needs, and beyond all the oppressions or "alienations," the "right" to 
rediscover what one is and all that one can be, this "right" - which the 
classical juridical system was utterly incapable of comprehending was the 
political response to all these new procedures of power which did not derive, 
either, from the traditional right of sovereignty.442 
 
Foucault’s notion of biopolitics (which he also refers to as ‘biopower’) thus focuses 
particularly on the ways in which power is exercised in the modern age. Foucault 
sets out a detailed account of what he means by power. For him power is a 
‘multiplicity of force relations’ that function at various levels. 443  Thus state 
sovereignty, laws and domination, are not given at the outset, but are ‘only the 
terminal forms power takes’.444 Foucault describes that power is omnipresent, not 
because it is unified and consolidated, but because it is localized and constantly 
produced at myriad points. He believes that rather than being an institution or a 
structure, power ‘is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in 
a particular society’.445  
 
Foucault differentiates his concept of power from what he terms the ‘juridical notion 
of power’, which originates in medieval monarchical forms of government.446 Juridical 
power comes in the form of visible legal prohibitions and interdictions. But Foucault 
sees power today as working in masked and subtle ways, and that it is these hidden 
forms that are most effective.447 Foucault offers a simple reason for this, stating that 
‘power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its 
success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms’.448 In his view, 
instead of representing power, juridical discourses cover up and hide the actual 
mechanisms of power.449 He argues that revolutionary movements since the French 
Revolution have made the mistake of assuming that power lies in legal systems and 
the exercise of law. Foucault thus states that: ‘In political thought and analysis, we 
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still have not cut off the head of the king’.450 For Foucault, modern methods of power 
aimed at ordering people’s lives and bodies do not operate through rights, law and 
punishment, but by technique, normalization and control, all of which run within and 
beyond state systems.451  
 
Foucault argues that modern power no longer operates through the traditional right of 
sovereignty, as sovereignty could not contest with the demographic growth and 
industrialization of 18th century – both at the bottom level of detail and at the top 
mass level.452 He states that instead of relying on sovereignty as a modality, power 
modified itself in two ways. On the one hand its apparatuses adjusted to disciplining 
the individual body through surveillance and training. On the other hand, at the mass 
level, power mechanisms adapted to the phenomenon of population through 
engaging in intricate procedures of organization and centralization.453  
 
As a result Foucault believes that modern biopolitics comes in two interconnected 
forms.454 The first form emerged at the end of the seventeenth century and during the 
course of the eighteenth century, and saw power concentrated at the individual level 
on ‘the body as machine’. This involved optimising and controlling individual bodies 
through disciplines such as schools, universities and army barracks. The second 
form of biopolitics emerged during the latter half of the eighteenth century and 
focussed at the mass level on regulating the ‘species body’.455 In this case power 
was addressed to collective populations, and saw the state concern itself with issues 
of public health and demography such as birth rates, life expectancy, migration, and 
the environment in which people lived, which would be studied through 
measurements and statistics.456 Foucault states that ‘The old power of death that 
symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of 
bodies and the calculated management of life’.457 Thus like Arendt he sees the social 
as administrating people’s lives and welfare through expansive bureaucracies. 
Foucault sums up: 
 																																																								
450	Foucault	The	History	of	Sexuality	(355)	at	25	and	88.	
451	Ibid	at	89.	
452	Foucault	Society	Must	Be	Defended	(note	440)	at	249.	
453	Ibid	at	249	to	250.	
454	Ibid	at	242.	Foucault	The	History	of	Sexuality	(note	355)	at	139.		
455	Foucault	The	History	of	Sexuality	(note	355)	at	139.	Foucault	Society	Must	Be	Defended	(note	440)	at	242.	
456	Foucault	Society	Must	Be	Defended	(note	440)	at	243.	
457	Foucault	The	History	of	Sexuality	(note	355)	at	139	to	140.	
	 166	
So we have two series: the body-organism-discipline-institutions series, and 
the population-biological processes-regulatory mechanisms-State. An organic 
institutional set, or the organo-discipline of the institution, if you like, and, on 
the other hand, a biological and Statist set, or bioregulation by the State.458 
 
Foucault concerns himself more with the second form of biopolitics, i.e. that 
biopolitical regulation of bodies as species, as he sees biopolitics as reaching its 
crystallisation when politics concerns itself with the problem of population at the 
mass level – i.e. the species body.459 At this level, the collective economic and 
political effects of population require regulation rather than individual discipline. 
Political interventions evolve from attempting to modify individual bodies, to 
intervening at the level of general phenomena. This entails complex systems of 
centralisation at a state level.460  
 
In Foucault’s view the individual body and species-body are connected by the 
element of the norm, as norms discipline bodies, as well as regularize populations. 
Like Foucault, Arendt also views the social as normalizing its members rather than 
encouraging action and distinction. Foucault believes that through the norm of 
discipline and the norm of regularization, power took control of all life in the 19th 
century, starting from the level of the body and reaching across entire populations.461 
He describes that managing bodies and populations requires ongoing regulation and 
steering. As a result the age of biopolitics has seen the rise of mass bureaucracies 
that rely on norms and regulations rather than the direct use of law and the judicial 
system.462  
 
For Foucault, the political focus on nourishing and ordering life has not seen a 
corresponding reduction in bloodshed and death. He argues that when the life and 
existence of populations is in question, it sees the emergence of wars that entail 
whole scale massacre and slaughter of people under the banner of life.463 In his view 
the Nazi holocaust was illustrative of biopolitical forms of war where heavily 
bureaucratic regimes unleash death upon those seen as threatening the 																																																								
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management of bodies, race and species. He states that the appearance of death on 
a mass scale is caused by the increasing reversal of the sovereign’s right to decide 
life or death, which traditionally entailed taking life or letting live. In the biopolitical 
age this has been replaced with the regulating power to make live or let die. In other 
words the ‘power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death’.464 
 
Foucault emphasises that race is vital to understanding biopolitics and its 
preoccupation with fostering - and annihilating - life. He argues that this is because 
racism is the only way to justify the biopolitical trait of murdering for the sake of 
strengthening life. Racism functions as a means to fragment the human species into 
subspecies, and frames certain ‘subspecies’ of people as biological threats. It 
thereby draws lines between who must live and who must die.465 Foucault believes 
that without racism biopower would be unable to kill, as it would run counter to its 
mission to nurture and grow life. In his view racism does not only run along the lines 
ethnicity or skin colour, but can also include biological or evolutionist thinking towards 
the mentally ill, criminals, class enemies or political adversaries.466 He describes that 
racism adopts the mentality of war in the way it targets certain groups of people – i.e. 
‘in order to live you must destroy your enemies.467 However, when applied on the 
species level, death does not only serve to guarantee safety (as in the case of war), 
but also guarantees the elimination of inferior races and hence makes life in general 
stronger.468 Foucault argues that such killing does not only take the form of murder, 
but also ‘indirect murder’. This can involve ‘exposing someone to death, increasing 
the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, 
rejection, and so on’.469 Foucault believes that this dynamic is evident not only in 
murderous states such as the Nazi Germany, but inscribed in all modern states – 
both socialist and capitalist. For example, he states that like modern capitalist states, 
socialist states also see their essential function as ‘to take control of life, to manage 
it, to compensate for its aleatory nature, to explore and reduce biological accidents 
and possibilities’.470 The governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers in South 
Africa entails a biopolitical exposure of foreign national traders to death through lack 
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of police protection and governance policies that attempt to outlaw their means of 
securing a livelihood. 
 
Like Arendt’s rise of the social, Foucault’s concept of biopolitics rests on the idea that 
politics is today largely concerned with the life process, which was traditionally 
located in the private sphere of the home. This results in the emergence of giant 
bureaucracies tasked with administrating and regulating people’s lives and bodies.  
While Arendt’s theory emphasises how this development erodes and limits the 
prospects of authentic politics, Foucault focuses on how the social deprives people of 
their ability to wield control over their lives and bodies, and becomes murderous 
towards those perceived as a threat to the life of the nation. Unlike Arendt, Foucault 
does not examine the emergence of the social or biopolitics from the perspective of 
actors. Instead he focuses on historical trends and institutional behaviours. 
 
Agamben builds on Foucault’s analysis of biopolitical racism and exclusion - i.e. the 
sovereign right to ‘let die’ – by examining how modern biopolitical racism entails the 
expulsion of unwanted life from the juridical order. The condition of foreign national 
spaza shopkeepers can be said to mirror this condition in that the operation of the 
law is frequently suspended in relation to them. While Agamben also draws on 
Hannah Arendt, he refers more to her thoughts on totalitarianism, than her analysis 
of the social.  
 
4.5.2 Giorgio Agamben, biopolitics and homo sacer 
In the late 1990s Agamben developed an alternative theory of the social. Like Arendt 
and Foucault he argues that modernity is characterised by the entry of life into the 
political realm. He describes that the politicization of bare life ‘constitutes the decisive 
event of modernity and signals a radical transformation of the political-philosophical 
categories of classical thought’.471 In his view the traditional classical exclusion of life 
from the polis has been reversed, and matters relating to reproduction and the 
sustenance of life are no longer confined to the domain of the home.472 
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Agamben begins his analysis by looking to classical Greek political theory where 
natural, simple life (in Greek zoē) was traditionally excluded from political life or bios. 
Yet unlike Arendt and Foucault, he argues that zoē was never completely excluded 
from the political sphere, as political life was constituted through what was excluded 
from it. As a result natural life was implicitly included in Western political systems.473 
Agamben therefore believes that Foucault’s concept of biopolitics needs to be 
improved upon, as:  
 
‘what characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of zoē in the 
polis - which is, in itself, absolutely ancient - nor simply the fact that life as 
such becomes a principal object of the projections and calculations of State 
power’.474 
 
Instead he argues that the rise of the social or biopolitics in modern times emerges 
when simple biological life no longer exists on the fringes of the political realm but 
overlaps with political life so that it is impossible to make out the distinction between 
what is excluded and included, and accordingly what is bios and zoē. Agamben also 
argues that although Arendt and Foucault identified the blurring of the boundaries 
between the spheres of politics and life, they failed consider the phenomenon of 
totalitarianism and the concentration camp in their analyses of the social. He states 
that while Arendt examined totalitarianism, she did not connect it to her later theory 
of the social. In Agamben’s view Arendt and Foucault’s omission to explore these 
phenomena left both of their theories incomplete, as he believes that totalitarianism 
and the camp comprise the starkest examples of biopolitics in our age. 
 
Agamben uses the concept of homo sacer to illustrate his theory. Homo sacer is a 
figure in ancient Roman law who had been expelled from bios or political life in 
society, and only possessed bare life. Because he held no political rights or legal 
protections, one could not be punished for killing him. He was furthermore excluded 
from the divine world so he could not be sacrificed. Homo sacer therefore exists in a 
state of exception to legal rules and orders. Yet this does not mean that he is wholly 
excluded from juridical systems. Agamben states that:  
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The most proper characteristic of the exception is that what is excluded in it is 
not, on account of being excluded, absolutely without relation to the rule. On 
the contrary, what is excluded in the exception maintains itself in relation to 
the rule in the form of the rule’s suspension.475 
 
Agamben describes that homo sacer’s exile into the state of exception was created 
through banishment. In monarchical times banishment and the establishment of the 
state of exception was the prerogative of the sovereign who could decide who was 
included and excluded from society. Agamben argues that the sovereign’s ban of 
homo sacer constituted the political realm, as by exiling homo sacer and reducing 
him to bare life, the sovereign established the boundaries between bios and zoē. He 
states that homo sacer preserves ‘the originary exclusion through which the political 
dimension was first constituted’. 476  Like homo sacer the sovereign was located 
outside of the political sphere and was an exception from natural and divine law. The 
sovereign’s decision to ban was not a once off occurrence, but operated continually. 
To be included in the political realm therefore entailed being subjected to an 
‘unconditional power of death’.477  
 
For Agamben the era of the sovereign monarch and his power to banish homo sacer 
has come to an end. Yet the figure of homo sacer still exists in modern political 
systems in a new way.  In particular he argues that homo sacer is no longer 
banished outside of bios (i.e. political life), but today corresponds with sovereignty 
and is located in the centre of the political realm. This state of affairs has come about 
through the biopolitical vesting of sovereignty in natural life. Agamben believes that 
the vesting of sovereignty in bare life is common to both 20th century totalitarian 
regimes and modern democracies, as both trace their roots to well-intentioned 18th 
century democratic declarations of rights, which replaced traditional monarchies. 
With the introduction of the rights of man, sovereignty no longer lay with divinely 
authorized monarchs, but became spread amongst all subjects in newly created 
nation states on the basis of their birth.  For Agamben birth equates to ‘bare natural 
life’, thus making life the ‘immediate bearer of sovereignty’.478  He argues that instead 
of founding political life or bios through banishing homo sacer, political sovereignty 																																																								
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and the bearing of rights is constituted through repeating the sovereign exception 
and isolating bare life or corpus in each person.479 Agamben argues that biopolitics 
came to the fore at this time, as natural life’s place in the political realm was no 
longer restricted to the sovereign’s exception of homo sacer. Instead each citizen’s 
natural life became the object of politics, as well as the bearer of sovereign rights, 
and the principal role of the state became the care of the ‘body of the people’.480  
 
In Agamben’s view ‘modern democracy does not abolish sacred life but rather 
shatters it and disseminates it into every individual body, making it into what is at 
stake in political conflict’.481 Like Arendt and Foucault, he believes that this political 
preoccupation with life has a disturbing underbelly. In particular he argues along the 
lines of Foucault that when life becomes what is at stake in politics, the state seeks 
to eliminate perceived threats to the biological health of the nation. This results in the 
identification of enemies to the people. For Agamben the weakening of the nation-
birth link since before the First World War has accelerated this desire to purge. As a 
result even individuals born within a nation’s territory can be considered as not 
possessing ‘authentic’ life.482 The rights of man have therefore become progressively 
separated from citizenship.483 
 
Agamben argues that the mechanism used to rid the nation of abnormal bodies is the 
‘camp’. These camps are created through states of emergency and martial law.484 He 
explores the role of the camp in modern western states by looking to the 
concentration camps of totalitarian regimes, which in his view were the most pure 
and absolute biopolitical spaces in history. These camps were not products of the 
law, but rather outcomes of martial law and states of emergency that suspended 
laws. Camps amounted to states of exception, as their inhabitants had been expelled 
from society and political life. Like homo sacer in the state of exception, the bare life 
of the camp inhabitants established the limit for who belonged and who was 
excluded from society.  However, in the camps, the state of exception no longer 
entailed being banished from an ordered location (as in monarchical times), but 
rather being localized in an orderless space. In Agamben’s view camps are not 																																																								
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specimens of a brutal past. They continue to feature on the political scene, 
evidenced by spaces such as Guantanamo Bay, certain city outskirts, and zones 
d'attentes such as the Hotel Arcades in Roissy France, where in 1992 French 
officials detained four Somali refugees and denied them entry to French territory. 
Thus he concludes that the modern nation state is characterized by four elements – 
state, birth, land and camps.485  
 
Agamben believes that it is never clear which individuals or groups fall within and 
outside of the state’s classification of the ‘people’. This is because the term ‘people’ 
is a fractured concept that lacks a unified interpretation. The perception of who 
belongs to the people therefore continually evolves resulting in new camps as well as 
‘new and more lunatic regulative definitions of the inscription of life in the city’.486  
This renders all citizens liable to having their rights suspended and their bare life 
exposed. He states ‘If today there is no longer any one clear figure of the sacred 
man, it is perhaps because we are all virtually homines sacri’.487 He states that the 
camp is no longer a physical location, but the ‘hidden paradigm of the political space 
of modernity’, suggesting that we all are potentially homo sacers living in a state of 
exception with only bare life and little else to protect us from the biological whims of 
the nation. 
 
Agamben’s account of biopolitics draws greatly on Arendt’s earlier deliberations on 
totalitarianism. In The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt explores the failure of human 
rights laws to protect those fleeing totalitarian genocide.  She concludes that in the 
era of nation states, human rights regimes in effect only applied to national citizens. 
Stateless people were reduced to bare life – much like animals – without any legal 
protections. This mirrors Agamben’s concept of homo sacer and the camp inhabitant 
who is banished from political society, and possesses noting but bare life.  Like 
Agamben, Arendt argues that this state of affairs derives from the 18th century 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and its vesting of sovereignty in natural life.  
She states that although man was the original source and goal of laws, when it came 
to matters of government ‘the ‘people’ rather than ‘man’ emerged as sovereign. For 
Arendt, man had therefore ‘hardly appeared as an emancipated, completely isolated 
being who carried his dignity within himself without reference to some larger 																																																								
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encompassing order, when he disappeared again into a member of a people’.488 
Refugees who were not considered one of the ‘people’ therefore came to lack any 
legal rights. Like Agamben, Arendt also compares the modern exclusion of bare life 
by nation states, to ancient and medieval banishment. She states that modern 
exclusion of the stateless from national juridical orders is more extreme than ancient 
and medieval banishment, which was simply intended to compel the surrender of 
accused, and came to an end with the introduction of effective law enforcement 
systems and extradition treaties. 489 
 
Agamben shares Foucault’s concern with how the social and biopolitics delineates 
between normal and authentic citizens and those who comprise a biological threat to 
the nation. For both theorists the problem of life being the centre of politics is that 
belonging becomes framed as a biological question, resulting in certain people being 
stripped of legal protections and excluded from society for not meeting constantly 
evolving biological or racial criteria. Unlike Foucault and Arendt, Agamben does not 
concentrate in detail on the substance of the political realm itself - apart from its 
capacity to exclude and expel. He therefore overlooks what occurs within the political 
sphere when it becomes concerned with matters relating to life. The next section 
compares the theories of Arendt, Foucault and Agamben and assesses their 
relevance to the thesis. 
 
4.6 Theories of the social and their suitability to the thesis 
Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s theories of the social share the same core 
observation that modern age has seen a blurring of the classical Greek distinction 
between the private realm of the household and public political sphere epitomized by 
the Greek polis. Such blurring is likewise evident in the governance of foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers, where the advance of diverse economic interests is a 
central political concern. Arendt focuses largely on the substance of the social realm, 
in particular its administrative nature and its tendency to erode political freedom. 
Foucault also highlights the administrative and bureaucratic qualities of the social 
realm, and their totalizing ability to control and regulate human life. However unlike 
Arendt he pays less attention to how the social impacts on political action and 
republican ideals. Foucault and Agamben also grapple with how the social realm 																																																								
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excludes through its racist and biological criteria for belonging. For Foucault, this 
involves mass murdering for the sake of strengthening life, while Agamben describes 
how biopolitics constitutes the political realm by suspending the rights of those who 
are not considered to authentically belong to the ‘people’.  
 
Given their varied focuses and emphases, it is necessary to assess the suitability of 
Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s respective approaches to the thesis topic, which 
focuses on the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers and what it 
reveals about the nature of politics in a postcolonial and developing world context. 
This entails examining their theories on three levels. The first level relates to the 
reach of their theories, and the comprehensiveness of the themes they cover. The 
second level of assessment concerns their relevance to governance contexts in 
South Africa and other postcolonial and developing states. On a third level it involves 
examining the suitability of the theories for a study of governance as an activity.  
 
In terms of reach, Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s theories cover four broad 
features of the social, namely its substance, how it can be moulded by surrounding 
socio-economic conditions, how it emerges during the course or aftermath of 
emancipatory struggles, and how it excludes from political life. Arendt focuses on the 
first three of these features. She pays close attention to the substance of the social, 
which she describes as being technicist, managerial and bureaucratic. She 
emphasises that the administrative nature of this realm has the effect of constraining 
and even excluding possibilities for authentic political action, and hence the 
realisation of political freedom.  
 
Arendt also analyses how socio-economic conditions shape social realms. Using the 
examples of the American and French revolutions, she explores how contexts of 
economic prosperity can better enable political actors to fend off private concerns 
and establish lasting political institutions. In contrast she believes that the 
predicament of poverty can quickly undermine the attainment of political goals. 
Lastly, Arendt examines social realms against the backdrop of revolutionary 
struggles for political freedom. In doing so she explores how the predicament of 
poverty impacts on emancipatory and revolutionary goals, and sees struggles for 
political freedom culminate in social forms of government instead. 
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Foucault similarly examines the substance of the social – in particular its 
bureaucratic and regulative qualities. However his interest lies less in its impact on 
political freedom and action, and more in how social spheres or ‘biopolitics’ take 
control over people’s lives and bodies. Unlike Arendt, he is also interested in how the 
social realm excludes those considered ‘abnormal’ or ‘degenerate’ and who are 
therefore perceived as posing a biological threat to the nation.490 However, Foucault 
does not explore the social in contexts of revolutionary struggle, or investigate how 
different socio-economic forces shape the ways in which social realms arise. In 
contrast to Arendt and Foucault, Agamben is almost solely preoccupied with the 
excluded – epitomised by homo sacer who is banished from political life and 
possesses nothing but bare life. In other words, he does not analyse the condition of 
those who are included in political life, except that they pose the constant threat of 
loosing their prime position and being rendered homo sacer at any moment.  
 
Thus Arendt, Foucault and Agamben cover different features of the social, while also 
overlapping to a degree. While all the above analyses are relevant to understanding 
the political implications of the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers in 
South Africa, Arendt’s theory of the social carries the most weight in terms of the 
reach of her theory. This is because her account of the substance of the social 
specifically explores how it impacts on the nature of political spheres, especially 
when it comes to political rights and freedoms. In contrast, Foucault concentrates 
more on the social’s impact on populations, i.e. how it disciplines individual bodies 
and takes control over people’s lives. Agamben also tends not to focus on the 
social’s impact on the political sphere, but rather on those whom the social sphere 
excludes. The thesis topic examines what governance reveals about the nature of 
South Africa’s political sphere, as opposed to its effect on population’s lives and how 
it expels perceived biological threats. In other words it looks to excluded groups to 
understand the workings of the political sphere, rather than vice versa. 
 
A second level of analysis relates to the relevance of Arendt, Foucault and 
Agamben’s theories of the social to the governance context in South Africa and other 
postcolonial ‘developing’ states. By ‘developing’ states the thesis refers to countries 
that experience relatively high levels of poverty and do not have wealthy, advanced 																																																								
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developed economies and large middle classes. All three theorists were located in 
western industrialised nations such as the US, Germany, Italy and France when 
developing their accounts of the social and never claimed to comprehensively 
describe phenomena in developing or postcolonial countries. Yet their theories still 
resonate with broader regions and contexts given how issues relating to life have 
encroached into political spheres across the globe. In South Africa for example, the 
governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers illustrates that the political goals 
of diverse parties ranging from community leaders, South Africa spaza shopkeepers, 
and landlords largely focused on their private economic interests rather than more 
general political and public concerns.  
 
Other similar observations regarding the entry of economic concerns into the South 
African political sphere have been made before. For example, in his analysis of the 
2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa, Landau argues that violence was fueled by 
the idea that foreigners threatened popular beliefs in state driven ‘salvation through 
economic transformation’.491 Similarly Steinberg diagnoses the 2008 violence as 
driven by struggles for state patronage.492 In his view to be free in South Africa today 
means nothing more or less than to ‘expect a better life.’493 He states:  
 
[F]reedom is associated with rapid upward mobility, and especially with the 
idea that one can progress from living in the townships, in which black people 
were historically confined by law, to the suburbs, once reserved for whites.494 
 
The entry of economic concerns into the political sphere is also evident in many other 
postcolonial developing states. Chatterjee describes that in postcolonial states in 
Africa and Asia: 
 
Ideas of republican citizenship often accompanied the politics of national 
liberation. But without exception—and this is crucial for our story about 
politics in most of the world—they were overtaken by the developmental state 
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which promised to end poverty and backwardness by adopting appropriate 
policies of economic growth and social reform.495 
 
Fanon similarly notes how in the aftermath of liberation anti-colonial movements 
quickly abandoned their political and democratic goals, choosing to focus on the 
narrow economic task of nationalising economies. 496  The social can therefore 
emerge in a number of different regions and periods. 
 
These observations call for a revisit of Arendt, Agamben and Foucault’s theories in 
new contexts. This involves assessing the degree to which their theories can 
accommodate features of postcolonial and developing countries’ political and 
governance landscapes, which exhibit widespread informality, high levels of poverty 
and inequality, and postcolonial identity and emancipatory politics. Unlike many 
Western industrialised states, many developing countries see bureaucratic 
centralised state governments exist alongside informal political power structures.497 
For example, Chatterjee describes how in post-colonial countries in Africa and Asia 
there exist parallel forms of governance that involve populations and governmental 
agencies engaging in negotiation and rule making over local level issues such as 
security and welfare. 498  He terms this phenomenon ‘political society’, and 
distinguishes it from political systems rooted in modern notions of sovereignty and 
democracy.499 The governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers in South Africa 
similarly illustrates that the South African state competes with a number of wielders 
of political power in the country. In addition to the state, informal governance 
structures such as SANCO branches and informal retailers associations carried out a 
significant role in local level informal rule making and enforcement, as well as 
influencing formal state policies through lobbying, petitioning and holding posts within 
the ruling party. As a result adherence to formal laws in the field sites was not very 
strict.  
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In contrast Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s accounts of the social depict models of 
government where political power is almost completely subsumed under a nation 
state and its mass bureaucracy. Arendt, Foucault and Agamben all view the social or 
biopolitics as manifesting in large formalized and technocratic state governments. 
For example, Arendt depicts the social realm as a sphere of bureaucracy and 
administration that takes its ‘political form in the nation state’. Foucault likewise 
argues that biopolitics in its most crystallised form comprises ‘bioregulation by the 
State’.  This occurs at the end of the 18th century, when life at the mass level comes 
under state control. Agamben views biopolitics as an outcome of the nation state’s 
vesting of sovereignty in the body of each citizen. His theory therefore also 
associates the social with formal state government. In this regard all three theorist’s 
analyses therefore fall short of explaining political conditions in many postcolonial 
developing countries where state authority can be weak and unstable. This leaves 
their theories unexplored in respect of how the social realm would operate in the 
absence of any unified political power.  
 
However, despite this limitation, Arendt and Foucault’s theories do not per se 
exclude the possibility that the social can manifest in political spheres beyond the 
state. Arendt’s concept of political sphere is not specifically located in the realm of 
the nation state. For example, she equates the political realm to any space where 
political action is exercised, and views political power as acting in concert. Thus her 
analysis of the political sphere extends to informal town hall meetings in revolutionary 
America and the assemblies of revolutionary France. Her approach therefore does 
not presuppose that political realms are located in state institutions or that political 
power is necessarily equated to state sovereignty. This in turn enables her theory to 
accommodate the phenomenon of informal political power.  
 
Foucault’s theory also does not constrain political power to the sphere of the state. 
He urges theorists to avoid associating power solely with the monarchic institutions 
and juridical systems and to ‘cut off the head of the king’.500 He defines power as a 
‘multiplicity of force relations’ that operates at various levels.501 Foucault’s analysis 
therefore also accommodates informal mechanisms of power. In contrast, 
Agamben’s theory rests on the assumption that political power is monopolised by a 																																																								
500	Foucault	The	History	of	Sexuality	at	25	and	88.	
501	Ibid	92	and	93.	
	 179	
formal centralised government. He associates sovereignty and political life with the 
nation state and formal citizenship, and does not consider contexts where political 
power does not derive from the state. Agamben’s theory is therefore limited when it 
comes to examining the role of informality in governance and political systems.  
 
Another factor that distinguishes many developing countries from those in the West 
is that they contend with widespread poverty and economic inequality, which weigh 
on governance actors and influence their politics. These economic pressures can 
contribute to threats of civil strife. For example, the 2014 UN Habitat State of the 
African Cities report describes that the protests that sprung up across in North Africa 
in 2010 during the ‘Arab Spring’ resulted ‘not only from lack of political participation, 
but was also embedded in sheer social frustration’.502 It warns that: 
 
… the Arab Spring offers a salutary lesson to governments across the world: 
if the needs, aspirations and grievances of the urban masses are not 
addressed, civic unrest is surely on the horizon.503 
 
This warning was subsequently born true in other African countries such as Burkina 
Faso and Ethiopia, where popular uprisings emerged in 2014 and 2016 respectively, 
largely sparked by economic grievances combined political abuses and lack of state 
responsiveness.504  Similar themes have emerged in South Africa. For example, 
many local residents who participated in attacks on shops, joined in not only because 
of xenophobic sentiment, but also out of frustration with their economic 
circumstances. 505  These urgencies have seen poverty reduction and economic 
growth become a core theme of the political sphere and concerns of governance in 
the public realm in the country. 
 																																																								
502	UN	Habitat	‘State	of	African	Cities	2014:	Re-imagining	sustainable	urban	transitions’	(2014),	available	at	
https://unhabitat.org/wpdm-package/state-of-african-cities-2014-re-imagining-sustainable-urban-transitions/,	
date	accessed	5	March	2017	at	32.	
503	Ibid	at	32.	
504	Herve’	Taoko	and	Adam	Nossiter	‘Mayor’s	Home	Burned	as	Burkina	Faso	Protests	Continue’	New	York	Times,	
27	April	2011,	available	at	http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/africa/28burkina.html,	date	accessed	5	
March	2017.	Aaron	Maasho	‘Ethiopian	protesters	attack	factories	in	Africa's	rising	economic	star’	Reuters,	8	
October	2016,	available	at	http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-unrest-idUSKCN1270MX,	date	accessed	5	
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505	See	chapter	three	‘Unpacking	the	shop	gevaar:	justifications	for	curbing	foreign	national	spaza	shops’.	
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Despite Arendt being based in the West, her theory speaks directly to this issue. In 
particular, she closely examines the role of poverty and destitution on the 
development of social realms in her analysis of the French revolution. She argues 
that the form that social realms take can be swayed by the predicament of poverty or 
what she terms the ‘social question’. This is because when people’s basic needs are 
not met their suffering can result in violent uprisings and popular rage. In France this 
saw the revolution cave to the pressures of poverty and hunger and culminate in a 
one-party dictatorship. In contrast, she argues that the American revolution played 
out in relative economic prosperity, resulting in the revolution being followed by 
limited constitutional government. Unlike Arendt, Foucault and Agamben do not 
cover the impact of economic deprivation on social realms. Their theories do not 
shed light on how the social manifests in contexts where poverty and inequality are 
rife. 
 
Post-colonial political contexts are also often characterised by appeals to identity. 
Many theorists have observed how identity politics plays a central role in the 
governance and politics of many postcolonial states.506 This is illustrated by Fanon’s 
account of the ‘pitfalls of national consciousness’ and Mamdani’s depiction of how 
indigeneity becomes a test for rights in postcolonial periods.507 Chatterjee explains: 
 
In many cases, classificatory criteria used by colonial governmental regimes 
continued into the postcolonial era, shaping the forms of both political 
demands and developmental policy. Thus, caste and religion in India, ethnic 
groups in Southeast Asia, and tribes in Africa remained the dominant criteria 
for identifying communities among the populations as objects of policy. 508 
 
Mbembe similarly argues that postcolonial African discourses are often rooted in the 
idea of ‘autochthony’ that links notions of identity and citizenship to territoriality and 
membership of a common genealogy.509 He believes that type of thinking lends 
																																																								
506	Chatterjee	(note	32).	Fanon	(note	31).	Mamdani	(note	39).	Edwards	W.	Said	‘Yeats	and	decolonialism’	in	Terry	
Eagleton,	Fredric	Jameson,	and	Edward	W.	Said	Nationalism,	colonialism,	and	literature	(1990)	University	of	
Minnesota	Press,	Minneapolis,	MN.		Achille	Mbembe	‘African	Modes	of	Self-Writing’	(2002)	14:1	Public	Culture	
239.	
507	See	chapter	three	‘Unpacking	the	shop	gevaar:	justifications	for	curbing	foreign	national	spaza	shops’.	
508	Chatterjee	(note	32)	at	37.	
509	Mbembe	(note	506)	at	266.	
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towards territorial warfare and exclusion of foreigners, and stifles the development of 
plural citizenship and political rights across the continent.510  
 
The effects of colonialism and apartheid linger on in South Africa today and play 
important role in the country’s politics. South African society is still defined and 
divided along racial and ethnic lines, ranging from the spatial geography of South 
African cities to workplace prejudice and discrimination. Identity politics also 
manifests in xenophobic attitudes towards foreign nationals who are often seen as 
depriving black South African nationals of the economic rewards of liberation.  
 
Postcolonial identity politics is largely absent from Arendt’s theory of the social. In 
this sense her analysis lacks a degree of relevance to the South African political 
context, as it fails to explore how the social interplays with the themes of race, 
citizenship and identity. Although Arendt explores identity politics in her work on 
totalitarianism511 as well as on Jewish identity,512 she does not link these analyses to 
her conception of the social. Her theory of the social thus fails to explore how it 
connects to identity issues, which are key concerns of postcolonial governance and 
politics. Identity politics in relation to the social is better explored by Foucault and 
Agamben, whose theories view the social realm as based on racism and 
xenophobia. Foucault and Agamben pay close attention to how the political 
preoccupation with life, entailed in biopolitics, involves the exclusion and 
marginalisation of those who that are considered abnormal or a biological threat to 
the nation. For Foucault this comes in the form of racism, while Agamben sees it as 
manifesting through the suspension of juridical orders in respect of those who are 
perceived as not belonging to the vaguely defined ‘people’. However on closer 
inspection, Arendt does touch on identity politics in her work on the social in her 
examination of how political leaders appeal to class (as opposed to race or 
citizenship) to engender themselves to their followers and garner legitimacy. These 
themes can likewise apply to postcolonial context where in place of (or addition to) 
sympathising with the poor, leaders rely on claims to advance the economic interests 
of certain national, race or ethnic groups in order to demarcate belonging and find 
ways to legitimise themselves and their regimes. 																																																								
510	Mbembe	(note	506)	at	266.	
511	Arendt	The	Origins	of	Totalitarianism	(note	488).	
512	Hannah	Arendt	The	Jew	as	Pariah:	Jewish	Identity	and	Politics	in	the	Modern	Age	(1978)	Grove	Press	Inc.,	New	
York.	
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The contribution of Arendt’s theory of the social towards understanding postcolonial 
politics lies more in her assessment of how social realms emerge during the course 
of and aftermath of emancipatory struggles. In particular she investigates how calls 
for political freedom evolve into demands for social and economic emancipation and 
how this influences the nature of post-liberation political spheres. This analysis is of 
relevance to the South African and other postcolonial contexts, where many citizens 
and political leaders continue to view their countries as being in the process of 
continued revolution and struggle against the social and economic legacies of 
colonialism. In these countries politics is not only about preserving and sustaining 
freedoms, but also about the promise of advancing a full liberation, which is yet to 
come. This expectation weighs on the shoulders of those who govern, and is often 
also exploited by them.  
 
Postcolonial identity politics is often linked to concepts of emancipation from 
colonisation.513 For example, Fanon observes how struggles against colonialism in 
newly independent states transform into nationalist claims for economic 
emancipation.514 For Said, resistance against imperialism is often conducted in the 
name of nationalism, 515  which while useful, can also be ‘a deeply problematic 
ideological, as well as sociopolitical, enterprise.’ He adopts Fanon’s call for a 
liberation, which ‘involves, in Fanon's words, a transformation of social 
consciousness beyond national consciousness’.516 In South Africa identity politics is 
also closely linked to emancipatory ambitions, as many citizens believe that freedom 
from apartheid and colonialism remains unmet so long as black South Africans 
continue to suffer from poverty and social exclusion. Thus a number of South African 
spaza shopkeepers did not only see foreign national traders as interfering with their 
economic entitlements as citizens, but also with their abilities to enjoy to the fruits of 
liberation from apartheid.517  
 
Arendt laments that many revolutionary struggles for political freedom veer off course 
and become solely preoccupied with economic issues. As a result authentic political 																																																								
513	Chatterjee	(note	32).	Fanon	(note	31).	Said	(note	506).	
514	Fanon	(note	31)	at	148.	
515	Said	(note	506)	at	74.	
516	Ibid	at	83.	
517	See	chapter	three	‘Unpacking	the	shop	gevaar:	justifications	for	curbing	foreign	national	spaza	shops’.	
	 183	
action goes into decline. This is especially the case in contexts of mass poverty, as 
Arendt argues that poverty is more urgent, and carries a greater force than the 
burden of political oppression. She describes this phenomenon as loss of the 
‘treasure’ of revolution. This loss is a central theme in the writings of many 
postcolonial theorists such as Fanon, Mamdani and Chatterjee.518  For example, 
Fanon glorifies the political action entailed in liberatory struggles. He states that: 
 
The nationalist militant… discovers in real action a new form of political 
activity which in no way resembles the old. These politics are the politics of 
leaders and organizers living inside history who take the lead with their brains 
and their muscles in the fight for freedom.519 
 
However, he argues that these emancipatory struggles have so far failed to achieve 
their intended goals in the aftermath of liberation. Fanon blames this largely on the 
nationalist middle classes. He argues that: 
 
… the national middle class does not follow this heroic, positive, fruitful, and 
just path; rather, it disappears with its soul set at peace into the shocking 
ways—shocking because anti-national—of a traditional bourgeoisie, of a 
bourgeoisie which is stupidly, contemptibly, cynically bourgeois.520 
 
Like Arendt and Fanon, Mamdani argues that in the aftermath of liberation, 
emancipatory struggles become preoccupied with accessing economic ‘entitlements’ 
based on race and indigeneity.521  
 
Arendt’s analysis of the social in the context of emancipatory struggles and their 
aftermaths - although based primarily on the French revolution - thus speaks directly 
to many postcolonial situations. Like the French revolutionaries and their followers, 
many political leaders and citizens in postcolonial states conceive of freedom in 
economic more than political terms. In contrast neither Foucault nor Agamben 																																																								
518	Chatterjee	(note	32).	Fanon	(note	31).	Mamdani	(note	39).	
519	Fanon	(note	31)	at	147.	520	Ibid	at	150.	521	Mamdani	(note	39).
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approach the social from the perspective of liberatory politics. Their accounts of the 
social treat political power as operating from an entrenched and static state platform, 
and exerting itself over a largely passive populace. This characterises the 
established social welfare states of Europe, more than the unstable emancipatory 
political projects of many postcolonial states, where full freedom from colonialism is 
often perceived as being unmet, and hence a central goal and beckoning of the 
political sphere. 
 
Thus although based in the West when developing their theories, Arendt, Foucault 
and Agamben’s accounts of the social address many core predicaments found in 
postcolonial and developing world countries. Of the three theorists, Arendt’s theory 
most comprehensively grapples with postcolonial and developing world themes.  In 
particular she explores how poverty and economic inequality destabilise political 
regimes and eventually come to direct social spheres in a dictatorial, as opposed to 
liberal constitutional, political direction. Furthermore, her concept of political action is 
flexible enough to encompass informal political power. She is also keenly interested 
in how the social manifests in the aftermath of emancipatory struggles. Foucault and 
Agamben’s theories relate to postcolonial conditions predominantly in their analyses 
of how the politicisation of life results in racism towards those that physically or 
racially divergent or ‘abnormal’. A similar theme emerges in many postcolonial 
states, where the entry of economic concerns into the political sphere manifests in 
rights and entitlements being linked to one’s race, ethnicity or genetic origin. 
 
Thus despite being located and largely preoccupied with western contexts, Arendt, 
Foucault and Agamben’s theories still speak to many postcolonial developing 
countries such as contemporary South Africa.   To various degrees they address key 
features of political and governance systems in these regions such as informality, 
poverty and economic inequality, and postcolonial identity and emancipatory politics. 
Of the three, Arendt’s theory most comprehensively addresses these features, as her 
concept of the political sphere accommodates informal power, and delves into how 
poverty, compounded by desires for social emancipation, moulds social realms. 
Foucault and Agamben’s contributions lie in their analyses of how the social realm 
excludes those who pose a biological threat to the body of the nation. Similar trends 
are evident in postcolonial states where access to rights and entitlements often rest 
on biological criteria such as race, indigeneity or autochthony.  
	 185	
 
The third level of analysis relates to the suitability of Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s 
theories of the social to a study of governance as an activity.  The thesis defines 
governance as the activity of steering social order by those exercising a degree of 
authority. It thus attempts to examine the political contestations and actions involved 
in generating and influencing social orders. It distinguishes governance from the 
structures and forces, which are contextual factors that surround governance 
actors.522 Arendt’s analysis of power as acting in concert, and her interest in how 
human actors constitute social and political realms, corresponds with the thesis’ 
interest in exploring socio-legal phenomena from the perspective of action. In this 
regard both Foucault and Agamben’s theories are lacking. Neither Foucault nor 
Agamben focus on action or agents in their accounts of the social. For example, 
despite emphasizing the multifarious ways in which power operates Foucault’s 
discussion of power does not specify the role of people and their actions within it. 
This makes it difficult to distinguish the human protagonists in processes of power 
from contextual factors that surround them and shape their motivations, thoughts and 
ability to act.523 Foucault’s vagueness when it comes to analyzing human actors 
within the workings of power, thus limits the applicability of his theory to the thesis, 
which focuses on the human activities in involved in governance. Despite this 
shortcoming, his analysis of the omnipresence and complexity of power, as well as 
the subtle and invisible ways in which it operates, can play an important role in 
understanding the structures and forces that weigh on governance actors.  
 
Agamben focuses on what he terms the ‘sovereign power’ of the monarch and later 
‘state power’ in his analysis of biopolitics. However, he does not define power or 
explain how it operates or is composed. He furthermore does not explore the human 
actions and decisions that support and maintain biopolitical regimes and the 
motivations behind them.  As such his theory is difficult to apply to the thesis’ study of 
governance. For him modern political life is constituted by expulsion, i.e. in 
monarchical times it was established via the sovereign’s ban of homo sacer, and in 
modern times through the isolation of bare life in every person. Thus it is almost 
created by default, rather than any deliberate action.  His omission to understand 
how human agents establish political spheres and wield power limits the applicability 
of his theory to the thesis’s analysis of governance. 																																																								
522	See	chapter	two	‘Methodology’.	
523	Ibid.	
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4.7 Conclusion 
Various state, informal and hybrid organisations and groupings have attempted to 
govern foreign national spaza shopkeepers in South Africa. In the process 
governance actors have had to weigh the political values of equality, inclusivity and 
dignity, against the economic interests of South African nationals. This clash of 
economic interests against political rights and freedoms displays the extent to which 
economic matters relating to the maintenance of life have entered the South African 
political domain. In particular governance actors both supporting and contesting the 
presence of foreign national businesses in the field sites tended to resort to 
economic, as opposed to political reasons for their continued stay or forced 
departure. As such theories of the social and biopolitics – i.e. the blurring of the 
distinction between the public sphere of politics and private sphere of life – are vital 
to exploring the political significance of the governance of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers in South Africa.  
 
Yet Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s theories differ substantially in terms of the 
subject matter that they cover, and their theories were also not specifically intended 
to address political dynamics in postcolonial developing world contexts. This makes it 
necessary to assess how suitable their theories are to the thesis, which relies on a 
case study of what governance reflects about the nature of politics in a postcolonial 
and developing world context. 
 
On closer inspection all three theorists touch on different aspects of the social and 
none can be said to be more comprehensive than the others. However, Arendt’s 
emphasis on the erosion of political freedoms as a consequence of the rise of the 
social speaks to the core inquiry of the thesis regarding the nature of the political 
sphere in South Africa. Arendt’s theory also has the added advantage that it 
examines the rise of the social from the perspective of action.  In this way it does 
more than simply describe the substance of the social, but also explains how it is 
generated and molded by diverse political actors. This makes her theory particularly 
relevant to the thesis, which views governance as an active process. 
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Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s analyses all have some relevance to features of 
governance and politics in postcolonial and developing states. A weakness of all 
three theories is that they all associate the social realm with the domain of the nation 
state and its expanded bureaucracy. In this sense none of them envision how the 
social would manifest in a situation where state authority and control is weak and 
unstable, and formal state governments find themselves having to negotiate and 
share power with diverse informal political structures.  At the same time Arendt and 
Foucault’s theories do not specifically exclude such a scenario, as they both 
conceive of political power very broadly – with Arendt viewing it acting in concert, and 
Foucault understanding power as a ‘multiplicity of force relations’. 
 
Of the three theorists Arendt’s theory most comprehensively deals with postcolonial 
and developing state conditions. This is because her theory explores social realms in 
contexts of poverty and economic insecurity (e.g. in revolutionary France and 
Russia), which are heated issues in in many developing states, having played a role 
in motivating popular protests such as the Arab Spring, and the Burkinabé uprising. 
Arendt’s description of revolutionary struggles and why they tend to generate 
differing forms of social realms is also of importance to governance in postcolonial 
struggles, where formal independence does not spell the end of emancipatory battles 
against colonialism. While Arendt’s theory fails to examine how social realms link to 
issues of race and identity, overall she accounts for several core contextual factors 
that weigh on governance actors in postcolonial developing states such as South 
Africa. 
 
Foucault and Agamben theories of the social deal expansively with the themes of 
racism and identity politics, which are important features of postcolonial politics and 
governance. Yet in other ways their theories fall short of dealing comprehensively 
with critical factors that impact on governance in in the postcolonial and developing 
world. Neither theorist considers how poverty may act as a force on political actors 
and influence biopolitical regimes. While Foucault’s theory of power is flexible 
enough to cover informal governance structures, Agamben’s theory associates 
political power with monarchies or nation states. This makes his theory lack 
application to informal and hybrid governance and political systems and how they 
intersect and interrelate with state institutions. Neither Foucault nor Agamben 
consider how the social operates in contexts of emancipatory politics, which typifies 
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continued postcolonial efforts to free citizens from the economic legacies of colonial 
conquest and oppression. 
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5. The fractured social: The political significance of governance interventions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Governance interventions that are aimed at regulating foreign national spaza shops 
in the South Africa have rarely unfolded as intended, as they frequently collide with 
competing economic interests held by diverse formal and informal actors, groups and 
institutions. In these battles, political and constitutional rights concerns often take a 
back footing. This shows that private economic interests play a central role in the 
South African political sphere (including its formal, informal and hybrid dimensions), 
and hence that South African politics is largely social or biopolitical. 
 
This chapter draws on Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s theories of the social in 
assessing what the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers reveals about 
the nature of South Africa’s political sphere. It finds that the social realm in South 
Africa differs from their accounts in two significant respects. First, Arendt, Foucault 
and Agamben portray the social as being concerned with the goal of sustaining 
human life. Arendt also views the social realm in America as advancing the 
‘American dream’ of consumption and abundance.524  In South Africa the social 
sphere is concerned with a third additional aim, namely to facilitate economic 
mobility. This latter goal is frequently incompatible with the former two. Thus the 
social realm in South Africa comes into conflict with itself. In particular, political 
concerns for economic mobility clash with other social goals of fostering life or 
consumption. This makes finding a path to advance overall economic advancement 
in the country more difficult and contentious. 
 
Second, as discussed in the previous chapter, the social sphere in South Africa is not 
a centralised bureaucratic monolith. It is a splintered and multifaceted system of 
power where no single political entity enjoys full authority. This results in a complex 
configuration and sharing of power between formal state institutions and informal 
grassroots organisations – what the thesis terms the ‘fractured social’. These two 
dynamics – the conflicted social realm, and phenomenon of fractured power – that 
manifest in the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers, comprise two 
central features of South Africa’s contemporary political landscape. These features 																																																								
524	Arendt	On	Revolution	(note	388)	at	139.	
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shape the nature of the country’s constitutional democracy as well as its ability to 
fully address the economic legacies of colonialism and apartheid. Given that many 
other postcolonial and developing states face demands to advance economic 
mobility, and contend with devolved political power, the lessons of the ‘fractured 
social’ realm may well apply further afield. 
 
5.2 The conflicted social realm 
The South African social realm has no clear unified goal. On the one hand it is 
preoccupied with the sustenance or fostering of life as in Arendt’s description of 
revolutionary France, and Foucault and Agamben’s accounts of biopolitics. This is 
illustrated in the state’s role out of social grants, and provision of public housing and 
healthcare. At the same time the social sphere also celebrates conspicuous 
consumption and abundance as in Arendt’s post-revolutionary America, evident in 
the lavish lifestyles of many political leaders such as the state president.525  Lastly, 
the South African social realm is also characterised by an aspirational hope of 
enabling economic and social mobility in the form of economic growth and self-
reliance through access to jobs, education and business opportunities. Mobility has 
continued to elude a number of South Africans whose lives have not sufficiently 
changed since the advent of democracy. Although South Africans are formally 
politically liberated, the country is still characterised by stark economic inequality, 
lagging youth unemployment and persistent poverty.526  
 
As a result, freedom and emancipation are no longer principally associated with 
political rights, as they were at the dawn of democracy.527 Neither are they simply 
equated to having the ability to meet one’s basic bodily needs. Instead they are 
increasingly associated with accessing economic opportunities that can improve 
one’s life circumstances. For example, when explaining the need to uplift South 
Africans through the creation of small businesses, the Minister of Small Business 																																																								
525	The	Public	Protector	of	South	Africa	‘Secure	in	Comfort’	report,	March	2014,	available	at	
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Development, Lindiwe Zulu has repeatedly described the country as experiencing an 
on-going economic liberation struggle. In her view freedom in South Africa will not be 
achieved ‘until all our people – blacks, workers, women, children, youth and people 
with disabilities - have been extricated from the crippling jaws of economic exclusion 
and are empowered to taste the fruits of our liberation’.528  To achieve this her 
department would ‘adopt policies that respond to the economic aspirations of the 
historically oppressed and marginalised… because our struggle for liberation was for 
the economic emancipation and empowerment of our people.’529 This sentiment is 
mirrored in Landau’s view that the 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa was 
driven by aspirations for economic ‘salvation’,530  and Steinberg’s belief that the 
violence was underpinned by notions of freedom that were associated with upward 
mobility and expecting a ‘better life’. 531 
 
South African spaza shopkeepers in the field sites also linked economic mobility and 
opportunity to notions of freedom and liberation from oppression. In particular they 
perceived foreign national spaza shops as limiting their economic freedom: ‘Somalis 
are displaced because of war and now we welcome them and are displaced and 
oppressed’. 532  Another shopkeeper complained about the lack of regulation 
restricting foreign national spaza shops stating: ‘If you say Khayelitsha is not 
regulated you are trying to systematically oppress the black people’.533 This reflects a 
key post-apartheid dilemma – namely that political liberation has not seen the advent 
of significant social transformation in South Africa. In this emancipatory context, the 
social takes on the added goal of economic mobility. It is this issue, and not only 
issue of sustaining physical life, or encouraging endless consumption that 
characterises the South African social sphere.  
 
While foreign national spaza shopkeepers may play a role in advancing South 
African livelihoods, they are not viewed as advancing South African economic 
freedom, which is framed from the emancipatory standpoint of mobility, rather than 																																																								
528	Lindiwe	Zulu,	speech	given	that	at	the	Principal	and	Vice	Chancellor’s	Women’s	Empowerment	gala	dinner,	
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532	South	African	shopkeeper	at	meeting	at	Lingelethu	West	police	station	in	Khayelitsha,	20	March	2012.	
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just basic sustenance. Shops’ economic contributions are thus often overlooked by 
South Africans who are anxious for opportunities to launch themselves out of poverty 
through entering the spaza market – even if this remains simply a pipe dream or 
ambition rather than a reality. Political leaders promising to bring prosperity to 
marginalised and poor black township residents are therefore placed under pressure 
by South African spaza retailers associations.  
 
While sustaining and nourishing the lives of citizens as well as opening up a 
theoretical space of economic mobility are all of vital political importance, the latter 
goal often obfuscates attempts at achieving the former. For example, policies that 
are aimed at preventing asylum seekers from operating small informal grocery 
businesses could inhibit access to low priced basic goods. They could also force 
asylum seekers to compete with poor South Africans in the job market. Yet, at the 
same time spaza shops are perceived as potential avenues for the economic mobility 
of South African and hence their long awaited economic freedom and liberation. This 
is evident in ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe’s explanation of the North 
West’s plan to confiscate foreign national spaza shops by stating that small 
businesses must be ‘incubators’ for South Africans.534 This clash between the goals 
of sustaining and fostering life, enabling consumption, and advancing mobility 
creates a conflicted social sphere, where various parties’ competing interests are 
difficult to neatly unravel and simultaneously advance.  
  
5.3 The fractured social realm 
The governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers illustrates that many political 
structures beyond the state are engaged with private concerns. Understanding this 
‘fractured’ social realm necessitates first of all describing the various formal, informal 
and hybrid organisations and individuals involved in local and national level 
governance. Secondly, it entails analysing how these parties interact, collaborate and 
influence each other. This is achieved by examining the fractured social from the 
perspective of action. 
 
																																																								534	Mantashe	(note	137).	
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5.3.1 The fractured social and its parts 
The governance of foreign national spaza traders shows that the South African social 
realm is not a unified coherent bureaucracy. It exhibits a conglomeration of formal, 
informal and hybrid governance actors ranging from the South African National 
Civics Organisation (SANCO), South African retailers associations, political party 
branches, police, local councillors, NGOs, and national government departments 
such as the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Department of Small 
Business Development. While South Africa’s fragmented political sphere has 
frequently been observed, 535  the thesis goes further to examine how devolved 
political power plays out when economic concerns increasingly enter and dominate 
the realm of politics, and the location of foreign national spaza shopkeepers in this 
process.  
 
Arendt, Foucault, and Agamben’s descriptions of the social focus on how it is 
exemplified in formalised state bureaucracies, rather than how it works in contexts of 
widespread informal political power structures. The South African government largely 
mirrors Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s analyses of the social as bureaucratic and 
managerial, as it operates through formalized channels that administer welfare and 
services to target populations. In particular it reflects Arendt’s description of ‘limited 
constitutional government’, which for her means ‘nothing more or less than 
government limited by law, and the safeguard of civil liberties through constitutional 
guarantees’.536 Arendt describes that limited constitutional government sets out to 
advance and protect each person’s pursuit of private happiness by limiting state 
interference in people’s private affairs.537 Rights to equality, human dignity, privacy 
and property in the South African constitution protect the rights and freedoms of 
inhabitants from invasion or abuse by the state. At the same time the South African 
state sets out to foster and manage life processes through socio-economic 
interventions such as social grants and public healthcare.  
 
For Arendt limited constitutional government is preferable to tyrannies and 
dictatorships, but falls short of revolutionary ambition of not only liberating citizens 																																																								
535	Thiven	Reddy	‘The	“Cabbage	and	the	Goat”:	Xenophobic	Violence	in	South	Africa’	(2012)	44	African	Historical	
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of	exclusion	 in	Alexandra	Township’	 in	 Loren	B.	 Landau	 (ed)	Exorcising	 the	Demons	Within	 (April	2012)	United	
Nations	University	Press,	Tokyo,	New	York,	Paris	at	109.	
536	Arendt	On	Revolution	(note	388)	at	143.	
537	Ibid	at	133.	
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from oppression, but also building ‘a new house where freedom can dwell’.538 This 
involves founding a new political order that guarentees a durable space for engaging 
in public affairs. South African limited constitutional government founded no 
substantial and durable space for the exercise of public freedom. Instead the 
constitution sets out distinctions between municipal, provincial and national powers, 
and leaves citizens with few formal avenues for direct political participation in 
government other than the vote, and sporadic invitations to make presentatioins to or 
consult the state. 
 
Thus limited constitutional government can do little to unseat the basic order of 
society. Since the enactment of the South African constitution in 1996, political 
freedoms such as the rights to equality and dignity have improved, but social and 
economic inequities have persisted and arguably widened.539 While the constitution 
sets out positive socio-economic rights, these rights are largely conditional and 
incremental. For example, when it comes to people’s rights to health care, food, 
water and social security, the state only has an obligation ‘to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of each of these rights’. 540  Socio-economic rights in the 
constitution therefore place little immediate burden on the state or society to 
fundamentally and hastily alter systemic inequalities in South African society. At the 
same time limited constitutional government is also hampered by its bureaucratic 
nature, which tends to entrench established norms and customs, as well as quell the 
spontaneity, creativity and risk taking needed to re-envision and implement 
fundamental change. 
 
However, state and bureaucratic phenomena only make up a section of the South 
African political sphere. The South African political sphere also extends to the 
informal domain of street based residents’ meetings, interest group mobilisations, 
and their contested and conflicting outcomes. Township governance structures 																																																								
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reflect a high degree of informal and hybrid rule-making and enforcement. At times 
these processes are conducted separately and parallel to the state and its 
institutions, while in other instances non-state actors collaborate with state officials 
and leaders in the generation and enforcement of informal rules as well as formal 
laws. This is new territory for understanding the social and biopolitics, as Arendt, 
Foucault and Agamben did not consider how the social manifests in contexts of 
fragmented and hybrid power.  
 
Traits of informal political spheres in South Africa were demonstrated in the township 
field sites in Cape Town. Diverse informal groupings participated in political activity in 
these neighbourhoods. The most dominant organization was the SANCO, which 
represented township civic groups on street, area, ward, and township levels, and 
also had provincial and national representation. Matters that could not be resolved by 
street committees were referred to area committees, which represented numerous 
streets.541 These committees in turn reported to ward committees, which worked 
alongside municipal ward councillors.542  
 
While SANCO and South African retailers associations featured most prominently in 
the local level governance of foreign nationals spaza shopkeepers, other grassroots 
organisations, such as political party branches, church groups, sports teams, and taxi 
associations, were also involved. For example, in Khayelitsha, Reverend Mbekwa of 
the Church of Restoration mediated the township’s trade agreement between foreign 
national and South African spaza shopkeepers in 2008 and chaired subsequent 
meetings between traders. Party politics also played a role in local governance given 
that many South African spaza shopkeepers were also ANC and SANCO members. 
For example, in 2012, ANC township branches in the Western Cape province called 
for the reduction of foreign national spaza shops in townships.543 Reverend Mbekwa 
was also affiliated to the ANC, becoming the leader of the party’s religious wing in 
the Western Cape and leading prayers at the party’s 103rd birthday event in Cape 
Town in 2015.544 Taxi associations were allegedly active in governance efforts in 
Masiphumelele where they reportedly participated in violent mobilisations against 																																																								
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foreign spaza shopkeepers in 2006. Their motivation at the time was that residents 
were shopping locally at foreign national spaza shops and relying less on taxis to 
transport them to more distant supermarkets.545 In other instances taxi associations 
protected foreign national spaza shops – especially those operating in the vicinity of 
taxi ranks.546 Some taxi owners were also landlords of foreign national spaza shops, 
resulting in these shops receiving added protection.547  
 
These formations were not unique to the field sites, but are typical to many townships 
across the country.  SANCO is a national body with a presence in many townships 
across the country. Furthermore other organisations in the field sites such as South 
African retailers associations, political party branches, and taxi associations can be 
found in many localities beyond Cape Town’s townships. Thus the attempts by 
governance actors in the field sites to regulate foreign national spaza shops provide 
a window to understanding the workings of the informal township politics more 
broadly. 
 
Many township grassroots organisations in South Africa trace their roots the political 
structures that emerged during the internal struggle against apartheid – in particular 
those of the United Democratic Front (UDF) that was founded in the 1980s. The UDF 
was established as an umbrella front for diverse anti-apartheid groups within the 
country. 548 At the time the ANC was banned and based in exile, and unable to 
organise openly inside the country. The UDF originally formed in 1983 in protest 
against state plans to reform the apartheid policy of influx control and the introduction 
of a tricameral government consisting of white, Indian and coloured 
representatives.549 Black South Africans would be unrepresented in government, and 
white representatives given disproportionate powers.550 From its beginning, the UDF 
linked direct goals to a larger vision.  For example, UDF leader Frank Chikane urged 																																																								
545 Staff	 reporter	 ‘'We'll	 drive	 out	 Somalis'’	 Mail	 &	 Guardian,	 13	 Oct	 2006,	 available	 at		
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South Africans to protest against influx control and tricameral reform proposals in 
order to bring down apartheid system and ‘put up a government by the people, where 
the people shall govern according to their will’.551  
 
The broad values of the UDF included non-racialism and unity amongst South 
Africans from different backgrounds. Numerous organisations and bodies fell within 
the auspices of the UDF ranging from trade unions, women’s groups, sports clubs, 
religious organisations, and youth groups. 552  Amongst them were groups from 
different income backgrounds, such as the Mowbray Interracial Group based in a 
middle class suburb in Cape Town, and trade unions and township civic groups 
representing low-income South Africans.553 Collaboration between diverse groups 
and affiliates was facilitated by the fact that the UDF did not possess a detailed 
ideology but was rather guided by broad political principles.554 Although affiliates 
tended to organise around immediate and specific goals such as protesting against 
Bantu education or seeking better working conditions for labourers, involvement in 
the UDF saw them tie these efforts to a common broader national struggle of 
opposing apartheid.555 While the UDF exhibited leadership on local, regional and 
national levels, its affiliates were autonomous bodies, not subordinate branches.556 
As a result the front was largely decentralised and non-hierarchical and leaders often 
had limited control over what affiliates did on the ground.557  
 
The UDF developed a strategy of ‘people’s power’, which entailed weakening the 
state through various forms of popular mass action such as strikes, consumer 
boycotts and withholding rent. 558  People’s power also involved the creation of 
‘parallel institutions’ in the form of township street committees.559 Street committees 
oversaw municipal issues such as street cleaning and rubble removal, and also set 																																																								
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up informal ‘people’s courts’ to adjudicate disputes. 560  These courts became 
increasingly violent during the course of the 1980s, with punishments including 
lashings, and ‘necklacing,’ which involved forcing a rubber tire containing kerosene 
around an accused’s chest and setting it alight.561 After the unbanning of the ANC in 
1991, leaders of the UDF disbanded the front, and established SANCO in its place in 
1992 to oversee remaining township civic bodies.562 The intention was that SANCO 
would focus on development and ‘bread and butter’ issues, while ANC branches 
would concern themselves with political matters.563 
 
Many features of the UDF linger on in township political life. For example, the UDF’s 
call for people’s power through the creation of parallel institutions persisted in the 
township field sites where non-state actors and structures continued to wield local 
authority, and many residents’ continued to fear and distrust state institutions, such 
as the SAPS and the formal judicial system. Street committees largely continued to 
operate under the banner of SANCO and oversaw municipal issues and local 
disputes. Local level organisations such as spaza retailers associations, taxi 
associations, political party branches and street committees continued to rely on the 
concept of ‘people’s power’ to disrupt the state and have their demands heard 
through violent protest action. This was evident in frequent service delivery protests, 
strikes and xenophobic riots in the field sites. 
 
Yet, township political structures in the field sites were at the same time significantly 
different from their predecessors that existed under the UDF. Unlike the UDF in the 
1980s, grassroots organisations in the field sites lacked any overall unifying political 
principles. Instead, as interest groups, their priorities were to advance the economic 
and developmental concerns and aspirations of their members. These structures in 
were thus essentially social. In particular they had more in common with the social 
realm that Arendt describes emerged in the aftermath of the French revolution than 
that of the American revolution. This was because member’s private concerns did not 																																																								
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simply enter into local political structures (as occurs in the case of limited 
constitutional government), but instead completely overwhelmed them. Their political 
actions were mainly aimed at furthering their members’ economic welfare for its own 
sake, without any substantial link to broader political and public goals. For example, 
South African retailers associations focused on the business challenges facing their 
members without considering other economic stakeholders such as township 
consumers, landlords or the country’s legal framework. Taxi associations would both 
attack and protect foreign national spaza shops depending on how they impacted on 
their economic interests. 
 
Unlike the UDF, which became an umbrella front for diverse organisations seeking 
political freedom, grassroots interest groups in the field sites operated in silos, with 
little reflection on the broader social and political ramifications of their actions. These 
groups generally no longer mutually collaborated with wider civil society towards a 
shared political vision.  Instead they drew on government and civil society assistance 
to advance the immediate economic interests of their constituencies.  
 
The lack of broader political principle guiding grassroots groups in the field sites 
meant that at times leaders forgot to further the interests of their own stakeholders 
and entered the political fray for their own personal gain. A Philippi resident 
explained that: ‘In Philippi, street committees are there by name… The only reason 
why they are being maintained is that the people involved in the leadership maintain 
their gatekeeper status for any projects coming from the outside’.564 A Khayelitsha 
resident described that SANCO members used their political positions for self-gain 
‘At the end of the day if you are a SANCO member or community leader you do not 
get paid, but you get paid at some way’.565 
 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees (UNHCR) were also involved in the informal governance of foreign 
national spaza shops in the field sites through offering expert advice or mediation 
services. These groups’ goals (such as the advancement of refugee and human 
rights) were often more political than social, but the structure of these organisations 
was more bureaucratic and thus ‘social’ than political in form. For example, NGOs 																																																								
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and the UNHCR were largely top-down and hierarchical. They had no significant and 
effective presence in township political life and governance structures and thus had 
little influence over township governance and rule making. In contrast NGOS 
achieved greater impact through litigation, evident in several court battles, which they 
won in favour of refugees and asylum seekers over the state.566 
 
5.2.3 The governance of foreign national spaza shops from the perspective of 
action 
While it is useful to examine diverse state and non-state structures engaged in 
governance and their goals and motivations, in order to understand the nature of the 
political sphere that they generate, it is necessary to explore how these structures 
work and interrelate in practice. This involves examining how agents within these 
systems strategise, collaborate and respond to varied contexts – i.e. how they act. 
Arendt’s theory is valuable in this regard, as her analysis of the social and how it 
emerges in emancipatory contexts is framed from the perspective of action. By 
focusing on action, Arendt sheds light on the individuals and groups that drive and 
maintain social realms and how they respond to contextual factors such as unstable 
state legitimacy, lingering poverty, and popular rage. 
 
When it came to acting, the diverse political structures and organisations involved in 
the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers faced different types of 
strengths and vulnerabilities. As mentioned, NGOs and the UNHCR had very little 
influence in regard to township politics in the field sites, as they enjoyed no formal 
authority, and had almost no significant presence in townships. NGOs were generally 
not based in townships, but rather in the city centre or in middle class suburbs. They 
operated in a top-down hierarchical way and their leaders and members largely 
came from different demographic groups to township residents. As a result their 
involvement in the governance of foreign spaza shopkeepers was limited to engaging 
as mediators and observers, or instituting litigation. At meetings between foreign 
national and South African spaza shopkeepers in the field sites NGO actors 
witnessed and at times facilitated the establishment of informal agreements that 
amongst other things prohibited new foreign national spaza shops from opening in 
certain neighbourhoods. For example, the NGO Africa Unite mediated a trade 
agreement in Masiphumelele in 2006 and was also involved in attempts to 																																																								566	Somali	Association	of	South	Africa	case	(note	171).	Watchenuka	case	(note	271).	
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renegotiate the Khayelitsha agreement in 2011.567 The UNHCR mediated a trade 
agreement in Gugulethu in 2009 which stipulated that foreign national spaza shops 
could not open new shops in the area, should charge the same prices as South 
African traders, and move their businesses a set distance away form South African 
shops. These outcomes usually went against NGOs’ and the UNHCR’s general 
mandates of advancing human rights, as agreements undermined the rule of law, 
and foreign nationals’ rights to equality, dignity and to work.  
 
Informal discussions with NGO activists during the course of the research shed some 
light on their involvement in local governance arrangements. Some NGO activists 
defended these arrangements as the only way to avoid violence and anarchy against 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers in townships. This revealed their own 
powerlessness in the face of social conflict, as without any institutional authority, 
popular support, or local presence, they had almost no ability to intervene to protect 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers in the township field sites. Instead it was left up 
to state actors and township grassroots organisations to deliberate and decide on 
interventions, and hence to act. Other NGO members stated that they initially 
supported informal trade agreements, as they mistakenly did not realise at the time 
that agreements were unenforceable, unlawful and discriminatory. A few were also 
sympathetic to the cause of South African traders and felt that despite their illegality, 
the informal trade agreements were justifiable compromises. These two latter views 
were largely fed by two common traits amongst NGO activists in Cape Town. First 
was a conscious or subconscious perception of foreign nationals’ as second-class 
citizens. Many NGOs in Cape Town experienced asylum seekers and refugees as 
powerless charity cases and help seekers. This often bred perceptions of asylum 
seekers and refugees as being tenuous guests in the country that were not entitled to 
compete with or inconvenience South Africans. Despite being sympathetic and at 
times even passionate about the plight of asylum seekers and refugees, NGO 
activists often had skewed perceptions of their rights and social status.  
 
A second trait of some NGO activists was a tendency to hold racist stereotypes of 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers. These activists tended to filter their perceptions 
of foreign national spaza shopkeepers through a lens of right-wing racism and 
combined with left-wing ideological stereotypes. The outcome was a casting of 																																																								
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foreign national spaza shopkeepers as foreign capitalists seeking to exploit poor 
South Africans in the name of unbridled wealth. This view was most clearly espoused 
by the Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation in Cape Town, which likened foreign 
national spaza shops to American grocery chain Wallmart, and claimed foreign 
national spaza shops (or ‘investors’) gained an economic advantage through relying 
on ‘cheap, imported labour’.568 Some human rights activists in Cape Town revealed 
similar suspicions of foreign spaza shopkeepers in passing discussions. A refugee 
activist in Cape Town was convinced that most foreign national spaza shops in the 
city were secretly owned by a handful of wealthy Somalis living in Bellville. He was 
also sceptical of a Somali shopkeeper’s claim to have suffered police brutality, 
advising me that the alleged victim was probably lying in order to fraudulently seek 
payment through a civil action. This was despite the fact that the victim – my 
fieldwork assistant – had visible wounds, had been examined by two different 
medical practitioners, and that the police investigation identified several members of 
the SAPS’ tactical response team as likely perpetrators. Another NGO community 
activist disclosed to me that she was alarmed by how Somali shopkeepers 
repeatedly risked their lives for the sake of accumulating wealth. Such prejudices 
likely resulted in some NGO activists sympathising more with South African spaza 
retailers, whom they perceive as victims of wealthy and conspiring foreign national 
capitalists. These biases were largely absent amongst townships residents – 
possibly because they were more closely located to foreign national spaza shops 
and had greater exposure to the economic and living conditions that traders lived 
under. Thus NGOs’ general powerlessness, their distance from township political life, 
as well as prejudices amongst some of their members (subtle or overt) inhibited them 
from substantively influencing the outcome of informal governance arrangements. 
 
The only way that NGOs had a direct impact on governance outcomes was through 
instituting litigation against state transgressions. For example, in 2012 Lawyers for 
Human Rights instituted litigation against several government departments in 
response to ‘Operation Hardstick’ in Limpopo Province,569 which involved police raids 
and closures of hundreds of foreign national spaza shops in the province.  In its 
judgement the Supreme Court of Appeal condemned the state’s actions and affirmed 
asylum seekers and refugees’ right to self-employment. Such achievements were 
attained by NGOs not because they wielded local political power and influence, but 																																																								
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rather because litigation involved harnessing the institutional power of the country’s 
limited constitutional government.  
 
Like NGOs, foreign national community organisations such as the Somali 
Association of South Africa (SASA), and the Somali Retailers Association (SRA) 
enjoyed little popular backing or allegiance in the township field sites. Intimidation, 
murders and continual threats also gave them little space to manoeuvre. A member 
of the Somali Retailers Association explained: 
 
We signed the agreement in Khayelitsha out of pressure from local people.  
Even though it was agreed it came out of pressure from local people. People 
will ask ‘why are Somalis signing these agreements?’ That is probably the 
answer then. You have to say ‘yes yes’ otherwise you know, someone can 
even shoot you.570 
 
Similarly, a Somali community representative described that meetings in Gugulethu 
in 2009 became so threatening that on one occasion Somali delegates secretly 
vacated a meeting without informing the remaining participants. Eventually they 
discontinued attending meetings in Gugulethu altogether due to levels of intimidation 
from South African spaza shopkeepers in attendance.571 
 
Power dynamics were evident not only in the ways in which foreign spaza 
shopkeepers were threatened in meetings, but also in the ways in which they were 
generally addressed and treated by South African spaza shopkeepers and mediators 
alike at meetings that they attended. For example at a meeting between South 
African and foreign national spaza shopkeepers in Khayelitsha in 2012 a South 
African trader argued that ‘Those who are influxing and coming as flies must stop 
their businesses and leave’. In response, a Somali shopkeeper complained about his 
choice of words, stating ‘We can’t refer to Somalis as “flies”.  We do not like that. It 
infringes our human dignity.  We are not flies we are human beings.’ The chairperson 
of the meeting then intervened and defended the statement by explaining that ‘He 
																																																								
570	Telephone	interview,	Somali	Retailers	Association	representative,	2	August	2012	
571	Ibid.	
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was making an example, he was just using the word “flies”’.572 Meetings were also 
not venues of genuine debate and deliberation on a level playing field, as 
discussions took place under duress and were limited to agendas decided in favour 
of South African traders. Furthermore, given the power play involved - few state 
actors, NGOs or Somali shopkeepers were prepared to raise objections.  
 
Not all foreign national spaza shopkeepers entered into agreements out of duress. 
Others supported informal trade agreements out of sympathy towards the plight of 
South African spaza shopkeepers and viewed them as fair and reasonable. 
Irrespective of the law, these traders did not think that foreign spaza shop activities 
should be causing any detriment to their South African competitors.573 For them, 
compromising on certain principles such as the rule of law and constitutional rights 
was worth the hope of peace. Some foreign national spaza shopkeepers were also 
content with agreements, as they enabled them to continue operating their shops, 
and prevented new competition from entering their vicinities.574 
 
In contrast to NGOs and foreign national community organisations, informal 
grassroots organisations in the field sites such as SANCO and South African spaza 
retailers associations were embedded in poor township neighbourhoods. Because 
they were part of local township communities they possessed a better understanding 
of local political dynamics and sentiments. This gave them the capacity to incite and 
mobilise local residents behind their cause. The authority of these informal 
grassroots structures was not rooted in the constitution and formal legislation, but 
rather in the popular support and recognition they received from their local 
constituencies – be they residents or fellow shopkeepers. Unlike the state, 
grassroots organisations could therefore act and drive change through direct forceful 
measures that did not have to go through careful legislative checks and balances. 
For example, residents associations often punished alleged criminals using violent 
methods such as beatings or necklacings, and South African retailers demanded that 
foreign nationals closed their spaza shops or faced having their businesses looted. 
Their lack of accountability to the law and constitution enabled them to take radical, 																																																								
572	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers	at	Lingelethu	West	police	station,	Khayelitsha,	
20	March	2012	
573	Informal	conversations	with	Somali	community	activists.	
574	Many	of	the	Somali	traders	interviewed	were	glad	that	other	Somalis	could	not	open	new	shops	in	
Khayelitsha.	Police	in	Harare	stated	that	the	agreement	only	prevented	new	entrants	–	not	existing	Somali	
traders	-	from	opening	new	shops,	stating	‘if	Abdul	has	been	there	for	a	while	he	can	open	as	many	shops	as	he	
wants’.	Interview,	Harare	sector	managers,	Harare,	Khayelitsha,	7	December	2012.	
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swift and direct action – such as banning new foreign national spaza shops - 
unconstrained by constitutional concerns and bureaucratic processes. 
 
Although informal grassroots structures such as SANCO and South African spaza 
retailers associations could harness the power of the ‘people’ and largely act without 
concern for legal frameworks, they were limited in what they could achieve, as they 
did not possess the means to implement highly effective and widespread change. 
They lacked the economic and bureaucratic capabilities of the state, which oversees 
and operates mass social programmes, and possesses a firm hold over formal law 
enforcement and justice systems. Informal grassroots organisations’ ability to carry 
out action was therefore localised and often haphazard. For example, informal trade 
agreements between foreign national and South African spaza shopkeepers related 
to specific townships and did not extend over entire cities, provinces or the country. 
Enforcement of these agreements was also difficult, as actors were left to resort to 
self-help, which could be risky and give rise to disputes between competing local 
stakeholders such as South African shopkeepers and landlords. 
 
At the same time the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers shows that 
state actors also experienced shortcomings in their capacity to effect change. The 
state – being a form of limited constitutional government – has restricted ability to 
meet the demands of local actors. As already mentioned, the South African 
government is constrained by the constitution, and thus cannot achieve the radical 
and swift economic reform often demanded of it. This was evident in state actors’ 
struggles to implement policies to curtail the ability of asylum seekers and refugees 
to operate businesses, as South African traders’ socio-economic demands came into 
conflict with asylum seekers and refugees’ rights to dignity. While state leaders paid 
much lip service to the need for regulatory and legal interventions, constitutional 
hurdles continuously obstructed their efforts. In contrast to informal grassroots 
organisations, the state could not act through the blunt axe of force unrestrained by 
legal and constitutional concerns.  
 
The inability of limited constitutional government in South Africa to achieve the direct 
change demanded of it by grassroots interest groups causes a further fracture, as 
state institutions clash with the desires of political officials that inhabit them. For 
example, while the laws governing township trade are clear, political leaders 
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engaged in governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers often overlooked 
these laws in their efforts to meet the calls of South African spaza retailers.  
 
The desire amongst many state leaders and officials to appeal to South African 
spaza shopkeepers was further motivated by their weak and uneasy legitimacy. This 
state of affairs was partly a legacy of the UDF and its distrust of state institutions 
(especially the police service). At the same time the unstable authority of South 
African political leaders within the state mirrored the Arendt’s description of the 
dilemma confronting the French revolutionaries, i.e. they could not claim to suffer the 
same economic predicaments as their followers. While South African political leaders 
within the state often professed to advance the economic liberation of the poor and 
marginalised, they did not form part of that social stratum. Instead they tended to 
belong to more affluent economic income brackets than their electorate of black 
township residents on whose support they relied on to remain in power. To maintain 
their legitimacy amongst voters, senior state officials needed to demonstrate that 
they empathised with the concerns of their political party’s constituency – or as 
Arendt puts it in relation to the French revolutionists – that they ‘belonged to the 
people’.575 This situation did not face informal grassroots leaders who shared more or 
less the same social conditions as those they claimed to represent. 
 
One way that government leaders addressed this legitimacy dilemma was through 
emphasising their commitment to the economic emancipation of black South 
Africans. This is different to Arendt’s analysis of revolutionary France, where 
revolutionists sought to found their legitimacy through their joint will to advance the 
economic interests of the poor in general. This distinction is likely because 
oppression and marginalisation in France was more class than race-based. Identity 
politics enhanced the legitimacy of political leaders in South Africa, especially of 
those who belonged to the same racial demographic as their followers. It enabled 
them to stress their shared history of disenfranchisement and oppression, and 
current experience of systemic racial prejudice and exclusion in South Africa. State 
leaders involved in the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers frequently 
made appeals to the need to advance the economic interests of black South Africans 
in particular.576The relationship between political leaders and township residents was 																																																								
575	Arendt	On	Revolution	(note	388)	at	74.	
576	See	chapter	three	‘Unpacking	the	shop	gevaar:	justifications	for	curbing	foreign	national	spaza	shops’.	
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therefore strengthened through fighting for the economic liberation – not the 
necessarily of the poor as a collective - but more specifically of black South Africans. 
As Lindiwe Zulu stated before parliament: ‘The ANC has and always will be about 
emancipation of Africans’.577  
 
Because of their respective shortcomings and weaknesses neither state actors nor 
popular informal groupings in South Africa enjoy full power and authority and cannot 
achieve effective action independently. This situation necessitates state and non-
state actors collaborating and working together to attempt to overcome their 
limitations. The governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers reflects this 
cooperation and reliance between formal and informal actors. Because of the 
absence of legal avenues to implement the demands of South African spaza 
retailers, state representatives condoned or actively endorsed informal governance 
arrangements that did not pass constitutional scrutiny. This was all the more 
necessary given the ‘threat’ or gevaar posed by the people. For example, police 
hosted meetings between foreign national community representatives and South 
African retailers associations where informal trade agreements were entered into that 
barred new foreign national shops. State leaders such as the advisor to the national 
minister of police, Sibongile Mbotwe and Eastern Cape local government and 
traditional affairs MEC Mlibo Qoboshiyane gave these arrangements their blessing, 
with Mbotwe describing the Khayelitsha trade agreement as the ‘beauty of 
Khayelitsha’.578 In Khayelitsha and Kraaifontein police worked with municipal law 
enforcement officials to enforce informal agreements, while in Philippi East they 
assisted South African spaza retailers by conducting audits of foreign nationals 
shops. 579  These hybrid regulatory approaches enabled state actors to by-pass 
legislative limitations and appease South African township retailers by restricting the 
economic activities of foreign nationals. This illustrates how together state actors and 
informal grassroots organisations make up a fractured social sphere whose parts are 
entwined by mutual reliance and the overall purpose to advance the economic 
interests of their stakeholders and electorates. 
 																																																								
577	Lindiwe	Zulu,	speech	given	during	the	course	of	a	no	confidence	vote	of	president	Jacob	Zuma	in	Parliament,	1	
March	2016.	
578	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers	at	Lingelethu	West	police	station	in	
Khayelitsha,	7	March	2016.	
579	Informal	conversations	with	Kraaifontein	police	officials.	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	
shopkeepers	at	Lingelethu	West	police	station	in	Khayelitsha,	20	March	2016.	
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When working together, both state and grassroots bodies find particular means to 
influence each other and steer outcomes in their favour. In particular, grassroots 
actors in the field sites often harnessed the widespread fury of poor and marginalised 
township communities. Threats of xenophobic attacks were a key bargaining tool for 
South African retailers associations who frequently warned of violence should their 
demands not be met. State actors were well aware that poverty and economic 
inequality in the country comprised a tinderbox. They therefore took South African 
traders’ threats to create havoc seriously and acted with caution and attempted to 
appease shopkeepers when threats were made. South African retailers also 
emphasised past and present racial oppression as way of putting pressure on state 
actors.  At a meeting in Khayelitsha in 2012, A South African spaza shopkeeper 
criticised a law enforcement official who had described the township as a ‘free trade 
area’: 
 
I am shocked because if you work for this government, which says Batho 
Phele ‘People First’. Now you want to leave it shows you don’t put people 
first… If you say Khayelitsha is not regulated you are trying to systematically 
oppress the black people.580 
 
While a key way that popular grassroots movements can sway the state is through 
their ability to incite popular anger and let loose violence, the state manipulates 
popular grassroots leaders and their followers through offers of patronage on the one 
hand or through the criminal justice system on the other. This was evident in 
governance strategies and responses to the shop gevaar, where the state responded 
to mobilisations by South African spaza shopkeepers by offering technical and 
financial support to retailers and their representative associations. For example, the 
Gauteng provincial government offered to link spaza shops to distribution channels of 
the national supermarket Pick n’ Pay. Furthermore in 2016 the North West premier 
announced plans to set up wholesalers in partnership with Nafcoc that would be 
backed by state guarantees and sureties worth R200 million. The state could 
temporarily diminish South African retailers’ threats through these offers of 
assistance. However too much reliance by grassroots organisations on state 
assistance could give rise to a conflict of interest, as they become dependent on the 																																																								
580	Meeting	between	South	African	and	Somali	spaza	shopkeepers	at	Lingelethu	West	police	station	in	
Khayelitsha,	20	March	2016.	
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institution they also aim to hold to account. Some residents saw township grassroots 
structures as compromised because of their reliance on the state. A youth in 
Khayelitsha argued that: 
 
There is a need to educate the youth about who they are, where they come 
from, why they are in their situation and how to get out of it...  Street 
committees don’t talk about these things, but only about money.  They are 
connected to political parties and people in power don’t want to talk about 
these things... Street committee leaders have a face, but they are not the 
ones leading the community because they have their bosses.581 
 
Another way that the state can exert control over grassroots organisations is through 
resorting to the formal criminal justice system. Heavy police action is often recruited 
in South Africa in response to popular service delivery protests and strikes. 582 
However, such action rarely occurred when it came to mobilisations against foreign 
national spaza shopkeepers. In some situations state leaders asserted that South 
African spaza traders wishing to use violence against their foreign national 
counterparts would be met with the full force of the law.  But in actuality this seldom 
occurred. For example, in June 2009, a Somali community leader was murdered 
shortly after attending a meeting between Somali and South African spaza 
shopkeepers in Gugulethu. The provincial MEC of community safety Lennit Max 
promised that the police would do all they could to bring the killer to justice.583 
However Somali community leaders stated that police never contacted them to 
discuss to murder and the crime remained unsolved several years later. 
 
The SAPS’s approach to mobilisations and threats by South African traders against 
foreign national spaza shops was also passive. Nowhere in Cape Town were South 
African spaza traders investigated and prosecuted for threatening or attempting to 
close down foreign national businesses. A police officer overseeing negotiations 
between Somali and South African traders in Philippi East stated that police chose 																																																								
581	Interview,	Site	C	Khayelitsha,	5	February	2011.	
582	Mark	Wohlwender	‘South	Africa	four	years	on	from	the	Marikana	mine	massacre	–	in	pictures’	The	Guardian	
16	August	2016,	available	at	https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2016/aug/16/south-africa-four-years-
on-from-the-marikana-miners-massacre-in-pictures,	date	accessed	5	March	2017.	Kwanele	Sosibo	‘Who	was	
Andries	Tatane?’	Mail	&	Guardian,	21	Apr	2011,	available	at	https://mg.co.za/article/2011-04-21-who-was-
andries-tatane,	date	accessed	5	March	2017.	
583	Gugulethu	agreement	(note	128).	
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not to investigate South African traders for threatening foreign shopkeepers and 
attempting to close down shops by force because police wished to be ‘neutral’. 
Western Cape Community Safety MEC Lennit Max similarly advised police at a 
meeting between Somali and South African spaza shopkeepers in Gugulethu in 2009 
to ‘be as neutral as possible in the trade conflict’ between the two groups.584 
Neutrality makes little sense when one side is breaking the law and the other is not.  
But the logic becomes clearer in the context of state actors’ desires to avoid an 
outbreak of broader violence and anarchy and maintain legitimacy. Political leaders 
within the state – while claiming to combat the threat posed by foreign national spaza 
shops, or protect traders - were in fact mainly motivated by their fear of the people. 
The state could not crack down on South African spaza shopkeepers, as they had 
the capacity to unleash widespread public unrest. Not only could such actions 
provide an avenue for residents to express their discontent with the state, but it could 
also put the state in the awkward position of having to protect foreigners against 
attacks by South Africans.  
 
State actors could not afford to be perceived as siding with foreign nationals given 
their appeals to represent and advance the interests of poor black South African. 
Like Arendt’s account of revolutionary France, clamping down on parties engaging in 
attacks on foreign national spaza shops could lead to township communities 
perceiving state and party leaders as going against their professed virtue, resulting in 
state and party leaders being seen as seen as hypocrites. This perception amongst 
the poor could trigger even wider unrest – this time against the perceived hypocrisy 
of the government and the political elite. The state thus had little to gain, and could 
even loose legitimacy by enforcing the rights of foreign nationals against South 
Africans.  Instead of acting against various South African perpetrators of crime, the 
state took visible action against foreign nationals in the aftermath of xenophobic 
attacks. This is evident in the government’s launch of ‘Operation Fiela’ (meaning 
‘sweep’ in Sesotho) shortly after a series of xenophobic attacks in Kwa-Zulu Natal 
and Gauteng in April 2015. 
 
The fractured social, illustrated by the governance of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers, presents an unstable alliance between formal state actors and informal 
grassroots political structures, neither of which possesses outright authority and 																																																								
584	Gugulethu	agreement	(note	128)	at	1.	
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sovereignty in South Africa’s townships. As a result they engage in constant power 
play and alliance building. This process has two key impacts. Firstly, the 
collaboration between state actors and informal interest groups acts aggressively 
against constitutional principles, which in turn undermines political freedom. 
Secondly, it does little to advance the overall economic wellbeing of the public. 
 
When the state attempts to counter its weak authority by claiming to advance the 
economic interests of poor black South Africans, its authority becomes rooted in 
these claims, rather than in constitutional powers and frameworks from which the 
state’s power is theoretically meant to derive. As a result the private interests of 
citizens do not only influence laws (as in the case of limited constitutional 
government), but begin to trump laws and constitutional protections. This causes 
limited constitutional government to become increasingly tyrannical and uprooted 
from the country’s constitutional framework, presenting a new form of social realm.  
 
This re-anchoring of state authority in claims to advance the life of certain categories 
of people, results in constitutional protections failing to protect those groups falling 
outside on the ‘body’ of the people. The state cannot afford to destabilise its already 
weak legitimacy by concerning itself with the lives and interests of outsiders. This 
causes the state to suspend and ‘neutralise’ the law in relation to these groups. For 
example, threats and intimidation by South African traders against foreign national 
spaza shopkeepers in the field sites were not investigated and prosecuted, but 
addressed through mediation processes and clemency for accused. In this way 
foreign spaza shopkeepers reflected Agamben’s homo sacer. They existed outside 
of the national ‘body of the people’ and thus lacked recourse to legal protections, 
which in Agamben’s view are vested on the basis of birth and increasingly and more 
vaguely the notion of ‘authenticity’. 585  In the case of the fractured social, this 
suspension of the law and its protections does not only occur in the formal sphere, 
but the informal as well. Furthermore, unlike Agamben the suspension of the law 
does not occur via special legal mechanisms such as ‘states of emergency’ or martial 
law, but through a shared understanding that state authority rests on its appeals to 
the people and alliances with key stakeholders, more than on legal and constitutional 
precepts. 
 																																																								
585	Agamben	Homo	Sacer	(note	356)	at	132.	
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Furthermore, when the life of certain categories of people becomes what is at stake 
in politics rather than broader principles relating to the public good, those falling 
outside of these categories loose their claims not only to laws, but also to life and 
sustenance. By emphasising the need to uplift and economically emancipate poor 
black South Africans many state leaders fell into the trap identified by Foucault in his 
analysis of biopower. For him, identifying certain race groups whose lives must be 
fostered and supported, necessitates racism, as it entails eliminating racial 
‘subspecies’ that are seen as biological threats to the population. Instead of fostering 
these lives they are disallowed ‘to the point of death’.586 The governance of foreign 
spaza shopkeepers reflects this trend, with the state unwilling to intervene to protect 
the lives and livelihoods of foreign spaza shopkeepers, and policy proposals 
frequently showing indifference to whether or not foreign nationals were exposed to 
destitution. A Supreme Court of Appeals judge even suspected that ‘Operation 
Hardstick’ in Limpopo was intended to leave foreign national spaza shopkeepers in a 
state of indigence, so that they would feel forced to leave the country.587 The judge 
stated: 
 
In the present case, one is left with the uneasy feeling that the stance 
adopted by the authorities in relation to the licensing of spaza shops and 
tuck-shops was in order to induce foreign nationals who were destitute to 
leave our shores.588 
 
The undermining of constitutional rights principles entailed in the fractured social 
eventually diminishes the potential for political engagement and freedom in the 
country. For Arendt political freedom requires a public space of appearance where 
diverse participants can engage in debate and deliberation over matters relating to 
public affairs. This was largely encapsulated by the UDF whose diverse affiliates 
created a platform for people to participate in political action via linking their 
immediate concerns with greater political and public goals. However, without 
adherence to values and principles such as equality, diversity, and dignity, there 
cannot be open and free political platform to deliberate on public affairs. This was 
evident in meetings between South African spaza and foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers, where formal and informal governance actors – more concerned with 																																																								
586	Foucault	The	History	of	Sexuality	(note	355)	at	138.		Foucault	Society	Must	Be	Defended	(note	440)	at	247.	
587	Somali	Association	of	South	Africa	case	(note	171)	at	para	44.	
588	Ibid.	
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political expediency and satisfying the interests of local interest groups - did not view 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers as equal participants possessing human dignity. 
As a result foreign national traders and community leaders were insulted, threatened 
and effectively prevented from airing authentic opinions. Such a state of affairs 
constrains prospects for political freedom, as political spaces tended to shut down 
speech, stifle competing opinions. At the end of the day decisions were reached and 
rules are established not through open discussion and free debate, but rather 
through meeting the demands of the loudest and those who had the capacity and 
inclination to unleash the most violence. Rules and laws become an outcome of 
successful political conquests, rather than a product of considered political processes 
that are aimed at servicing the public good. 
 
The fractured social therefore shows that the political energy and loose unity of the 
UDF was never effectively channelled and leveraged in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Not only does the political focus on fostering life and social mobility lead to the 
murder (direct and indirect) of racial ‘subspecies’ along the lines of Foucault, or their 
expulsion from the body politic, and with it the suspension of legal protections as 
described by Agamben. The devolution of political power and authority illustrated in 
the fractured social realm does not generate greater political participation and 
freedom. The erosion political rights principles such as equality, dignity and 
inclusivity entailed in the fractured social realm instead makes free and open 
engagement in public affairs more difficult and elusive. Therefore while the fractured 
social realm involves grassroots and state bodies collaborating and mutually 
influencing each other, the outcome is not a democratic and progressive politics.  
 
Second, despite the close and overlapping relationships forged between state and 
non-state actors entailed in the fractured social realm, their interactions and alliances 
can do little to address broader systemic inequality and poverty in society, and in 
many ways act against these goals. This is because the dominance of the private 
concerns in the public domain has the effect of depoliticising struggles to their 
detriment. For example, grassroots organisations in the field sites failed to link the 
economic goals of their members to broader political principles or values. This turned 
them into fragmented interest groups bent on advancing the economic mobility 
interests of their members - be they shopkeepers, taxi drivers, local residents - with 
very little concern for wider society. Such a state of affairs worked against advancing 
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the economic interests of the many, as development was seen in a fragmented and 
blinkered way rather than comprehensively and systemically. In this sense the 
fractured social is not only a social realm that lacks overall unity and comprises both 
formal and informal elements. Its non-state components are splintered even further 
into a myriad of informal interest groups that compete with each other in order to best 
advance the private concerns of their members.  
 
Furthermore, over time the state, having limited authority in township 
neighbourhoods distracts itself from the tasks of limited constitutional government – 
i.e. of ensuring measured and gradual change in conformity with constitutional laws - 
and attempts to appease the chaotic and at times violent demands of grassroots 
interest groups, and their threats to unleash the wrath of poor and marginalised 
township residents. It largely abandons its social goals of ensuring the broader 
sustenance of life. Instead the state focuses on short-term measures aimed at 
maintaining political stability and legitimacy in key electoral strongholds through 
satisfying narrow interest group demands. This is evidenced by state actors’ 
approaches to foreign national spaza shops, where instead of devising strategies to 
leverage the economic opportunities posed by foreign national businesses, they 
preoccupied themselves with finding any possible means – legal or manifestly illegal 
and discriminatory - to contain or even rid neighbourhoods of foreign national spaza 
shops. The result is a confused and conflicting economic policy that threatens many 
economic stakeholders, such as township consumers and landlords. 
 
The governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers shows that the fractured 
social realm is thus incapable of comprehending the complexity of South Africa’s 
political and economic landscape. The needs of the public are placed on a second 
footing to the more direct demands of grassroots interest groups. The fractured 
social is thus incapable of navigating and reaching a balance between its conflicting 
social goals of fostering life and aiding economic mobility. This gives rise to stunted 
policies that serve particular interest groups as opposed to achieving broader 
upliftment and transformation of society.  
 
The overlooking of constitutional rights concerns, and with it, the weakening of 
political freedom does not only impact on marginal and vulnerable groups (such as 
foreign nationals, or alleged thieves and delinquents). It furthermore limits the ability 
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of political actors to resolve underlying factors contributing to social discontent. This 
is because the absence of an authentic political space means that there are few 
platforms in the country where groups’ immediate objectives can be debated in light 
of their wider economic or political concerns, and the broader public interest. The 
state cannot host widespread political debate and deliberation between diverse 
groups regarding social and economic transformation and inequities, as it is hefty, 
opaque and bureaucratic institution. Furthermore, the state is not geared towards 
facilitating fundamental change in the country given that the constitution envisages 
slow and incremental socio-economic development in the country that avoids 
interrupting general social orders. NGOs staffed by middle class professionals and 
based in the city centre, tended to have top-down structures and little presence in 
township political life. While the informal sphere offers a potential opening for greater 
political engagement, grassroots interest groups were inward facing and addressed 
mostly the private interests of leaders or the immediate demands of their members, 
without tying tie these concerns to broader shared political rights values such as 
equality, freedom and dignity.. This means that the South African political sphere is 
largely deprived of a space where participants from all walks of life can freely engage 
in genuine discussion, debate and deliberation about the challenges society faces, 
including migration, poverty and economic inequality. The absence of an accessible 
and plural political platform prevents communication between different facets of 
society that could form the basis of a new and more inclusive vision for the country. 
Instead socio-economic stagnation and inequities are left unaddressed, and battles 
are played out using foreign nationals as proxies.  
 
The governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers therefore shows that the 
political sphere in contemporary South Africa cannot deal with major questions of 
economic transformation and development in the country. The state is focussed on 
limited interference in the private domain, the slow delivery of welfare, and 
increasingly with the conflicted economic demands of scattered interest groups – not 
with systemic and radical change.  At the same time people’s collective power grows 
in an uncontrolled way to represent the interests of fragmented groups. The fractured 
social realm – the collaboration between limited constitutional government with 
grassroots private interest groups – that eventuates from this dichotomy is not any 
better, and comes at the cost of broader mobility, the rule of law, political freedom 
and fostering life itself. This is illustrated by the governance of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers, where economic opportunities and prospects for inclusive growth were 
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constricted, laws ignored, and the population’s basic survival was put at risk through 
proposed policies that are aimed at curtailing small retail providers of food and basic 
household items. 
 
The abandonment of political principles entailed in the emergence of the fractured 
social puts all – not just foreigners – at risk. The inability of the fractured social realm 
to grapple with more complex and systemic facets of poverty and inequality results in 
a situation is created where many South Africans – especially those living in low 
income areas - are left seething with resentment and frustration at the slow pace of 
change in the country. Instead of realising economic emancipation in relation to 
distributions of power and wealth, South Africans experience a continuation of the 
economic status quo with no adequate venue to deliberate on finding constructive 
paths forward.  Without substantial transformation of society, the more popular 
frustration and violence is likely to persist and grow in the country. This will give rise 
to increased rage and violence (largely mirroring Arendt’s ‘uprising of the poor’) that 
will continue to weaken the legitimacy and authority of limited constitutional 
government. Political leaders will continue to leverage identity and patronage to 
appease electorates and interest groups, and show increasing less regard to the law, 
whose processes are too slow and inaccessible to respond adequately to popular 
anger and frustration. The outcome could very much mean the failure of limited 
government in South Africa, and with it the democratic ‘miracle’ that came with the 
fall of apartheid. Instead limited constitutional government could follow grassroots 
interest groups and become indifferent to the law, and reliant on popularism and 
unrestrained violence to generate authority. This would see limited constitutional 
government in South Africa decay into a one party dictatorship, much like Arendt’s 
account of post-revolutionary France.  
 
Another possibility is that overall economic decline in South Africa could be such that 
many South Africans will become disillusioned in the self-interested politics of 
grassroots groups and the manoeuvrings of politicians’ identity politics. Instead of 
providing political support based on identity and patronage, South Africans could 
instead inquire into which grassroots structures and political parties effectively deliver 
services and contribute to general economic growth and welfare. In such an event 
limited constitutional government may well be reinvigorated in the country, but 
transformation of South Africa’s unequal society would still prove to be elusive. To 
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build a political space that can cater for the types of participation and principles 
needed to transform South Africa’s economically unequal and divided society, a 
complete renewal and rebuilding of the political sphere would be necessary. Along 
the lines of Arendt, such a sphere would provide a space for debate and deliberation 
about public affairs – including how to link myriad local developmental concerns to 
broader political values such as inclusivity, political freedom, and equality. But the 
impetus for such far-reaching change would likely require a context of severe political 
and economic decline and impasse.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The thesis’ critical evaluation of the governance of foreign spaza shopkeepers shows 
that private household concerns relating to life are firmly lodged within South African 
political sphere. However, this differs from the accounts of Arendt, Foucault and 
Agamben. Firstly, these concerns do not only relate to fostering life and 
consumption, but also meeting emancipatory calls for economic mobility in the form 
of economic growth, jobs and economic self-reliance. Secondly, unlike Arendt, 
Foucault and Agamben’s descriptions of the social, the South African social realm 
manifests not only in the state institutions, but also in informal grassroots 
organisations. This results in political dynamics that are largely overlooked by the 
above three theorists’ accounts. While South Africa’s formal state institutions mirror 
Arendt’s description of limited constitutional government, a myriad of fragmented 
interest groups also exist that seek to advance the particular economic interests of 
their members.  
 
These two components of the South African social sphere – limited constitutional 
government on the one hand and informal grassroots interest groups on the other do 
not present a progressive form of politics. Instead political efforts towards advancing 
the lives of particular population groups gives rise to a desire to expel and exclude 
others. It also sees a constriction of constitutional rights and political freedoms. 
Furthermore these two spheres working together are unable to substantially 
transform South African society, which, despite the advent of democracy, continues 
to be characterised by structural and systemic inequality that runs to a great extent 
along the lines of race. The state, being a mass bureaucracy controlled by elected 
officials, provides little effective space for political deliberation and decision making 
that could address complex systemic challenges. While it cooperates with grassroots 
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organisations, the nature of its interactions is not that of broad and open debate, but 
of focussed stakeholder engagement about the roll out of specific services,  
development projects and patronage opportunities. At the same time township 
grassroots interest groups – be they SANCO, spaza associations, or taxi 
associations - have no unifying purpose, and focus inwardly on the demands of their 
members be they service delivery, business concerns, or job creation.  This inhibits 
their ability to bring about extensive transformation of South African society that 
focuses on the wider public interest and benefit.  As a result socio-economic 
stagnation and inequities are left unaddressed, and battles are played out using 
foreign nationals as proxies. This points to a need for new popular alliances and 
engagement that are unified by broader political values, which seek to advance the 
interests of the public at large.  
 
The fractured social is of relevance to other postcolonial developing countries that 
similarly exhibit social spheres that extend beyond formal bureaucratic governments 
and include numerous local level informal interest groups. When these realms come 
under the sway of the social and are confronted by contexts of widespread poverty 
and popular demands for economic freedom, the outcome can very much see 
political spheres uproot themselves from political principles and public concerns. The 
fractured social may even have growing applicability to traditional western states, 
which are similarly encountering growing nationalism, inequality and weakening state 
establishments. 
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6. Conclusion 
The thesis explores what the governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers 
reveals about the nature of politics in a postcolonial developing world context – 
namely contemporary South Africa. The governance phenomena that the thesis 
critiques includes the formal, informal and hybrid laws and social rules that govern 
foreign national spaza shops, how these laws came into being, the degree to which 
they are implemented, and the contextual structures and forces weighing on 
governance actors.  
 
Given that the thesis is interdisciplinary and relates to legal, social and political 
phenomena and their interrelation, it locates itself in law and society movement, 
which examines law from a social science perspective. The thesis defines 
governance as the ways in which individuals or bodies exercising a degree of 
authority attempt to steer social or public order. By focussing on governance rather 
than ‘law’ enables the thesis to explore laws from a social science perspective. 
Governance is a site of action and political contestation where laws are developed 
and applied. Its processes therefore shed light on the linkages between legal 
phenomena and their social and political settings. Furthermore the term ‘governance’ 
– unlike ‘government’ - incorporates both state and non-state activities. Governance 
is also a useful approach to understanding law and society in contexts of rapid social 
and political change, as it sheds light on the development and evolution of laws, 
policies and social rules over a period of time, as opposed to a static snapshot of 
them. The thesis does not regard governance as a structure or force, but rather as 
the human endeavour of steering social order that shape society by those exercising 
a degree of authority. In other words governance is form of action.  
 
6.1 Justifications for governance practices and their limitations 
The case study involves examining the justifications for governance interventions, 
how they unfolded over time, and their political significance. Governance 
interventions mainly involved curbing the number of foreign national spaza shops, 
rather than supporting businesses or leaving them to be. This was evidenced by 
informal trade agreements that prohibited foreign national spaza shopkeepers from 
establishing new shops in certain townships, as well as police fining operations that 
disproportionately targeted foreign national shops. New draft legislation also 
suggests prohibiting asylum seekers from operating businesses altogether. 
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Governance actors offered several reasons for these strategies. A common reason 
given for the need to limit foreign spaza shops was the perception that these shops 
closed down business opportunities for existing and potential South African spaza 
shopkeepers. Foreign national spaza shops were thus argued to be generally 
harmful to local economies. Furthermore their greater success in the market was 
often attributed to unfair business tactics or cultural traits that South Africans could 
not adopt. Other reasons given for the need to curb foreign national business include 
that they engaged in unlawful activities, the presence of their businesses contributed 
to increased rates of business robbery, and failure to curb their businesses would 
see shopkeepers fall victim to violent attacks. The thesis argues that the above 
reasons for curbing foreign national businesses did not adequately add up and were 
not fully genuine. 
 
For instance, foreign national spaza shopkeepers’ business practices were neither 
‘unfair’ nor difficult for South Africans to imitate. Shopkeepers relied on practices 
such as forming partnerships, and targeting specials and low prices when procuring 
goods. These were not highly complex, but were largely generic and commonplace 
business strategies. Furthermore, a close analysis of local economic conditions 
revealed that foreign national spaza shopkeepers offered many economic 
advantages. They paid substantial rent to landlords, and benefited local consumers, 
suppliers and wholesalers. Thus, although South African spaza traders’ anger over 
new competition is understandable from their perspective, they were only one of 
many different stakeholders and were small in number relative to other stakeholders 
who stood to be negatively affected by efforts to curb or reduced foreign national 
spaza shops. It is therefore not immediately clear why governance actors would 
forward the interests of South African retailers over a number of other stakeholders, 
and go so far as to breach the law on many occasions to meet their demands.  
 
Furthermore, while many foreign national spaza shops operated informally, this does 
not mean that shops and the business practices that they rely on were ‘illegal’ per se. 
Many township zoning schemes permitted the establishment of businesses on 
residential properties. Asylum seekers and refugees also enjoyed the right to operate 
businesses in the country.  While a number of foreign national spaza shopkeepers 
were known amongst police to possess unregistered firearms and illicit cigarettes, 
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these activities did not pose major social threats. For example, South Africans were 
far more likely to use unlawful firearms against foreign nationals than the other way 
around. This, as well as the fact that governance actors showed little concern about 
the lawfulness of South African business activities suggests that illegal behaviour 
was not a key factor driving attempts to curb foreign national businesses. As to the 
third common justification – that foreign spaza shops fell disproportionately victim to 
business robberies and hence contributed towards increasing crime statistics - the 
thesis argues that drastic efforts to curb shop numbers (including unlawful fining 
operations) were not accompanied by similar efforts to clamp down on perpetrators 
of such crimes. This suggests that business robberies affecting shops were not the 
only concern driving police interventions. Lastly, many governance actors claimed 
that informal agreements barring new foreign spaza shops were a necessary means 
to prevent violent and at times deadly attacks on foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers.  However, the state showed little concern when it came to rooting out 
perpetrators of violent crimes such as looters and South African spaza shopkeepers 
who frequently sent intimidating letters to foreign national traders, and threatened 
them directly at numerous meetings in the presence of police, NGOs and other state 
officials. Thus competition, illegality, business robbery and threat of violent attacks, 
do not sufficiently explain governance interventions that are aimed at limiting and 
reducing foreign national spaza shops.  
 
Theorists such as Weber, Bonacich, Fanon, Mamdani have suggested further 
reasons for why foreign national traders or ‘minority middlemen’ are so often viewed 
as a threat to host populations. Weber describes that host populations often despise 
‘pariah’ groups.  He does not give explicit reasons for this, but his account highlights 
pariah people’s distinctive religious traits and social separation from mainstream 
societies. Bonacich argues that middleman minority groups’ economic activities and 
‘solidarity’ draw the ire of settled communities who view them as unassimilable and 
economically extractive and parasitic. Low levels of integration and assimilation 
contributed towards antagonisms towards foreign national spaza shopkeepers’ in the 
field sites, whose general lack of familiarity and close contact with host communities 
allowed stereotypes and fears about them to go unchecked and enabled criminals to 
target tem with impunity. However, the shortcoming of this explanation is that it does 
not focus enough on how broader social and political contexts also feed into shops 
being viewed by various parties as a threat.  
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Fanon and Mamdani focus less on the actions of foreign national traders (be it their 
economic activities or general failure to assimilate), and more on social and political 
contexts to explain hostilities towards them. In particular they both highlight how in 
many postcolonial countries, notions of rights and entitlements that are linked to 
indigeneity result in the targeting of perceived ‘settlers’ and outsiders. This causes 
certain national, ethnic or racial groups to view businesses operated by foreigners 
and other outsider groups as rightfully belonging to them. However, the thesis argues 
that while indigeneity did influence many South Africans to harbour negative 
perceptions about foreign national spaza shopkeepers, it did not explain the urgency 
behind interventions, which frequently involved breaching the law. This was 
especially the case given that most residents did not view the presence of these 
traders as of serious concern of theirs. Views about foreign spaza shops differed 
between residents. However, generally their anxieties and frustrations about shops 
were peripheral, and not urgent priorities. The main protagonists behind attacks on 
foreign nationals businesses and calls to regulate them were a much smaller group, 
namely South African spaza traders who were concerned about economic 
competition.  
 
Yet, on many occasions, South African spaza shopkeepers encountered little 
difficulty in inciting residents against foreign national spaza shops. Such attacks 
demonstrated widespread xenophobic disregard towards foreign national spaza 
traders, but not necessarily acute antagonism. Many participants in mob violence 
were motivated less by discontent towards foreigners, than general frustration with 
life circumstances such as poverty and unemployment. Foreign national traders also 
made easy and expendable targets, given that they fell outside of township social 
and political life and the protections these offered. This, compounded by weak state 
responses to crime, left foreign spaza shopkeepers and their shops largely 
defenseless against public violence and crime in general.  
 
Expressing discontent and frustration through looting and public violence against 
foreign national spaza shops also served to communicate dissatisfaction to political 
leaders and the state. Foreign national spaza shops are symbolic of economic 
mobility in township neighbourhoods. The popular violence against foreign national 
spaza businesses was thus also a call on leadership to accelerate the economic 
mobility of South African township inhabitants. It is this discontent amongst the 
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people, so easily incited by local South African political and business leaders, which 
threatened the state and fed its urge to curb the activities of foreign national spaza 
shops. By clamping down on foreign national spaza shops through governance 
interventions, political leaders demonstrated their commitment to the economic 
cause of township residents. They also appeased South African retailers and 
lessened their desires to incite the popular violence. Targeting foreign spaza shops 
also tacitly attributed township economic woes to the economic activities of foreign 
nationals – rather than the actions (or inactions) of state departments and politicians.  
Thus despite political leaders’ and state bodies’ reasoning and declared intentions 
(be it migration, competition, illegality or crime) the primary threat with which 
governance actors were concerned was that of public disillusionment and anger in 
their failed promises and polices. The thesis therefore maintains that while the 
above-mentioned reasons for curbing foreign national spaza shops influence 
governance actors, they did not comprise the core motivations and drives behind 
governance interventions. Instead the primary ‘gevaar’ or threat that was being 
addressed by governance efforts related to the disillusionment of many people living 
in low-income township neighbourhoods and the ability of South African spaza 
traders to incite their discontent. This put the state and political leaders on a back 
footing. 
 
6.2 Governance in practice: The entry of the economic into the political 
Having analysed various parties’ drives to curtail foreign national spaza shops 
through governance, the thesis goes on to explore how governance interventions 
have played out in practice. It finds that the priorities of governance actors were 
largely economic in nature and often trumped political and constitutional rights 
concerns. While laws generally ran consistent to the constitution, the interests and 
priorities of political actors frequently did not, and their actions therefore often 
breached state laws. For example, senior state officials condoned informal 
agreements that undermined various laws including constitutional rights and 
freedoms and South African traders were prepared to kill for the sake of their 
business interests. Economic concerns were also central to how political issues were 
rationalised amongst ordinary township residents. For example, residents described 
looters as being motivated by the prospect of opportunistically accessing free goods 
as well as raising attention towards their dire economic circumstances. Their 
personal economic interests thus took precedence over the rights and freedoms of 
foreign national spaza shopkeepers, and political rights values in the constitution in 
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general. In addition economic issues were central to the ways in which civic groups 
and residents rationalised the presence of foreign national spaza shops in their 
neighbourhoods, as they tended to emphasise economic benefits such as product 
prices and rent as reasons for shops to remain, more than political values such 
freedom, diversity and equality. 
 
Thus irrespective of whether governance actors supported the barring of new foreign 
national spaza shops, or wished them to remain and grow, their motivations were 
primarily economic. They were rarely if ever linked to broader political principles and 
constitutional rights concerns such as the rights to equality and dignity and the value 
of diversity. This was surprising given that governance efforts entailed discriminating 
against particular demographic groups and overlooked formal laws. Although 
constitutional litigation prevented several formal state attempts at curtailing foreign 
national spaza shops by prohibiting asylum seekers from working or accessing 
business licenses, this was less a reflection of state actors’ commitment to the 
constitution, and more an indication of how the constitution acted as a barrier to state 
actors’ preferred actions and policies. 
 
The governance of foreign national spaza shopkeepers in South Africa therefore 
indicates that the political sphere is largely governed by the private economic 
concerns of citizens, and that political rights principles have to a large degree fallen 
out of favour. This observation is not unique, and has been made by many theorists. 
Arendt, Foucault and Agamben in particular believe that the modern age is 
characterised by a political preoccupation with private matters relating to the 
maintenance of life. Arendt terms this phenomenon ‘the social’, while Agamben and 
Foucault refer to it as ‘biopolitics’. Although they use distinct terms, they essentially 
identify the same phenomena, namely the modern blurring of the ancient Greek 
separation between the public sphere of politics and the private realm of the 
household. The elevation of economic concerns in the South African political sphere, 
entailed in the governance of foreign nationals spaza shopkeepers, reflects this 
trend. It hence indicates that South African political sphere is essentially social, as 
private economic concerns preoccupy a large range of political actors. Theories of 
the social therefore guide the thesis in examining and critiquing the governance of 
foreign national spaza businesses and theorizing its political implications.  
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Although Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s theories share a common concern with 
the politicisation of life in the modern age, their analyses differ significantly. The 
thesis compares their different approaches to the social and assesses their 
relevance and shortcomings in relation to a study of governance in South Africa and 
other postcolonial developing world contexts. In so doing, it examines their analyses 
on three levels, namely their reach (what aspects of the social they cover), their 
relevance to postcolonial developing states such as South Africa, and their suitability 
to a study of governance as a human activity. 
 
When it comes to reach, Arendt, Foucault and Agamben’s theories of the social 
together encompass four broad features, namely they explore the substance of the 
social realm, how social conditions shape it, how it emerges in contexts of 
emancipatory struggles, and the social realm’s tendency to exclude certain groups 
from political life. Arendt’s theory is preoccupied with the first three features of the 
social. It analyses the substance of the social realm by examining its technocratic 
and bureaucratic nature and its impact on political freedom, how its forms can differ 
depending on the economic conditions under which it emerges, and how it emerges 
during the course of or aftermath of revolutionary struggles for political freedom. 
 
Like Arendt, Foucault is interested in the substance of the social, and its bureaucratic 
and regulative qualities. However, he does not examine the social in emancipatory 
contexts or how it’s impacted on by surrounding economic conditions. Instead he is 
more concerned with the social realm’s capacity to exclude those perceived as 
posing a biological threat to the nation, such as people who are considered to be 
‘abnormal’ or ‘degenerate’. 589 Agamben is also preoccupied with those who are 
expelled from political life due to the vesting of citizenship in birth and hence in the 
body of the ‘people’. But Agamben’s theory overlooks the substance of the social 
realm, as it does not explore the condition of those who are included in political life, 
apart from the fact that they face a constant threat of having their rights suspended 
and being relegated to homo sacer. Although all three theorists overlap to a degree, 
Arendt, Foucault and Agamben have different emphases when it comes to their 
theories of the social. Arendt and Foucault explore the substance of the social realm 
– in particular its normalising and bureaucratic nature (and in the case of Arendt, how 
it impacts on authentic political action). Foucault and Agamben share an interest in 																																																								
589	Foucault	Society	Must	Be	Defended	(note	440)	at	255.	
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those who are excluded because they are seen as a biological threat to the body of 
the nation. Of the three theorists, only Arendt examines how emancipatory politics 
come under the influence of the private concerns and are shaped by social 
conditions such as mass poverty. 
 
A second level of analysis assesses the degree to which Arendt, Foucault and 
Agamben’s accounts of the social are relevant to the South African governance 
environment. This is because all three theorists’ work is based on Western contexts 
such as the US, Germany, France and Italy, and none of them make any claim to 
comprehensively describe occurrences in developing or postcolonial countries like 
South Africa. Yet their theories still touch on issues that are relevant to broader 
governance contexts. For example, Arendt’s theory of the social examines the impact 
of poverty and inequality on the emergence of social realms, and explores how the 
social unfolds in contexts of revolutionary struggle. Likewise widespread poverty and 
economic inequality shape governance in many developing countries, and politics in 
many postcolonial countries is often linked to emancipatory goals that are aimed at 
freeing citizens from the economic legacies of former colonial regimes. Furthermore, 
although Arendt’s theory contends that the social realm is epitomised by centralised 
state bureaucracies, her theory of power can also accommodate the informal political 
groupings, which characterise local governance in South Africa, as well in many 
developing countries. What Arendt’s theory of the social lacks in terms of having 
broader application is an investigation of how it relates to the politics of race and 
identity, which is a key dynamic in contemporary South African governance (and an 
increasingly globalising world). In contrast, Foucault and Agamben both view racism 
as ingrained in the fabric of the social realm and explore how it excludes those who 
are seen as a threat to the national body of peoples. They examine how the political 
focus on life results in the marginalisation of people who are considered abnormal or 
a biological threat to the nation.  
 
Foucault also locates politics and power beyond the sphere of formal government. 
His theory can therefore also account for the phenomenon of informality, which 
characterises a large part of South African governance. Agamben does not factor in 
poverty, emancipatory politics or informal locations of power in his framework of 
biopolitics. He assumes all political life is located within the domain of the nation 
state. Those who are outside of the state’s mechanisms have no power - only bare 
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life. Unlike Arendt, neither Foucault nor Agamben explore the social against the 
backdrop of poverty and emancipatory politics. This omission limits the suitability of 
their theories to the South African context, where poverty is a key force impacting on 
the social realm, and where governance actors navigate a chaotic emancipatory 
political project rather than manage stable welfare states. 
 
The third level of analysis examines how appropriate Arendt, Foucault and 
Agamben’s theories are to the thesis’ study of governance.  The thesis understands 
governance as an activity. Yet, of the three theorists only Arendt analyses the social 
realm or biopolitics from the perspective of action, as her theory concentrates on the 
human actors engaged in constituting social and political realms. It thus sheds light 
on different ways in which people usher in and maintain social realms, as opposed to 
just outlining features of the social realm itself. Although Foucault describes the 
complex and numerous ways in which power functions and governs, he does not 
explore workings of power from the perspective of human agents. Instead for 
Foucault, power comprises multiple ‘force relations’, which include human actions 
and contextual factors framing them.590 This makes it difficult to identify the human 
role in generating, maintaining and wielding power, which is a key aspect of 
governance.  
 
Agamben explores the ‘sovereign power’ of the monarch and later ‘state power’ in his 
analysis of biopolitics. However, he does not offer a definition of power, i.e. whether it 
is a result of people acting in concert, or whether it includes the structures, 
institutions and norms influence people on a daily basis. Irrespective, his analysis 
overlooks the human actions that maintain biopolitical regimes. For example, he 
constitutes political life not through the actions of members of a political community, 
but rather as a defacto result of the act of expulsion.  
 
All three theorists’ analyses of the social have advantages and drawbacks in terms of 
their scope, their appropriateness to the South African governance context, and the 
degree to which they assist in analysing the phenomenon of governance as an 
action. While the thesis draws on all three theorists’ work, it relies most heavily on 
Arendt’s analysis of the social, which on the whole has greater application to the 																																																								
590	Foucault	The	History	of	Sexuality	(note	355)	at	92	and	93.	
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thesis. The weakness of her approach for the purposes of the thesis is that she does 
not consider the role of identity and race in her conception of the social. Her account 
therefore lacks a degree of insight into a core theme in South African and 
postcolonial politics and governance – something that Foucault and Agamben hone 
in on. But on other grounds her analysis offers comprehensive foundations for a 
critical examination of the governance of foreign migrant spaza businesses through 
the philosophical lens of the social.  
 
6.3 The fractured social and its implications for South Africa’s political and 
economic agenda 
The thesis then investigates what the governance of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers reveals about the nature of the South African political sphere. It argues 
that the country’s political sphere is essentially social given the vital role that 
economic interests play in it. However, the South African social sphere is 
characterised by two significant features that differ from Arendt, Foucault and 
Agamben. First is that the South African social realm is in conflict with itself. It 
aspires to maintain and sustain the lives of the people and meet their basic physical 
necessities, for example through offering social welfare grants. It also celebrates 
material abundance and consumption. At the same time it seeks to advance the 
economic mobility of South African nationals though opening up business and job 
opportunities. This is an important goal, as mobility has continued to elude many 
South African township residents whose basic living conditions have changed little 
since the advent of democracy. As a result liberation in the country is seen as merely 
partial, with full emancipation only being realised once formerly oppressed black 
South Africans can escape poverty and economic marginalisation. 
 
However these differing social goals come into conflict with each other when tackling 
the issue of foreign national spaza shops. On the one hand spaza shops provide 
reasonably priced basic goods to low income consumers on flexible terms and in 
close proximity to where they live. They therefore enable people to engage in 
consumption and meet their basic physical needs. At the same time they cause 
agitation amongst sectors of society, as they are seen as taking up economic 
opportunities that ‘belong’ to South Africans. Thus the social realm is governed by 
differing and irreconcilable goals, and attempts to advance the latter goal often result 
in threatening or undermining the former one.  
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Secondly, not only are the goals of the social realm in conflict with each other, but 
the social realm itself is fractured and dispersed between manifold formal and 
informal locations of power. This situation reflects a very different type of social 
sphere to that described by Arendt, Foucault and Agamben, who associate the 
sphere with the realm of the nation state and its characteristics of centralisation and 
bureaucratisation. In contrast the South African ‘fractured’ social realm is spread 
across state as well as informal grassroots structures, giving it a different form and 
nature. The thesis puts forward the argument that these two dynamics – a conflicted 
social realm, and phenomenon of fractured power – are core features of the South 
Africa’s contemporary political landscape. 
 
The thesis examines the conflicted and fractured social realm by setting out the 
various actors and participators in governance, and how these parties interact and 
attempt to influence each other and sway governance interventions in their favour. It 
argues that South African state’s centralised and managerial features largely mirror 
more conventional notions of the social realm described by Arendt, Foucault and 
Agamben. In particular it closely reflects Arendt’s description of ‘limited constitutional 
government’, which sets out to protect peoples’ private liberties from state intrusion, 
while also advancing the basic economic interests of citizens. The South African 
constitution, which binds the state, similarly provides political protections and 
conditional socio-economic rights. However, its limited nature also means that the 
state encounters barriers in taking radical transformative actions. 
 
Yet the state is not the only locus of political power in contemporary South Africa. 
The political sphere is also typified by informal grassroots power structures that, like 
the state, are essentially social. These organisations (such as SANCO, political party 
branches, church groups, and business sector associations) reflect features and 
methods of the internal anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s that organised under 
the banner of the United Democratic Front (UDF). This includes using similar tactics 
and mechanisms to those of the UDF’s strategy of ‘people’s power’, which entailed 
weakening the state through popular mass action and the setting up of parallel 
institutions. 
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However, unlike the UDF, township grassroots organisations lack any shared political 
goals. Instead they largely consist of separate interest groups each aiming to 
advance the economic and developmental concerns and aspirations of their 
members. In this sense they are also essentially social. However, unlike limited 
constitutional government, which attempts to balance private and political concerns 
through constitutional checks and balances, township grassroots structures are 
almost wholly preoccupied with the private interests of their members. The authority 
of these informal grassroots structures (where such exist) is not rooted in the 
constitution and formal legislation, but instead through the support they receive from 
their constituencies. This means that they can take forceful and direct measures 
without concern for formal laws and the country’s constitutional framework. At the 
same time they lack the financial and institutional capacity of the state. Their impacts 
thus tend to be localised and haphazard. For example, informal trade agreements 
between foreign national and South African spaza shopkeepers were limited to 
specific townships and were inconsistently enforced. While these groups 
collaborated with government and civil society, this was done for the benefit of their 
members or the personal interests of leaders rather than out of concern for a 
common world. Because they lacked broader political aspirations, they operated in 
silos, with little concern for the wider effects of their actions. NGOs, the UNHCR, and 
migrant community organisations also participated in governance, but possessed 
very little power to shape governance outcomes. Meetings were thus largely a test 
between the wills of state actors and informal township interest groups.  
 
At the same time both the state, and informal grassroots groups encounter hurdles in 
achieving change. As mentioned, the state – being a form of limited constitutional 
government – is restrained by the law and the constitution. It therefore cannot 
implement the radical reforms demanded of it, in this case the immediate closure of 
foreign national spaza shops. Its protections of individual rights meant that it could 
not utilise unrestrained force in achieving its goals. This was evident in constitutional 
court cases, which struck down the state’s attempts to curtail asylum seekers’ ability 
to work and close down their businesses. It was also apparent in the state’s inability 
thus to pass legislative reforms to limit foreign nationals from operating spaza shops 
in the country.  
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The constitutional limitations on the state cause internal conflict between the state’s 
institutions, and political actors who inhabit them and wish to appeal to their electoral 
constituencies. State actors thus engage in informal governance in the absence of 
being able to legislate new policies or adapt existing ones. 
 
As a result of their respective shortcomings and limitations neither state actors nor 
popular informal groupings enjoy full power and authority in South Africa’s townships. 
They respond to this dilemma by collaborating and working together to attempt to 
overcome their limitations. The governance of foreign spaza shopkeepers reflected 
this cooperation in its hybrid regulatory approaches, which included state actors 
working with civic structures and informal retailers associations to establish local 
informal rules governing the spaza market. These arrangements enabled political 
leaders within the state to by-pass legislative limitations and demonstrate their 
commitment South African township retailers over their foreign competitors – and 
thus their symbolic prioritisation of South African nationals in general. The state’s 
involvement in grassroots governance also legitimised and strengthened informal 
grassroots organisation influence in their localities, especially through promises of 
financial aid and technical assistance.  Together state actors and informal grassroots 
organisations made up a fractured social realm whose components were interwoven 
through mutual reliance and aimed at appealing to the economic interests of their 
constituencies.  
 
When collaborating, these two spheres – the formal state and informal grassroots 
groups – find means to influence each other. The state does so through patronage 
and recourse to its security and justice arms, while informal grassroots structures rely 
on their capacity to incite local frustrations – including that of unleashing xenophobic 
violence. Yet, in the field sites the state rarely acted on its own threats to reign in 
criminal action against foreign national spaza shopkeepers through reliance on 
formal police and justice mechanisms. This was because such action would put the 
state in an uncomfortable position of potentially having to protect foreigners from 
being attacked by South Africans. Thus the state failed to apply the law, and let 
looters off the hook, and their inciters entered mediation and conflict resolution 
processes rather than being subject to police investigations and prosecutions.  
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However this system of devolved political power is neither progressive nor 
transformative. While devolutions of power have the potential to advance progressive 
forms of politics by encouraging greater participation in public affairs and buffering 
against the bureaucratic rule by ‘nobody’,591 the governance of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers shows the contrary. This is because when the political sphere seeks to 
serve the bare economic interest of certain national or racial groups, those falling 
outside of these categories become expendable.  The governance of foreign national 
spaza shopkeepers mirrors Foucault’s theory of the social by illustrating how the 
lives of those not belonging to the body of the people become disposable. Instead of 
tracing and prosecuting perpetrators of violent crimes affecting them, governance 
actors attempted to address crime by clamping down on victims. For example, 
agreements prevented foreign nationals from opening new spaza shops in many 
townships, police engaged in fining operations against them, and sought to prevent 
asylum seekers from accessing business licenses. Much like Agamben’s 
observation, governance actors largely suspended the application of laws in relation 
to traders who fell outside of formal and informal body politics. These were often 
replaced with social rules regulating foreign national spaza shops that were 
completely out of sink with legal and constitutional frameworks. This is most clearly 
illustrated by the North West Premier’s call to confiscate all foreign national operated 
spaza shops in his province – despite asylum seekers and refugees possessing the 
right to operate businesses in the country. 
 
Furthermore, many of the rights in the constitution are corner stones for political 
freedom in the country. When political actors rest their claims on economic interests 
rather than deriving them from principles such as dignity, equality and inclusiveness 
then political freedom becomes undermined. For example, South African spaza 
shopkeepers failed to recognise foreign nationals as equal human beings, thus 
curtailing their ability to engage freely in political debate and decision-making. 
Instead mediators and South African spaza shopkeepers shut down attempts by 
foreign national spaza traders to voice independent opinions and meetings were 
littered with insults and personal threats on participants’ lives. The outcomes of these 
engagements were not mutually debated and negotiated agreements that aimed to 
further the public good, but rather unequal arrangements that were entered into 
under duress.  
																																																								
591	Arendt	The	Human	Condition	(note	33)	at	40.	
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The underpinning of the political sphere with economic concerns stifles political 
freedom in other ways. For example, many community leaders saw their role as 
largely economic, and leveraged their position of authority to threaten and extort 
bribes from foreign national community representatives. At the same time state 
officials neutralised township activism through financial and technical support and 
dependency, which was distributed through political channels. Thus, as Arendt 
emphasises, the political sphere of public freedom becomes threatened when politics 
centres on issues relating to the private domain of the home.  
 
The collaboration between the state and grassroots informal structures also realises 
few benefits to low-income residents, and has done little to address broader systemic 
inequality and poverty in society. Grassroots organisations, having largely 
abandoned their political goals, have become isolated interest groups advancing the 
economic concerns of their members with little thought for the wider impacts of their 
demands. When working together, the situation is further aggravated, as grassroots 
interest groups become increasingly incorporated within state patronage networks. 
Furthermore, political leaders within the state increasingly ignore the limits of the 
country’s constitutional framework as well as their basic task of advancing citizens’ 
socio-economic wellbeing in an incremental and measured way in order to meet the 
isolated demands of grassroots interest groups. This is made more complicated by 
the fact that South Africa experiences a conflicted social realm where emancipatory 
calls for economic mobility come into conflict with the basic needs of the people.  
 
Ultimately the fractured social realm is unable to provide a political venue to 
deliberate on progressive and widespread socio-economic transformation and justice 
in society. The state’s bureaucratic and complicated administrative processes mean 
that there is no platform for citizens to participate in direct political action in 
partnership with the state. Instead state consultative processes are sporadic, and 
recommendations need not be taken up. Likewise the political values and strategies 
of the UDF did not persist into the post apartheid era. What remains in South African 
townships are informal grassroots organisations which are largely interest groups 
that demand agreement (often on threat of force) rather than debate and free 
exchange of opinions. The NGOs based in more affluent neighbourhoods and city 
centres are largely top-down, enjoy little popular following, and engage the public 
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largely through press releases or once off seminars, rather than regular discussion 
and debate between equals. There is thus almost no established political realm in 
post apartheid South Africa where actors from all walks of life can freely engage in 
genuine discussion, debate and deliberation about the common challenges society 
faces. 
 
The end consequence is that the transformation of South Africa’s unequal society is 
left unaddressed and low-income township residents become increasingly frustrated. 
The resulting battles between disgruntled citizens and the state are played out 
against foreign national spaza shopkeepers, who fall outside of the body politic and 
its legal protections.  Thus the shop gevaar sees foreign national spaza shops 
become set up by South African traders as proxy targets for both popular anger 
against the state, and state attempts to apportion fault elsewhere and demonstrate 
its allegiance to the ‘people’. The thesis thus argues that the governance of foreign 
national spaza shops illustrates that the South African political sphere is not geared 
towards meaningful economic and social transformation promised at the advent of 
democracy. The collaboration between state and non-state actors does little to 
address each sphere’s deficiencies. To the contrary their cooperation weakens both 
their abilities to address the needs of poor marginalised township residents and 
erodes the political gains of the liberation struggle.  
 
6.4 Concluding thoughts 
The thesis’ critical assessment of the governance of foreign national spaza 
shopkeepers demonstrates that the generation of laws and normative orders - 
through governance – is a valuable means to understand the broader society that we 
live in and the nature of its politics. It shows how the political sphere has become 
swayed by economic concerns, which in turn shapes the nature of laws and social 
rules and their manner of enforcement. When a state with weak authority and 
claiming to advance the economic interests of citizens comes up against pressing 
social discontent and calls for economic emancipation, it sees the private concerns of 
nationals come to dominate the political realm altogether. Governance actors within 
the state scramble to show commitment and allegiance to their constituencies, with 
the result that laws and social rules come to separate from constitutional boundaries, 
and are decided on the basis of group membership and private interest. The centring 
of politics on the fragmented private interests thereby has the effect of undermining 
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constitutional rights and political freedoms. This results in marginal groups falling 
outside the protections of the law and their lives exposed to death. It also weakens 
the ability of political actors to address systemic and underlying causes of socio-
economic grievances.  
 
The fractured social thus raises many questions about popular notions of 
constitutional democracy and grassroots engagement. It highlights that when 
devolved power hinges on isolated economic interests it can undermine political 
freedom and participation. Goals are achieved not through persuasion, but through 
threats, violence and even death, largely meted out against society’s most 
vulnerable. At the same time laws evaporate due to ambiguous and contested state 
authority, and become replaced by informal ad hoc degrees and social rules born 
from political expediency. These themes are pertinent to other regions that have 
likewise witnessed the ‘rise of the social’ in contexts of poverty, informality and 
emancipatory politics.  
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Annexure 1:  Research protocols for initial research culminating in report titled 
‘Elusive Justice: Somali traders’ access to formal and informal justice 
mechanisms in the Western Cape’ (Vanya Gastrow with Roni Amit (2016) 
African Centre for Migration & Society) 
 
A) Question to Somali shopkeepers 
1. When did you open your shop and where? 
2. Incidents of crime affecting your business 
3. Police responses to crime/crimes 
4. Community responses 
5. Are you affected by shop searches and fining? 
6. Any informal agreements regulating business? 
7. When did crime first start to increase and why? 
8. When did major influx of Somalis to Cape Town occur and why? 
9. Why do Somalis move around between different towns and city in South 
Africa? 
 
B) Questions to residents 
1. Describe local community structures. How do they work? 
2. What do you think of Somali shopkeepers opening shops?  
3. Do Somali shopkeepers need permission from street committees to open 
shops.  Do some open without permission?  What happens to such shops? 
4. Are Somali shopkeepers integrating? Do they attend community meetings?  
Do other foreigners attend community meetings?  
5. Are community structures important to keeping law and order in townships? 
How? 
6. Do street committees investigate attacks on foreign shops?  Why or why not? 
7. Do you think foreign shopkeepers are here legally or illegally? Why? 
8. Are shops ever looted during service delivery protests? If so why and how 
does it begin? What is the response of the police?  
9. What do you think the solution is? 
 
 
C) Questions to police: 
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1. For example any robberies, hijacking, crimes organized by SA traders, crimes 
organized by Somali traders? 
2.  Who are the alleged culprits of attacks? 
3.  When did patterns of crimes against Somali shopkeepers first begin to 
become noticeable in the area? 
4. When did Somali traders first begin opening businesses? 
5. When did robberies of Somali shops first start becoming noticeable? 
6. When did orchestrated crimes carried out by competing SA traders start 
becoming noticeable. Has such crime subsided?  
7. Do police experience any particular difficulty investigating crime committed 
against Somali shops, if so what types of difficulties?  
8. What kind of factors strengthen investigations into shop attacks? 
 
D) Questions to prosecutors: 
1. Is business robbery the same as robbery at non-residential premises? 
2. Have you ever been involved in cases regarding crime committed 
against Somali traders? 
3. What types of crimes were committed against the Somali traders in the 
cases you were involved in? 
4. Who were usually the accused in such cases and what were their 
motivations? 
5. When did you first come across Somali shopkeeper cases? 
6. Have you come across cases where Somali complainants have 
accused other Somali traders of crime?  - What was the nature of the 
dispute leading to such crime? 
7. What are the main difficulties experienced prosecuting crimes affecting 
Somali traders? 
8. Have you ever prosecuted crime committed against South African 
traders or residents in your area?  If so, did you tend to experience the 
same types of difficulties? 
9. Have you secured any convictions in respect of crime committed 
against Somali traders?  What were the key factors that led to the 
success of the case? 
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10. Do you think that some statements may have been written without the 
assistance of a translator? 
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Annexure 2: Focus group protocol for report titled ‘Somalinomics: A case 
study on the economic dimensions of Somali informal trade in the Western 
Cape’ (Vanya Gastrow with Roni Amit (2016) African Centre for Migration & 
Society) 
. 
 
How do businesses work?  
1. Location of shops: How do you choose where to open businesses? Why in 
townships? Is there a difference between black and coloured townships? Is 
there higher supermarket competition in coloured townships? 
2. Do you place low or higher mark-ups on goods?  Why? 
3. Why rent shops from landlords? 
4. Supply practices: collective buying?  Sharing transport? Bulk buying? 
5. Employment and housing practices: Are spaza shop employees relatives or 
of the same clan? Are they newcomers to SA? Do some shops employ SA 
shop assistants? 
6. How do Somalis raise investment into shops? 
7. Do you operate shops alone or in partnership? Why use multiple 
shareholding as a means of shop ownership? 
8. What offerings and services do you provide to draw customers – e.g. credit 
for pensioners 
 
Contribution to the economy - discuss: 
1. Rent to landlords 
2. Small-scale suppliers and manufacturers 
3. The wholesale market 
4. South African employees (e.g. cleaners) working in Somali shops 
5. South Africans working for Somalis in Bellville 
6. Consumers 
7. Somali traders 
 
 
